(SBU) PM MOVES TO NIP SECTARIANISM IN THE BUD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001346

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2014
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KISL SOCI KU
SUBJECT: (SBU) PM MOVES TO NIP SECTARIANISM IN THE BUD

Classified By: CDA JOHN MORAN; REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: The liberation of Iraq,s Shiite majority
has increased the assertiveness of Kuwaiti Shiites (about
one-third of Kuwaitis),who were already making progress
against institutionalized discrimination. They now have
their own family-law court, more building permits for
mosques, approval for their own Waqf, and markedly increased
religious freedom. This year, for the first time in memory,
they were allowed to stage a public reenactment of the Battle
of Karbala during Ashoura. The vast majority of Shiites here
stress they are Kuwaiti first and Shiite second; when the
young militant Yasser al-Habib fell afoul of the law for
insulting Sunni beliefs, the Shia establishment condemned the
provocation while quietly lobbying for clemency.
Predictably, Sunni extremists have become more stridently
hostile towards Shiite practices. Prime Minister Shaykh
Sabah al-Ahmed has met separately with the various religious
and political groupings in an attempt to nip sectarianism in
the bud. End Summary.

Shia/Sunni relations
--------------

2. (S) Nearly all of our Shiite interlocutors profess loyalty
to the State of Kuwait and attempt to downplay any sectarian
differences. But scratch a bit deeper and many Shia can also
tell you how they or their family members have been affected
by a system that limits their employment in certain sectors
and denies them full religious freedom. The prosperity of
Kuwaiti society makes it easier to tolerate the
institutionalized discrimination (as a Shiite lawyer told
Poloff, Shia in Kuwait are &much better off than anywhere
else8),but it's there: the Faculty of Sharia offers no
courses from a Shiite perspective; the disproportion in
mosques is glaring; it is very difficult for a Shiite to
become a diplomat or enter certain branches of the security
forces (KSS, the State Security service, has no/no Shiites).



3. (SBU) Although the GOK does not publish exact figures, it
is generally estimated that Shiite citizens number roughly
300,000 ) 350,000, i.e. about a third of the approximately
900,000 Kuwaitis living here. As would be expected, the
Shiite minority traces its roots mainly to Iraq and Iran. It
has played an integral role in the economic development of
the country, and many of the leading commercial families are
Shiites (Behbehani, Dashti, Bukhamseen, Marafie, Qabazard)
who have benefited from family ties to neighboring states.
Throughout most of Kuwait,s history, Sunnis and Shiites have
lived side by side with little conflict.


4. (SBU) The nadir of Sunni-Shiite relations came in the
heady days of the Iranian Revolution; the GOK reacted to a
perceived threat by silencing and expelling Shiite radicals.
During this period, which included the 1983 bombings of the
US and French Embassies, purportedly by an Iran-based Shiite
group, our interlocutors tell us Shiites faced open hostility
from a Sunni majority that questioned their loyalty. One
Shiite activist recalled schoolyard taunts from Sunni
children who referred to him as &Khomeini.8


5. (SBU) The 1990 Iraqi invasion strengthened all citizens'
sense of Kuwaitiness and allowed Shia to prove their loyalty,
according to our contacts. Shiites played a large role in
the Kuwaiti resistance, and were heavily represented among
Kuwait,s war dead. By then, of course, the bloom was off
the Iran Revolution's rose. Relations between Sunnis and
Shia have been steadily improving since liberation in 1991.

Shiite Strides Over The Past Year
--------------

6. (SBU) Since the fall of Saddam Hussein,s regime, Shiite
MPs and other Shi'a leaders have approached the GOK on a
number of long-standing requests for reform, and have made
some headway:

- Waqf: The establishment of a Ja,afari Waqf, i.e. an agency
to administer religious endowments according to the Shiite
Ja,afari school of jurisprudence, has long been a demand of
Kuwait,s Shi'a population. The government has approved its
creation and it is in the process of being established.

- Family-law court: Family law in Kuwait is handled by
religious courts. Shi'a now have their own courts of first
instance and appeal, though still no court of cassation
(supreme court). Shi'a have formally requested a Ja'afari
court of cassation and an increase in the number of Shi'a
Ja'afari judges to handle Shi'a personal status and family
law cases. In late 2003, the government approved their
requests. The court has not yet been established, however, as
there are no Ja'afari judges for this level of prosecution.

- Approval of Shiite mosques: There are approximately 30
Shi'a mosques and approximately 1,200 Sunni mosques in
Kuwait. Since 2000, the government has granted licenses for
and has approved the construction of 4 new Shi'a mosques. All
4 mosques are reportedly still under construction.

- This year for the first time, Kuwaiti Shi'a publicly staged
a historical play during Ashoura depicting the martyrdom of
Imam Hussein, the Prophet Mohammed's grandson.


7. (SBU) There can be little doubt that events in Iraq have
stimulated a more assertive stance by Kuwaiti Shiites. For
the first time in memory, Kuwait TV ran programs on Ashoura
and the authorities allowed a public reenactment of the
Battle of Karbala. At least one young Shiite militant,
21-year-old Yasser al-Habib, went beyond what the GOK was
prepared to tolerate when he distributed an audiocassette
last December that was deemed insulting to Sunnis. He was
tried, convicted and sentenced, then released -- apparently
by mistake -- as part of the Amiri Pardon on the occasion of
National Day in February. A warrant for his arrest was
issued, but at last report he remained at large. The Shia
establishment publicly distanced itself from the offending
cassette and condemned any attempt to foment sectarianism,
but influential Shiites quietly asked Prime Minister Shaykh
Sabah to show clemency to al-Habib.

Reaction From Sunnis
--------------

8. (SBU) The vast majority of Kuwaitis, both Sunni and Shia,
are keen to preserve peaceful, friendly co-existence, but the
most hardline Sunnis have reacted badly, e.g. distributing
scurrilous anti-Shia leaflets outside Sunni mosques. The
fact that the Information Minister (longtime UN PermRep
Mohammed Abulhassan)is both a Shiite and a liberal has made
him a prime target for Salafi members of parliament. They
keep threatening to "grill" him (a longstanding procedure
that can lead a vote of no-confidence which, if successful,
would force the minister from office). Some of what they
criticize Abulhassan for has more to do with his being a
liberal than with his being a Shiite, e.g. licensing
entertainment they consider immoral, such as "Arab Super
Star" and "Star Academy."


9. (SBU) Recent events in Iraq have incensed Sunni
hardliners. In the April 12 newspapers, the spokesman for
the Salafi Movement (aka Scientific Salafis - the most
radical overt Islamist current) condemned the US for "savage"
attacks on Falluja, and called for moral and material support
to defeat the American "enemy" whose military presence in the
region "is no longer justified" (now that Saddam's regime has
been eliminated). The next day, the Salafi Movement
participated in a meeting to launch a "parliamentary and
popular committee to assist the Iraqi people"; about twenty
people, including two Members of Parliament, attended;
virtually all wore typical Salafi garb. Our Salafi contacts
regularly insist that Shiites are a minority in Iraq (and
only about 15 percent of Kuwaitis); they perceive that the US
is siding with Iraq's Shiites (and Kurds) against Sunni Arabs.


10. (SBU) The GOK maintains a strong public commitment to
tolerance: Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed was quoted
in the local media April 14 as saying the Shia are a key
category in Kuwaiti society and should be given their full
rights. Notwithstanding opposition from Sunni Islamists, he
has also been quoted as promising that popular entertainment
shows will continue. But he clearly sees cause for concern:
over the past several days, he has held a series of meetings
with all the political and religious currents, as well as
tribal leaders. To all, the message was clear: sectarianism
will not be tolerated in Kuwait. While Kuwaitis
overwhelmingly support that message, some fault the PM for
implicitly validating incipient notions of sectarian identity
by meeting separately with groups according to their
religious affiliation (Shiites, Sunnis associated with the
Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis); these critics say he would have
reinforced the sense of national unity if he had either
brought them all together or held meetings on a geographic
basis (neighborhoods or governorates).


11. (C) COMMENT: We expect the Shiite community to remain
peaceful and loyal. More telling will be the trajectory of
Sunni radicalism, and the regime's reaction to it. So far
the Government has been unwilling to take on the Sunni
radicals as strongly as it has Shia radicalism. Until
recently, Kuwait's Islamists have differed from those in
other countries by recognizing the need for, and reality of,
US protection from an Arab Muslim enemy -- Saddam Hussein.
Now that Saddam and his regime have been removed, some no
longer feel the need to maintain that exception to reflexive
enmity towards the US. But the line of thinking articulated
by the Scientific Salafis runs counter to obvious Kuwaiti
interests: most people in this small country understand
perfectly well that they cannot afford a US military pullout
while Iraq remains insecure; most also understand that the
perpetrators of atrocities in Falluja, though they may be
Sunni Arabs, need to be brought to heel -- and are in any
event hostile to the independent existence of Kuwait, let
alone a democratic Iraq.


12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The Scientific Salafis' stated
position need not imply an endorsement of violence against
Americans inside Kuwait: they recognize their regime as
legitimate and Islamic, acknowledge that US forces are its
guests, and affirm the religious duty to ensure the safety of
such guests. Still, some young hothead with little aptitude
for nuance could feel authorized to attack Americans here.
And it is no stretch at all to interpret their call as
out-and-out incitement to kill Americans in Iraq or elsewhere
outside Kuwait.
MORAN