Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KINSHASA1839
2004-10-04 06:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

RCD: SOME STILL SEARCHING FOR REASONS TO ABANDON

Tags:  PGOV CG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001839 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014
TAGS: PGOV CG
SUBJECT: RCD: SOME STILL SEARCHING FOR REASONS TO ABANDON
THE TRANSITION

REF: KINSHASA 1311

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001839

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014
TAGS: PGOV CG
SUBJECT: RCD: SOME STILL SEARCHING FOR REASONS TO ABANDON
THE TRANSITION

REF: KINSHASA 1311

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Bizima Karaha, one of the RCD-G's most
well-known extremists, told Ambassador September 23 that the
transition has failed, implying that another mechanism should
be found. Ambassador reiterated strongly our message that
the transition, while flawed, remains the sole available
vehicle through which peace can be maintained and the
Congolese people's interests advanced. Karaha also repeated
the oft-heard RCD demand that Congolese military elements
deployed in the Kivus must be withdrawn and the government
cease supporting the Interahamwe. Ambassador also raised the
importance of ending the climate of impunity which has partly
enabled the cycle of violence plaguing the DRC. End Summary.

An Extremist Flexing His Muscles


2. (C) As recently as late-May of this year, Bizima Karaha
was on the outs with RCD-G president Azarias Ruberwa, and
indeed, had retreated, together with seven like-minded party
colleagues, to a sort of exile in Goma. (Note: Karaha and
the "group of seven" had disregarded Ruberwa's instructions
on key votes, had publicly misspoken themselves in the
Parliament, and as a consequence, Ruberwa had sent a letter
to National Assembly President Kamitatu removing the eight
from their RCD-appointed seats, a decision which prompted
their disgruntled move east (ref). End Note.) In the wake
of the Gatumba massacre, however, Karaha and others have
recast themselves as among Ruberwa's close advisors --
although other party members have characterized Bizima more
as a thorn in Ruberwa's side, or even as his "Rwandan
jailor." In any event, his star within the party seems on
the rise, and many of his previously disregarded statements
have emerged as policy demands underpinning the RCD's return
to the transitional government. During his September 23
meeting with Ambassador (a meeting which Karaha requested),
he struck some familiar chords, including:

-- the RCD is afraid that the transition will end with many
promises unmet; it is seriously behind schedule and little is
being done to put things right; these current negative trends
have serious implications for the future;

-- there has been no progress on military integration, which

is key to progress on improving social services, installing
democracy and holding elections; worse, there is no interest
by the Congolese participants in making progress on these
issues;

-- President Kabila doesn't act like a national leader, but
instead tolerates hate media and makes promises that aren't
kept;

-- therefore, given all the hidden agendas, the lack of
Congolese ownership of the processes and general bad faith,
the transition has failed.


3. (C) Karaha went on to reiterate another well-known RCD
complaint, namely that the current deployment of government
and MLC troops to the East is promoting uncontrolled
fighting, exacerbating general instability, prohibiting the
return of refugees, and generally making more difficult any
move toward "real" military integration, since the current
brassage ("mixing") of troop elements as seen in the East is
forced and unnatural, and will lead different elements to
turn on each other. He concluded by accusing the government
of continuing to support the Interahamwe, and indeed of
having integrated some elements into the military, including
in the personal bodyguard of South Kivu regional military
commander Mabe.

Transition Flawed, But Necessary


4. (C) In response, the Ambassador noted that no one had
expected the transition to function perfectly; it is an
ungainly conglomeration but the only means by which the
ex-combatants can be brought to work together. Undeniably,
progress has been slower than we and the international
community had hoped, and much remains to be done. Flawed
though it is, however, the transition remains the best and
only means by which to reach the shared goal of free, fair
and democratic elections, and to protect and advance the
rights and interests of all the Congolese people. We must
all work with what we have available, and that is the
transition. Military integration and the related issues of
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are
complicated issues in which the international community
perhaps could usefully play a better coordinated role.
Nonetheless, in this area there also is positive movement,
seen in meetings of the Supreme Military Council and renewed
activity by the international community. The Ambassador
reminded Karaha that the mere existence of the CIAT (the
International Committee to Accompany the Transition) is an
unprecedented example of international interest in,and
coordination with, the DRC.


5. (C) The Ambassador said that another complicated but
important priority is addressing the climate of impunity
which has enabled the cyle of violence plaguing the Congo.
While the GDRC's request to the ICC may be a part of the
answer, there are other avenues as well to address
allegations that date back a number of years. The Ambassador
went on to note that, as for the problem of the Interahamwe
presence, the actions of (RCD) renegade commander Nkunda and
the presence of his troops have essentially stymied very
promising voluntary repatriation of Interahamwe elements
facilitated by Monuc which, pre-Nkunda, had successfully
moved over 14,000 FDLR and their families back to Rwanda.
Post-Nkunda, the number of voluntary repatriations has fallen
to practically zero. He concluded by noting that clearly it
is in the interest of both the DRC and its neighbors,
particularly Rwanda, to put an end to the menace of the
Interahamwe, and to support disarmament and relocation
programs.

Comment


6. (C) On the way out of the building, out of earshot of
others, Karaha noted to the Ambassador that he had applied
for a visa but had been told he needed to wait for some time
before receiving and answer (note: e.g., a security advisory
opinion). He asked if there is a problem. The Ambassador
replied that he did not track individual visa cases, but
underscored that in all cases, procedures standardized at all
U.S. Embassies needed to be followed.


7. (C) Karaha may, in part, have come to hear for himself
the U.S. reaction to his "the transition is dead" line. Or
he may simply have been fishing to see if his failure to
obtain a visa immeidately signaled bigger problems with the
U.S. Alternatively, Ruberwa may have encouraged Karaha to
hear for himself that the U.S. doesn't accept that the
transition is dead, in hopes that he will modify his stance.
The latter, however, would be a vain hope, since by all
accounts Karaha is the embodiment of RCD-G hard-core
positions, and widely perceived to be a close Kigali ally.
Karaha's comments, however, make painfully clear how very
little manuevering room Ruberwa has, particularly since,
having chosen to retreat to Goma in the wake of Gatumba, he
has made himself more susceptible, at least in the
short-term, to Karaha's and other hard-line factional
influences.
MEECE