RCD/G WANTS MORE FROM TRANSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001746

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: RCD/G WANTS MORE FROM TRANSITION

REF: KINSHASA 1657

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D


1. (C) Summary. In exchange for returning to Kinshasa and the
transitional government on September 1, VP Ruberwa asked the
government and international community to address a laundry
list of RCD/G concerns about the transition. The demands,
which ranged from disbanding parallel military structures and
firing a military commander to sorting out parastatal
appointments and ending hate media, did not resonate with
many Congolese who have vastly different concerns with the
present state of the transition. End Summary.

It Isn't Fair...
--------------


2. (C) Ruberwa met with the Ambassador and polcouns on
September 1 and with the Ambassador, the British Ambassador,
and former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, who visited the DRC
in her capacity as a member of the Blair Commission for
Africa, on September 2. Ruberwa claimed the RCD/G has not
received equal treatment in the transition, discussed general
insecurity in the east, and raised what he called the
'genocide' in Gatumba. Ruberwa gave the Ambassador a summary
of political, military, and economic demands, including an
end to parallel structures within the transitional
government, dismissal of certain military commanders,
convening the Supreme Military Council, removal of recently
deployed FARDC troops from eastern DRC and a share of posts
in the parastatals and other government entities. The RCD/G
also called on the transitional government to end hate media
and develop a plan to bring refugees back to S. Kivu. See
para 5 for complete list.


...or Working
--------------


3. (C) In addition to his specific demands, Ruberwa said the
transition process is not working, and he does not see how
elections can take place in this type of insecure
environment. President Kabila makes most important decisions
within the Presidency and the 'Maison Militaire' (a parallel
military advisory structure controlled by the President and
key hardliners, including Samba Kaputo) without any reference
to Ruberwa. For example, Ruberwa said he was not informed
that VP Bemba and Kabila planned to send large numbers of
troops to the east, which further marginalized his role as VP
of Politics and Security. (Comment: Bemba sent large numbers
of troops from Gbadolite and reportedly received several
million dollars for ferrying troops in his planes. End
comment.) Ruberwa said that S. Kivu military commander BG
Mabe had deliberately integrated anti-Banyamulenge forces
into the military, which has contributed to a generally
anti-Banyamulenge, anti-RCD, and anti-Ruberwa policy on the
part of the former government.

Mbeki's Mediation
--------------


4. (C) Ruberwa said he was very happy with South African
President Thabo Mbeki's mediation efforts during his August
30-31 visit to Kinshasa. (Note: On September 10, he told a
CIAT delegation the same thing. See septel. End note.)
Ruberwa said Mbeki wanted to see the Global Accord respected,
understood there were stresses in the transition, and tried
hard to mediate specifically between Kabila and Ruberwa.
(Comment: In fact, one presidential advisor told polcouns
that Mbeki's high-profile involvement angered President
Kabila, and led to Kabila's refusal to meet jointly with
Ruberwa and Mbeki during the latter's visit, forcing the
South African President into a series of time-consuming
'shuttle diplomacy' meetings--a method later confirmed by the
South African Ambassador in a CIAT briefing. End comment.)

What does the RCD/G want?
--------------


5. (U) The RCD/G's list of demands, as presented in Ruberwa's
August 31 letter to Mbeki, follows:

--End parallel structures within the transitional government
and encourage the normal functioning of Institutions set up
by the All Global and Inclusive Accord

--Set up a joint mechanism (CIAT ) Components) to evaluate
the transition every three months and include the mediator
and the co-mediators in the follow-up process for the
transition

--Recognize the role of the Vice President in charge of the
Political, Defense and Security Commission in the daily
management of military, security and diplomatic issues, as
well as his authority over the army and security services

--Finish dividing up 'responsibilities' within the
parastatals, financial enterprises, security services and the
local provincial administration. Until divided, retain
existing structures put in place by the various
administrations

--Release individuals jailed for political opinions or
membership in the RCD
Military Demands
--Dismiss the 10th Military Region Commander (BG Mbuja Mabe)
and certain of his officers who were 'actual or intellectual'
authors of the Gatumba genocide, and killings and massacres
in Bukavu and Kalehe (Comment. There is no proof to support
these allegations. End comment.)

--Convene the Defense Supreme Council and establish a
calendar of meetings (done)

--Immediately set up a mechanism to identify and neutralize
ex-FAR, Interahamwe and FNL militia who are hiding in the
FARDC

--Reinstate all former ANC commanders and put them back in
control of their respective units until the army integration
process is complete

--Stop all new deployments of troops to eastern DRC until the
regular integration process is complete

--Regroup recently deployed troops to eastern DRC outside
North and South Kivu until integration can take place and
negative forces (ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FNL) can be removed
from the FARDC

--Reinstate the 8th Military Region Commander's (BG Obedi)
authority over all of North Kivu

--Immediately release arrested former ANC military officers

Economic/Financial Demands
--------------

--Allow Goma-based companies and enterprises which were
authorized by the former RCD administration to operate
throughout the country

--Audit public property management without obstructions from
state agencies

--Submit large expenditures of all government agencies,
including the Presidency, to public bid procedures and make
joint decisions on government expenditures

Other Concerns
--------------

--Set a time-line for the return of refugees from Burundi and
Rwanda, and provide for the refugees' security

--End hate media, as well as discriminatory, racist, ethnic
and xenophobic speeches

--Ensure non-discriminatory access to official media for all
political parties

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Ruberwa's demands are focused on RCD/G and
Banyamulenge concerns and are out-of-touch with political
realities in much of eastern DRC and Kinshasa. Most Congolese
hope to get to elections as quickly as possible and want to
see more of the central government--not less. Ruberwa
undoubtedly feels buffeted by strong forces he cannot
control. He is mistrusted by most of the political leaders in
Kinshasa, he is under attack from Bizima Karaha and other
hard-liners within his own party, and not unrelated--he
harbors strong fears for his personal security at all times.
His inability to act as a national vice president by seeing
past his political party and ethnic identity, however,
severely limits his effectiveness as a party and national
leader. Moreover, the problem is made worse by his tendency
to make unhelpful, impassioned statements when provoked by a
perceived injury to one of his constituencies. (Note: Unless
provoked he has an intensely legal, pedantic style of
speaking. End note.) We will encourage Ruberwa to think and
act to present the RCD/G as a national political party and
not as an ethnic movement, to further his own interests as
well as those of his core constituency and the country
generally. Most importantly, we will stress the importance of
avoiding any military actions that will only work to the
further detriment of Tutsis and other groups in the east, and
to his own party. He and other RCD/G leaders, however, must
be aware of their very limited popular support and therefore
limited options for a political future in a post-election DRC.
MEECE