POLITICALLY-INEPT RUBERWA PLAYS CARDS BADLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001745

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: POLITICALLY-INEPT RUBERWA PLAYS CARDS BADLY

REF: KINSHASA 1657

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D


1. (C) Summary. On September 10, VP Azarias Ruberwa met with
a CIAT delegation and complained about the CIAT's
ineffectiveness, the state of army integration, security
sector reform, and hate media. It is unclear how committed
Ruberwa and his followers will be to the transition if their
key demands cannot be met. End summary.


2. (C) Since the RCD/G's return on September 1, the Supreme
Defense Council has met twice. National Security Advisor
Samba Kaputo told DCM and polcouns on September 10 that the
council would discuss military integration, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR),and what he calls
'military missions' and what Ruberwa calls 'parallel military
structures.' On September 6-8, the Council of Ministers
discussed Ruberwa's evaluation of the transition.

RCD/G Hard-liners Meet with CIAT
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3. (C) MONUC Poloff told poloff that on September 10 an
abbreviated CIAT group (South Africa, Belgium, UK,
Netherlands in its capacity as EU President, Angola and
African Union) met with Ruberwa (in his capacity as RCD/G
President) and a group of RCD/G hard-liners who all went to
Goma during the recent transition standoff. The two-hour
meeting took place at Ruberwa's residence. For 1 1/2 hours,
Ruberwa went through the standard litany of RCD/G complaints.
He complained extensively about the CIAT's ineffectiveness,
said the CIAT was partly to blame for past problems with the
transition and would be responsible for future possible
problems if it did not take a more active role--perhaps as an
arbitrator of disputes. He also complained that the
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI),at the local level,
would be staffed by PPRD faithful because the CIAT failed to
support earlier RCD/G calls for representation for all
components at all levels of the electoral process. (Comment:
Earlier this year, we and other CIAT members lobbied hard to
prevent precisely what Ruberwa is proposing, because it would
have politicized the CEI and rendered it unwieldy. End
comment.)


4. (C) Ruberwa also complained about parallel military
structures, nonexistent progress on army integration,
security sector reform and hate media (septel). He said that
there was very little money in the budget for general
military expenditures, and no money in the current budget for
army integration. (Comment: These two points are valid. Most
military spending is decided by the 'Maison Militaire'--an
advisory structure within the Presidency. End comment).
Ruberwa said there has been no progress on security sector
reform, citing as an example the fact that the ANR (the main
intelligence agency) has never submitted a single report to
him. Finally, Ruberwa loudly complained about the climate of
hate media which he claims is being supported directly by
those close to the President. (Comment: This serious
allegation has some merit. On September 9, moderate Vice
Minister of Interior, Paul Musafiri (MLC) told polcouns that
for $100, anyone could go on television and say anything they
wanted. He suggested that PPRD members had provided money to
certain individuals, including Pastor Ngoy, to deliver
anti-Banyamulenge messages. End comment.)

Comment
--------------


5. (C) CIAT colleagues present told the Ambassador that it
was a fatiguing exercise. Present with Ruberwa in the room
were a variety of RCD/G leaders, most known as relative
hard-liners. None of the non-Tutsi RCD/G Ministers who
refused to accompany Ruberwa to Goma recently nor associate
themselves with the RCD/G decision to 'suspend' participation
in the transition were present. Subsequent discussion in the
CIAT indicated that the CIAT will not make any formal
response to the many RCD/G points, but rather indicate that
the CIAT is actively engaged in addressing problems and
issues that threaten continued progress in the transition, or
violate principles and provisions of the underlying peace
accords.


6. (C) Though some of his complaints are valid, Ruberwa has
played his cards badly. Although intelligent, Ruberwa often
seems politically blind and has consistently managed to
present himself as a defender of the Banyamulenge and
Rwandans first, and of the Congolese second. His often
emotional reaction to nationality issues seems to have played
into the hands of extremists (like Bizima Karaha and Moise
Nyarugabo) within his party, and has probably strengthened
the hand of PPRD and MLC hard-liners, making compromise on
key questions such as amnesty and nationality laws that much
more difficult. Pro-government press, most notably the daily
L'Avenir and the digitalcongo.net website, have had a field
day-- a veritable Ruberwa-roast over the past several days.


7. (C) As the political space for moderate, reasoned debate
continues to erode, the possibility for political stalemate
or, worse, conflict, grows larger. In response, the CIAT
will likely play a more active role, privately and publicly.
There is still political will to reach the elections (partly
because no one party or individual wishes to be identified as
the spoiler, and we believe that this commonality of
interests between the international community and the
Congolese political class, together with progress on some of
the RCD/G's more reasonable demands, will enable the
transition to recapture momentum. End comment.
MEECE