RUBERA ON THE EDGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001584

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2010
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL CG
SUBJECT: RUBERA ON THE EDGE


Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.5 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In a late August 18 telephone conversation,
Vice President Ruberwa was unreceptive to the Ambassador,s
message underscoring the importance of continuing engagement
with the transition government. Ruberwa complained that the
status quo was doing nothing to improve the situation of
Congolese Tutsis. He did not, however, say that he is
resigning his position. Pressed, Ruberwa listed three
actions that he said could represent a way forward, including
an Mbeki or Obasanjo chaired meeting of GDRC principals to
obtain commitments to progress, a regional gathering of
governments to pledge actions against "negative forces," and
pressure to force the GDRC to make changes to government
military deployments in the east. We believe Ruberwa is
likely to stay for some time in Goma, although not
necessarily formally resign from the Government. We assess
his conditions to reflect in part personal frustration, but
it also reflective of internal RCD problems. End summary.

Ruberwa and RCD/Goma Uncertainties
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2. (C) Vice President Ruberwa is presently in Goma, North
Kivu Province, following a scheduled tour of eastern Congo.
As reported septels, Ruberwa went to Goma following the
August 14 attack on the Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi
which targeted Congolese Tutsi refugees. Ruberwa immediately
issued several unhelpful public statements, which among other
things accused Mai Mai and other Congolese of being involved
in the Gatumba attack (Comment: Although to our knowledge,
Ruberwa has no additional evidence of Congolese involvement
beyond the somewhat confusing accounts of attack survivors.
End comment).


3. (C) There is widespread speculation in Kinshasa that
Ruberwa and/or the party he heads, RCD-Goma, is preparing to
formally withdraw from the Transition Government. As covered
septels, there are major divisions within RCD-Goma, and
certainly at least some members are advocating such a
withdrawal.

Ambassador,s August 18 Call
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4. (C) After multiple attempts starting the evening of August
17, the Ambassador successfully reached Ruberwa by phone the
evening of August 18. Expressing condolences for the Gatumba
attack, and reiterating points from the Washington-issued
statement, the Ambassador nonetheless emphasized to Ruberwa
the importance of remaining engaged in the Transition
Government. The basic message was that the GDRC transition
process represents not only the best chance to bring peace
and stability to the Congo, but as well ensure the security
of vulnerable populations, notably including Tutsi
communities, in eastern Congo.


5. (C) Not surprisingly, Ruberwa did not embrace the message.
Instead, he launched into a lengthy explanation of why the
Transition Government was failing in key objectives. He said
specifically many senior officials are still opposed to
reconciliation leading to further criminal attacks such as
that in the Burundi camp. What is the point of continuing
the process? Ruberwa, however, stopped short of saying that
he is resigning from the Vice Presidency or that his party or
he himself are withdrawing formally from the transition
government.

Some View Forward
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6. (C) Near the end of the conversation, pressed on what he
believed represents a way forward, Ruberwa listed three
points. He indicated that a conference of GDRC principals,
perhaps chaired by South Africa President Mbeki or Nigeria
President Obasanjo, could be convened to obtain fresh
commitments for progress, in essence correcting problems of
the current transition. Second, Ruberwa wanted changes made
to the composition of the FARDC military forces in South
Kivu, specifically including the removal of 10military region
commander General Mabe, and an overall major reduction in the
number of forces currently deployed. Finally, Ruberwa called
for a conference of regional leaders to promise firm action
against "negative forces" (note: a traditional phrase used to
refer to Hutu extremist elements. End note). Ruberwa asked
for U.S. support in the CIAT and generally to achieve these
goals.

Comment: No Clear Strategy
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7. (C) It did not appear that Ruberwa,s three points
reflected well-considered positions, but rather more of an
on-the-spot effort to define some objectives. Much of
Ruberwa,s reported actions and speech since the Gatumba
attack suggest that he has been reacting emotionally, but has
no planned long-term strategy. As the RCD-Goma Vice
President, Ruberwa has been been the object of sustained
suspicion by much of the rest of the Congolese political
class. As well, he has more recently been buffeted by major
public divisions within the RCD-Goma, with his leadership
under challenge by Bizima Karaha and 7 other "dissident"
parliamentarians and undoubtedly other influential RCD-Goma
hard liners. It is therefore difficult to determine how much
of Ruberwa,s stated position stems from his personal
convictions and frustrations, his current position under fire
within RCD-Goma, or reflected views of the part of the
RCD-Goma leadership currently gathered in the east. He is
reportedly hearing a similar message to the Ambassador,s
regarding the need to stay engaged from a lot of sources in
the international community, and from other moderate
Congolese leaders. We do not expect Ruberwa to return soon
to Kinshasa, however, as he works out a personal and
institutional way forward.
MEECE