Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KINSHASA1557
2004-08-18 16:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

EASTERN TURN FOR THE WORSE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL CG MONUC 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001557 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL CG MONUC
SUBJECT: EASTERN TURN FOR THE WORSE


Classified By: Amb Roger Meece, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001557

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL CG MONUC
SUBJECT: EASTERN TURN FOR THE WORSE


Classified By: Amb Roger Meece, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Septel describes worrying events in eastern Congo
following the weekend attack on the Gatumba refugee camp in
Burundi, and effects on the fragile DRC transition government
and peace process. While the Burundi refugee attack did not
in itself provoke a complete change in transition dynamics,
it has significantly heightened tensions and exacerbated
divisions and fears already present. A decision by Vice
President Ruberwa to withdraw from the transition government,
a similar RCD-Goma institutional move, or a military
miscalculation or &accident8 in the east could have major
negative consequences for what is at best a volatile
situation in the region.


2. (C) There are at least three major Congolese military
forces operating right now in the east. Rebel General
Nkunda,s forces, the militia controlled by North Kivu
Governor Serufuli, and FARDC forces. The latter are composed
of various factions, and include at least some units of
questionable loyalty. Likewise it is unclear when and under
what circumstances Serufuli might seek to use his militia, or
to what purpose. There are probably also scattered
Congolese Mai Mai forces of varying interests, capability,
and loyalty depending on the individual group, and Rwandan
Hutu extremists (e.g., FDLR, Interahamwe) in the area,
although it is difficult to impossible to obtain an accurate
estimate of the size or capabilities of these groups. It is
unlikely that anyone holds a decisive military advantage
right now. The introduction of any foreign forces from
Burundi, Rwanda, or elsewhere, of course would significantly
alter the equation. The latter would also have major
negative political effects in Kinshasa.

Political Moves
--------------


3. (C) On the political front, President Kabila apparently
decided to participate in meeting(s) in Dar es Salaam
following the SADC Mauritius summit, a useful act that should
at minimum help to open communications with Burundi
officials. We have also received reports from various
sources that President Mbeki has been active, among other

things to encourage Vice President Ruberwa to remain in the
transition government. We assume that he is also seeking to
defuse explosive feelings in Kigali and Bujumbura, as well as
in his contacts with Kabila.


4. (C) SRSG Swing was able to speak with Ruberwa August 17 to
encourage him to remain engaged. Swing indicated that
Ruberwa still seems to be considering his options. (Comment:
Ruberwa is likely motivated by personal fears as well as
political calculations. End Comment.)

What We Can Do
--------------


5. (C) There are two major problems that we believe need to
be addressed. One related to the political process in the
DRC; the other potential military mistakes that could lead to
wider conflicts in eastern Congo.


6. (C) Regarding the domestic Congolese poltical aspect, the
Ambassador has been trying to reach Ruberwa August 18 to
convey a similar message to that of SRSG Swing. Ruberwa is
currently in Goma with other RCD leaders, and phones are not
being answered. While unsuccessful thus far, the Ambassador
will continue to try to get through. We are also requesting
a one on one meeting of the Ambassador with President Kabila
on the latter,s return to Kinshasa to discuss the issue,
encourage negotiation to maintain the integrity of the
fundamental transition process, and avoid unhelpful military
actions.


6. (C) The communique issued by the Department in Washington
on Monday, August 17, was very useful, and the re-issued
communique distributed by the Mission in Kinshasa has sought
to disseminate the text as widely as possible. (It was read
verbatim on 8 major radio channels, and appears in 7 of the
leading newspapers.) We believe in all public and private
statements in Washington and the region, it is useful to
reiterate the basic themes of that communique, i.e.
condemnation of the attack, the need for a full
investigation, and the need for cooperation among government
in the region to maintain peace and security.


7. (C) The planned trilateral meeting in Kampala next week
will provide a potentially very useful forum to try to
stimulate dialogue between Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala. In
the interim, we believe it would be useful to encourage
strongly governments in all regional capitals to avoid
inflammatory rhetoric, much less provocative military moves
or actions, that could set off wider conflicts in the
uncertain military environment of the east. Calls from a
senior Department official to appropriate officials could
help underscore the seriousness with which we view the
current situation.


8. (C) Finally, pending the actions described above, we
believe it would be useful for Embassies in relevant
capitals, including Pretoria, London, Paris, and Belgium, to
consult with host country to share information and encourage
coordinated action.
MEECE