A RELAXED RUBERWA RENEWS OLD ACQUAINTANCE WITH NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001504

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2008
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: A RELAXED RUBERWA RENEWS OLD ACQUAINTANCE WITH NEW
AMBASSADOR


Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D


1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador Meece's August 6 initial
call on Vice President Azarias Ruberwa, Ruberwa provided a
tour d'horizon, highlighting his concerns about the current
situation. He outlined a series of challenges facing the
transition, suggested a political solution to the Nkunda
problem, and called for a stronger MONUC mandate. Ruberwa
referenced the need to manage difficult DRC/Rwandan
relations, but also referred to potential problematic Rwandan
military involvement, for example in support of Nkunda's
forces. The Ambassador concurred on the importance of
ensuring the transition's success, and reiterated USG
support. He pointed out potential pitfalls to a political
'reward' for Nkunda. The Vice President, who seemed relaxed
and comfortable throughout the meeting, said he planned to
leave August 6 for a week in the Kivus. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador accompanied by PolOff made an
introductory call on VP Ruberwa August 6. Ruberwa's political
advisor was also present for the meeting, which lasted a bit
over an hour. Ruberwa opened the substantive discussion with
a tour d'horizon of the current situation in the country,
highlighting his areas of concern. In Ruberwa's opinion, a
lack of trust and confidence among the major composantes, a
failure by certain parties to respect power-sharing
principles, delays integrating the army, managing DRC-Rwanda
relations, and resolving the Nkunda problem are major
challenges facing the transition. On a personal level,
Ruberwa said it is difficult to work in an environment where
his motivations and actions are always considered suspect by
both RCD hardliners and other government composantes. Ruberwa
told Ambassador that he planned to leave later the same day
for a week in the Kivus where he intends to meet with a wide
range of people, even 'extremists' in Bukavu, Uvira, Burundi
(Banyamulenge refugees) and possibly Goma. (Note. Ruberwa
arrived in Bukavu on August 7. End note.)

Internal Dynamics
--------------


3. (C) The Vice President sees the fall of Bukavu and the
resultant Nkunda/ Mutebusi problem as the most serious crisis
the transition government has faced. He believes that if it
is mishandled, it could derail the transition. In Ruberwa's
view, there are two possible solutions---political or
military. As Nkunda is a member of the RCD and part of his
ethnic community, Ruberwa prefers a political solution,
perhaps sending them to school overseas for a few years. More
importantly, in his opinion, a military solution is unlikely
to be successful because Nkunda knows the terrain, soldiers
in the N. Kivu Military Region are mostly Rwandaphone and
likely to side with Nkunda, and if fighting spreads into
Goma, Rutshuru and Masisi, Rwanda might get involved.


4. (C) In a subsequent response to Ruberwa's points, the
Ambassador strongly reiterated USG support for the transition
process, and underscored the need for ongoing dialogue
between the major factions and leaders. He observed that
everyone involved was well aware of the depth of mutual
mistrust and the difficulty of implementing a peace process
from the time of early negotiations. He emphasized that
substantial progress had nonetheless already been achieved,
making it even more important for all parties and leaders to
maintain open channels of communication. Ruberwa acknowledged
the point. Regarding Nkunda, the Ambassador noted the perils
of 'rewarding' Nkunda and thereby creating potential
incentives for other would-be rebels. Ruberwa did not
challenge this, but questioned whether any other viable
solutions existed.


5. (C) Ruberwa said delays integrating the army were
'inexcusable,' and elections will be impossible without
military reform. He accused the PPRD of maintaining parallel
military power structures, and complained about high-level
corruption and mismanagement, which he sought to characterize
as being at the worst levels ever. The Ambassador observed
that corruption is a long-standing major problem in the DRC;
Ruberwa concurred.


6. (C) The Ambassador made an oblique reference to problems
within the RCD, but said that it did not seem the best time
to discuss the issue. Ruberwa picked up on the reference, and
said it would be a useful topic for the 'next meeting.'

External Dynamics
--------------


7. (C) In order to improve DRC-Rwanda relations, Ruberwa
suggested dedicating 2-3 FARDC brigades to disarming the
Interahamwe, preferably with MONUC logistical assistance. He
called for a stronger MONUC mandate and opined that MONUC
should use its 10,000 soldiers to forcibly disarm foreign
combatants. He underscored the need for a more capable, and
by implication, larger MONUC force. The Ambassador observed
that we and all others were awaiting the UN SYG's report and
its recommendations regarding the future of MONUC. Once we
had that in hand, we could formulate our response to the
proposals. He pointed out, however, that it is important for
DPKO and the SYG's office to prepare recommendations that are
realistic and can be implemented.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Ruberwa appeared relaxed and comfortable throughout
the meeting, and made several references to Ambassador's
previous time in Kinshasa. Ruberwa was frank in assessing the
military situation in the east, including the likely
sympathies of local soldiers and commanders, as well as the
real possibility of direct Rwandan involvement. He clearly
was looking for a way out to avoid what he sees as a
potential military mess for Kinshasa, but could only come up
with the dubious idea of an Nkunda and/or Mutebusi
scholarship. Ruberwa is obviously in a very vulnerable
position, and he made it clear he feels the pressure. His
week-long trip east is undoubtedly motivated to a great
extent by his need to shore up a position relative to the
RCD-Goma organization, especially given the overt challenge
posed by Bizima Karaha and seven other 'dissident'
parliamentarians. It is less clear whether he is also seeking
to do anything to address directly the problem of Nkunda
while in the region.
MEECE