N. KIVU MILITARY/POLITICAL SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001380

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: DECL:1.6X.6
TAGS: PHUM CG PGOV PREL MONUC
SUBJECT: N. KIVU MILITARY/POLITICAL SITUATION

REF: A. KINSHASA 1117 B. KINSHASA 1376 AND 1377

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D


1. (C) Summary: Poloff, DATT and British DATT visited
Kisangani and Goma July 19-22 to meet with N. Kivu governor
Serufuli, N. Kivu Regional Military Commander Obedi, and
MONUC elements. Obedi no longer appears loyal to the
transition government, and Serufuli's loyalties are opaque.
MONUC Goma miloff morale was poor. In recent weeks, MONUC
Kinshasa has done a poor job separating the important rumors
from the junk. End Summary.

Kisangani
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2. (C) On July 19, MONUC miloffs briefed on the current
situation, operations, and challenges in Orientale (septels
DAO). Ex-ANC (military wing of the RCD/G) Deputy Military
Commander said that he had worked with Nkunda in the past and
that Nkunda was professional and competent, but not a
charismatic leader and was supported by someone else. He
added that Nkunda was loyal to principles and if he had made
an agreement with someone, he would 'go to the end.' Local
human rights group Groupe Lotus told poloff that human rights
in Kisangani had improved, but civilians outside the city
were still subject to abuses by soldiers. For example, ex-ANC
soldiers man numerous checkpoints along the Congo River,
collecting taxes from travelers, and stealing merchandise and
personal belongings from those who cannot pay. Groupe Lotus
estimates that a traveler from Kisangani to Ubundu (about 60
miles) pays 2000FC ($5) and goes through 10 checkpoints.

Brigadier General Obedi
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3. (C) N. Kivu Regional Military Commander Obedi
disingenuously presented himself as an apolitical team player
who could be counted on to respond to his Kinshasa-based
military hierarchy. He said he was firmly with the transition
government, would execute orders from his military
hierarchy-- including to arrest Nkunda if he entered Goma--
and would attack any elements who attempted to enter his
province. He qualified these statements by saying he could
not guarantee his troops would follow him, does not receive
regular military instructions from Kinshasa, the Nkunda
affair is really about military integration, and there are
serious reports that 107 Rwandaphones have been killed by
troops loyal to FARDC S. Kivu Commander Mabe outside Kalehe.
(Comment: His actions do not support his claims. He failed to
attend a mid-July Kinshasa meeting of eastern military
commanders, his brother-in-law Nkunda continues to move
freely in N. Kivu, and Nkunda used large numbers of ex-ANC
(RCD/G military wing) N. Kivu troops during his June
occupation of Bukavu (Ref A). Obedi's claim that his older
brother's death prevented his attendance at the mid-July
Kinshasa meeting is dubious at best. End comment). MONUC and
DATT report that the FARDC is likely to declare Obedi a rebel
commander in the next few days.

Governor Serufuli
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4. (C) N. Kivu Governor Serufuli also appears to be trying to
keep his options open. On the one hand, he raised RCD/G
standard complaints that the transition government's failure
to adequately address the legitimate concerns of ex-ANC
officers has contributed to the current crisis, raised
questions about alleged massacres of Rwandaphones by FARDC
troops and suggested poloff meet with dissident RCD/G
parliamentarians. He said he has not negotiated between
Kabila and Nkunda because it is a military problem and he is
busy working on political issues. On the other hand, he has
agreed to work with MONUC to repatriate Rwandan Hutu (FDLR)
elements, and said that Nkunda has two choices-- arrest or
exile. Serufuli said he favors exile, although he thinks it
is unlikely that Nkunda will be able to find a country of
refuge.

Poor MONUC Goma Morale
--------------


5. (C) On July 21, MONUC miloffs briefed on the current
situation, operations, and challenges (septels DAO) in N.
Kivu. MONUC Goma miloff and poloff morale was poor. Miloffs
were pessimistic about the future of the transition,
elections, and MONUC's revised mandate. MONUC poloff and
miloffs complained about Kinshasa/field relations and said
that oftentimes MONUC-Kinshasa believes 'unfounded rumors'
rather than its staff in the field. On June 21, the Indian
Aviation Contingent flew 4 sorties at a cost of $50,000 to
chase down unfounded rumors of 10,000 troops marching on
Bukavu-- despite US, UK and MONUC field offices reports that
there were no significant troop movements along the
Goma-Bukavu road, and indeed the Indian Aviation Contingent
reported no unusual activity along the road. On June 22, Emb
team conducted a low-level flight over the area of Kalehe and
saw no unusual activity, concentrations of people, vehicles,
boats, or evidence of burned-out buildings.

Comment
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6. (C) By accident or design, Obedi apparently has become yet
another ex-ANC dissident commander. As a result, any FARDC
eastern DRC offensive will probably target Nkunda in northern

S. Kivu and Obedi in Goma. Serufuli, however, remains a
wildcard who is motivated by self-interest and the desire to
maintain his regional power base. He is a shrewd, calculating
actor who is unlikely to commit firmly to either camp until
he knows who will win. Although MONUC field offices
consistently report that Kinshasa does not understand
dynamics on the ground and changes their messages before
sending them to New York, assertions that HQ does not trust
field reporting is a further troubling development. In recent
weeks, MONUC-Kinshasa has done a poor job of separating the
important rumors to be verified from the junk. Chasing 10,000
ghost soldiers from Bukavu to Goma was a waste of $50,000 and
valuable flight hours. Timely verification of whether FARDC

S. Kivu Commander Mabe's troops have killed up to 100
Rwandaphone civilians outside Kalehe would have been a better
use of MONUC's resources.
MEECE