Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KINSHASA1356
2004-07-20 15:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

KINSHASA - GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Tags:  ASEC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001356 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/C, DS/C/PSP, DS/IP AND DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: KINSHASA - GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 151051

Classified By: RSO JEFF LISCHKE. REASON 1.4 (G).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001356

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/C, DS/C/PSP, DS/IP AND DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: KINSHASA - GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 151051

Classified By: RSO JEFF LISCHKE. REASON 1.4 (G).


1. (U) The following from RSO are Kinshasa's responses to
reftel subparagraphs A-L:


A. (C) Physical Security Upgrades - Official Facilities:
(2) Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated
to mitigate vulnerabilities. Kinshasa completed a major
physical security upgrade project at the Chancery and the
Joint Administrative Office (JAO) in April of 2002 which
greatly improved the physical security at both compounds.
With the involvement of the Ambassador, we also received
permission to close off Dongo Street which runs along the
west side of the Chancery and Avenue des Aviateurs which is
the street located directly in front of the Chancery. Our
most vulnerable point is the south-east portion of the
Chancery where Avenue des Aviateurs passes in front of the
Portuguese Embassy and then within 8 feet of the perimeter
wall and 20 feet of the Embassy building. The Ambassador,
DCM and RSO met with the mayor of Kinshasa on several
occasions and requested permission to close off this portion
of Aviateurs with negative results. Before approaching the
Mayor of Kinshasa, we received approval from the Portuguese
to close off Ave. des Aviateurs in front of their Embassy and
have a shared vehicle control point. However, without
permission from the local government we are unable to do
this. Another vulnerability at the Chancery is the Consular
Section. After the 1998 bombings and the push for
co-location, the Consular Section moved from the USAID
building onto the Embassy compound in early 2000 without
receiving permission from DS. During an IG inspection in
2002, the number one recommendation of the IG was to renovate
the Consular Section building to make it more secure and
efficient. OBO provided funding but DS is holding up the
funds because a waiver package to co-locate was never
submitted. We recently submitted the waiver package and are
looking forward to a favorable response from DS so the
project can move forward and address the numerous security
vulnerabilities the Consular Section currently has. We also
requested during the physical upgrade project to have the
mechanical/hydraulic drop arm located inside the Embassy
compound moved to the initial vehicle checkpoint on Dongo
street but were told we could not do it. More Embassy

employees park on Dongo street than inside of the compound so
in our opinion in makes much more sense to have the
mechanical barrier located on Dongo street and the manual one
located inside the Embassy compound.

(C) The JAO compound, located approximately .8 kms west of
the Embassy, is relatively secure but does not meet the
setback requirement in the south and south-west portion of
the main building. All administrative functions of the
Embassy are located at JAO - Admin, B&F, GSO, FM, Motor Pool,
etc. The Public Affairs Library also does not meet the
setback standard. The CAC's and vehicle checkpoints meet DS
standards and we feel relatively good about the security at
JAO other than the lack of setback issue.

(C) The USAID compound is located .4 kms from the Embassy in
a commercial office space that also has 7 apartments. USAID
completed a major physical security upgrade project in the
spring of 2003 and installed DS standard drop arms and guard
booths. We also installed cement planters that increased the
setback from approximately 30 feet to 60 feet from the main
street. One of the most noticeable and disturbing
vulnerabilities of the USAID building is the uncontrolled
access to a junk yard/mechanic shop located directly behind
the facility on the eastern side. USAID has also grown
substantially. In July of 2001 there were 5 direct hire
American employees. Now there are 16. The Center of Disease
Control also moved into this building in the winter of 2002
and they have 2 American direct hire staff. The bottom line
is that USAID and CDC will run out of office space if they
continue to expand.

(C) Other than the Consular Section renovation project, we
do not have any other physical security upgrade projects
planned in the near future. The only way to improve the
security at all three locations would be to close more
streets which the Congolese Government will not permit us to
do. The good news is that we just located a parcel of land
and received permission from the Department to sign an option
to buy contract with the owner for a proposed New Embassy
Compound (NEC) project that is supposed to start in 2008.
Unless we received permission to


B. (C) Chemical/Biological Protection: Program is
necessary element of the overall RSO security program at post
but is ineffective and requires improvement. We still have
not received First Responder training. It has been scheduled
several times in the past, but has always been canceled.
That said, we do feel that the threat of a chem/bio attack in
Kinshasa is low but would still like to receive the training.
Our APO facility can be sealed in the event of a chem/bio
incident and we are looking forward to receiving the Quick
Mask 2000.


C. (C) Technical Security Upgrades: Program is highly
relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates
important vulnerabilities. As a result of the major physical
security upgrade project completed in April 2002, we have
excellent CCTV coverage at the Chancery, JAO and USAID with
Intellex capability at all except USAID where the video
recorder and tapes are being utilized. We have hard-wired
and remote IDNS capability at both the Chancery and JAO but
nothing at USAID in spite of several requests to USAID
Security to address this issue.


D. (U) Armored Vehicle Program: Program is necessary,
generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate
important vulnerabilities. In a post like Kinshasa and as
events of the recent coup and student/population
demonstrations proved, lightly and fully armored vehicles
are a necessity. During the recent student demonstrations,
several of the Embassy LAV's were struck with rocks, bottles,
etc. and did not suffer any damage. We currently have a
fully armored Suburban for the COM and 10 LAV Suburbans. We
do believe that Toyota Landcruisers would be a better option
in Kinshasa because of the reliability, availability of spare
parts and fuel consumption.


E. (U) Guard Programs: Program is necessary, generally
effective, can be updated to better mitigate vulnerabilities.
Our contract guard service provided by USDS is excellent in
spite of the low salaries paid to the guards. As anyone who
has served at an Embassy is well aware, the local guards are
our first line of defense and play a critical role in the
security of both facilities and residences. The problem is
that guards are usually woefully underpaid and receive
minimal medical and retirement benefits by the guard contract
companies because they want to maximize their profit margins.
I have always been a strong advocate of a FSN/LES guard
force where the guards work directly for the Embassy so we
can guarantee a basic salary that is paid on time and ensure
that the guards receive adequate family medical benefits
which is paramount for their morale. How can we expect a
guard to be loyal to the Embassy and give up his life if he
feels he is underpaid, receive limited medical benefits and
are not respected? Additionally, guards in a post like
Kinshasa (and many others in Africa),they cannot comprehend
the fact that they do not work for the Embassy but rather for
a company that has a contract with the Embassy.


F. (U) Surveillance Detection Program: Program is highly
relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates
important vulnerabilities. Our SD program is effective and
we feel that it should continue.


G. (U) Residential Security: Program is necessary,
generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate
vulnerabilities. Residential security is critical in
Kinshasa. All residences have safehavens alarms that are
connected to a Central Alarm Monitoring System (CAMS),grills
on all windows and doors that are reasonably accessible, good
perimeter security lighting, a perimeter wall with
concertina/razor wire and 24-hour guards. As a result, we
have not experienced one residential break in for several
years. I am not sure whether or not SRWF is required for all
residences. It is necessary for key officers' residences,
but I do not believe that SRWF is necessary on every single
residential window. That said, the majority of our
residences have SRWF and those that do not will have it
installed.


H. (U) Soft Targets: Program is highly relevant, operating
effectively, well supported and mitigates important
vulnerabilities. I have worked closely with the
Administrator from The American School of Kinshasa (TASOK) to
ensure that we took advantage of the funding offered by the
Department for the different phases of the security upgrade
programs at Overseas American Schools. TASOK now has a PA
system that enables the Administrator to give emergency
instructions to students throughout the campus and the class
rooms, a 25 watt mobil radio that enables him to communicate
effectively with Post # 1 and SRWF on the majority of class
room and office windows. Most recently, we requested and
received $70,000.00 to improve the perimeter wall and place
concertina/razor wire on the entire wall.

(U) We do have an issue with security at the Congo American
Language Institute. We would like to improve their security
by adding hard-line doors, a proper screening area and some
other security upgrades but are having a problem with
funding. Is PD or DS responsible for providing funding?
Please note that there are no Americans who work at the
facility, but we consider it a soft target.


I. (U) Briefing Program: Program is highly relevant,
operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important
vulnerabilities. We have an excellent briefing program for
permanent and TDY American personnel, FSN/LES staff and the
private American community. We included the checklist sent
by the DS as a result of the Larry Foley Accountability
Review Board in our briefing. We regularly give security
advice to Embassy personnel at our All American Staff meeting
that is held every other Friday. We also brief members of
the private American community at Town Hall meetings held at
the Ambassador's residence. We also provide newly hired
FSN/LES with a security/CI briefings.


J. (U) ATA Program: Program is a necessary element of the
overall RSO security program at post, but is ineffective and
requires improvement. It has been my experience as RSO that
unless the country you are serving in is on the foreign
policy map - Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, etc. - there is no
opportunity to take advantage of this incredible program. I
have, however, worked closely with our Public Affairs Officer
and sent several Congolese Police and Security Officials back
to the States under the International Visitors (IV) Program.


K. (U) Emergency Management Program: Program is highly
relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates
important vulnerabilities. In a post like Kinshasa that has
been evacuated 5 times in the last 10 years, emergency
planning is paramount. I provide a briefing to all pertinent
members of the Embassy on their responsibilities in the event
of an evacuation. The CLO and I recently held a briefing for
all Embassy and USAID employees and their dependents on what
to expect in the event of an evacuation. Additionally, the
Crisis Management Exercise (CME) conducted by the Department
also helps prepare Embassies for crisis situations. One
comment on the EAP: DS/SPP needs to clarify the
incorporation of the Section 1500 completed by the Integrated
Survey Teams and with what the Section 1500 is supposed to
have.


L. (U) RSO and RSO/IS Training: Program is necessary,
generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate
vulnerabilities. Both of the ARSO's serving in Kinshasa
arrived well-trained and ready to handle the challenges a
post like Kinshasa offers. That said, there is not much
opportunity for a RSO who has been in the field for 2-3 posts
to receive any RSO/IS training.


2. (U) POC is RSO Jeff Lischke at 243-81-88-44608 (cell) or
934 ext. 2207 (IVG).


SCOTT