Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KINSHASA1324
2004-07-16 05:58:00
SECRET
Embassy Kinshasa
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001324
SIPDIS
KINSHASA TO BRAZZAVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG UK
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL VIEWS
1.) Summary : HMG is reviewing its policy towards the DRC,
taking into account the UN Ambassador's view that President
Kabila and the hard-liners around him have no real desire,
protestations to the contrary, to see any transition take
place that threatens their long-term power and access to the
country's riches. The Ambassador believes Kabila needs to
hear a clear undivided message from the major members of the
concerned international community to the effect that his
current path is dangerous and will not receive our support.
End Summary
2. (C) I paid an initial call on outgoing British Ambassador
James Atkinson on July 8th. He gave me some of the elements
of his end-of-tour assessment of policy towards the DRC--none
of it positive.
3. (S) Atkinson said that HMG and the other western
donors (and HMG has an aid budget for the DRC this year of 70
million dollars) had been led astray by the protestations of
the current government. There is, in fact, no desire for
serious reform, or any real transition--at least one that
would threaten their position. Instead, they are determined
to hold on to power and keep their access to what money they
can. In this respect it does not differ much from the days
of Mobutu and, of course, many of the same people (or their
sons) are in place now.
4. (C) Joseph Kabila is surrounded by hard-liners using
him as a front. The young man does not have his father,s
occasionally brutal leadership style (and the DRC needs a
forceful hand),but serves the interest of those who
(probably) killed his father. None of these want a
successful transition to what would pass for a democratic
system with the exception of the RCD. These latter want to
stay in power no less than the rest, but having no local
ethnic base, depend on a reasonably successful transition to
maintain their position here. Otherwise, it is back to the
East and to whatever can be salvaged of their position there.
5. (C) Kabila is also trying to assure that he remains as
the only contender left with real military muscle. He uses
the "Maison Militaire" to go around the Ministry of Defense
and while the troops belonging to other factions decay, the
FAC under his command maintain a relatively advantageous
situation.
6. (C) I asked who he could identify as the chief hardliners
in the Kabila entourage. He cited Katumba Mwabe (A Bemba
from Katanga, he is a former governor of Katanga, former
Minister of the Presidency and currently
Ambassador-at-large),Mwense Kongolo (A Luba from Katanga, he
is a former Minister of Justice under Laurent Kabila and
Minister of Security under Joseph Kabila--from which he was
suspended in October 2002 after unfavorable mention in the UN
Panel report on illegal exploitation of Congolese
resources.),and Gen. John Numbi. He noted that all of
these were Katangans. Other hard-liners included Samba
Kaputo (National Security Advisor. From one of the smaller
tribes in Katanga, but he grew up in the Kasais. He was
Governor of Orientale Province under Mobutu.) and Evariste
Boshab (Kabila's Chief of Staff).
7. (C) These have the support of Vice-President Bemba and
his crowd. Bemba does not want to be president; he just
wants to keep his hands in the till.
8. (C) Atkinson said that FCO was sending a paper to Cabinet
arguing that the presumptions on which UK support for the
Kabila government were no longer supportable. There was a
need to be clear about the situation and the direction in
which the DRC was being taken. He agreed that any approach,
to have any hope of success, needed to be a concerted Western
effort. I asked who he thought shared his views. He replied
he thought his analysis would not be rejected by most of the
major embassies here, but said that the World Bank seemed
happy to be shelling out the cash.
9. (C) What would a change mean? The DRC leadership needed
to be called to order-- diplomatically, of course. (There is
a strong Congolese sensitivity to criticism that could result
in a counterproductive reaction if given an excuse.) I
gather that HMG may, if the paper is approved, be arguing
this position shortly.
10. (C) Comment: Atkinson is prone to overstating, or
dramatizing, events, as was the case when he excitedly
declared the March 28 security incident in Kinshasa a coup.
His due assessment of the state of play reflects this
tendency. We agree-and have reported-that there are strains
in the Transitional government, including the use of
hard-liners around President Kabila. However, we believe
that, at least so far, Kabila remains able to balance these
elements and remains committed to elections - elections which
apparently he believes he can win.
SCOTT
SIPDIS
KINSHASA TO BRAZZAVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG UK
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL VIEWS
1.) Summary : HMG is reviewing its policy towards the DRC,
taking into account the UN Ambassador's view that President
Kabila and the hard-liners around him have no real desire,
protestations to the contrary, to see any transition take
place that threatens their long-term power and access to the
country's riches. The Ambassador believes Kabila needs to
hear a clear undivided message from the major members of the
concerned international community to the effect that his
current path is dangerous and will not receive our support.
End Summary
2. (C) I paid an initial call on outgoing British Ambassador
James Atkinson on July 8th. He gave me some of the elements
of his end-of-tour assessment of policy towards the DRC--none
of it positive.
3. (S) Atkinson said that HMG and the other western
donors (and HMG has an aid budget for the DRC this year of 70
million dollars) had been led astray by the protestations of
the current government. There is, in fact, no desire for
serious reform, or any real transition--at least one that
would threaten their position. Instead, they are determined
to hold on to power and keep their access to what money they
can. In this respect it does not differ much from the days
of Mobutu and, of course, many of the same people (or their
sons) are in place now.
4. (C) Joseph Kabila is surrounded by hard-liners using
him as a front. The young man does not have his father,s
occasionally brutal leadership style (and the DRC needs a
forceful hand),but serves the interest of those who
(probably) killed his father. None of these want a
successful transition to what would pass for a democratic
system with the exception of the RCD. These latter want to
stay in power no less than the rest, but having no local
ethnic base, depend on a reasonably successful transition to
maintain their position here. Otherwise, it is back to the
East and to whatever can be salvaged of their position there.
5. (C) Kabila is also trying to assure that he remains as
the only contender left with real military muscle. He uses
the "Maison Militaire" to go around the Ministry of Defense
and while the troops belonging to other factions decay, the
FAC under his command maintain a relatively advantageous
situation.
6. (C) I asked who he could identify as the chief hardliners
in the Kabila entourage. He cited Katumba Mwabe (A Bemba
from Katanga, he is a former governor of Katanga, former
Minister of the Presidency and currently
Ambassador-at-large),Mwense Kongolo (A Luba from Katanga, he
is a former Minister of Justice under Laurent Kabila and
Minister of Security under Joseph Kabila--from which he was
suspended in October 2002 after unfavorable mention in the UN
Panel report on illegal exploitation of Congolese
resources.),and Gen. John Numbi. He noted that all of
these were Katangans. Other hard-liners included Samba
Kaputo (National Security Advisor. From one of the smaller
tribes in Katanga, but he grew up in the Kasais. He was
Governor of Orientale Province under Mobutu.) and Evariste
Boshab (Kabila's Chief of Staff).
7. (C) These have the support of Vice-President Bemba and
his crowd. Bemba does not want to be president; he just
wants to keep his hands in the till.
8. (C) Atkinson said that FCO was sending a paper to Cabinet
arguing that the presumptions on which UK support for the
Kabila government were no longer supportable. There was a
need to be clear about the situation and the direction in
which the DRC was being taken. He agreed that any approach,
to have any hope of success, needed to be a concerted Western
effort. I asked who he thought shared his views. He replied
he thought his analysis would not be rejected by most of the
major embassies here, but said that the World Bank seemed
happy to be shelling out the cash.
9. (C) What would a change mean? The DRC leadership needed
to be called to order-- diplomatically, of course. (There is
a strong Congolese sensitivity to criticism that could result
in a counterproductive reaction if given an excuse.) I
gather that HMG may, if the paper is approved, be arguing
this position shortly.
10. (C) Comment: Atkinson is prone to overstating, or
dramatizing, events, as was the case when he excitedly
declared the March 28 security incident in Kinshasa a coup.
His due assessment of the state of play reflects this
tendency. We agree-and have reported-that there are strains
in the Transitional government, including the use of
hard-liners around President Kabila. However, we believe
that, at least so far, Kabila remains able to balance these
elements and remains committed to elections - elections which
apparently he believes he can win.
SCOTT