PLAYING THE TROOP NUMBERS GAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001217

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2008
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CG MONUC
SUBJECT: PLAYING THE TROOP NUMBERS GAME

REF: KINSHASA 1131

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government and rebel groups in the east
are prone to inflate the number of troops they deploy, but
clearly there is a build-up of troops going on in the east.
As of July 1, the FARDC probably has about 14,000 regular
soldiers in eastern Congo, including MLC components. These
forces appear to be mobilizing for an attack against Nkunda's
positions in Kalehe and Minova (in the northern part of S.
Kivu province). Possible total rebel forces (troops loyal to
Nkunda and possibly local defense forces loyal to Serufuli
and some ex-ANC troops nominally loyal to Obed) are estimated
at 6,000-11,000. On June 21, dissident commander Mutebusi
and about 300 armed troops crossed from Kamanyola into
Rwanda, where they were taken into custody and disarmed by
Rwandan authorities. FDLR, Mai Mai, ex-ANC (RCD/G military
wing) troops in Goma and possible external involvement from
Rwanda, along with ongoing rebel recruiting are largely
unquantifiable wildcards. END SUMMARY.

S.Kivu Update
--------------

2. (C) On June 21, Mutebusi and about 300 armed troops
crossed from Kamanyola into Rwanda, where they were taken
into custody and disarmed by Rwandan authorities. Their
current official status and what will happen to them next are
unknown; the GOR is making no effort to restrain their
movements nor to feed them. As of July 1, the area around
Kamanyola appeared calm and was under the control of the
FARDC and associated Mai Mai. Mutebusi's withdrawal to Rwanda
and his subsequent disarming are positive developments. There
are unconfirmed reports of speedboats landing at Kalehe,
however, and some S. Kivu residents believe that Mutebusi's
'flight' was a trick to allow him to transit to Rwanda to
join fellow dissident General Laurent Nkunda in the area of
Kalehe or Minova, in northern South Kivu. There were
unconfirmed reports that rebel forces reinforced troops in
Nyabibwe via Numbi (these two villages are located between
Minova and Kalehe) with the aim of attacking Government
troops deployed to Kalehe. It is likely that the FARDC
commander in the area of Kalehe/Minova exercises very little
control over his troops (ex-ANC troops who until recently
were part of N. Kivu's military region).


N. Kivu Update
--------------

3. (SBU) Goma remains relatively calm for the moment, but
civil society reports suspicious boat traffic on Lake Kivu
and alleges that Jerome Kakwavu Bukande, leader of the Armed
Forces of the Congolese People (FAPC) currently based in the
Ituri towns of Aru and Mahagi, and Nkunda may be working
together. (Note: Rumors of Jerome and Nkunda have been
circulating for some time, including an unconfirmed report
that the two met in Kampala. End note.) Nkunda's exact
whereabouts are unknown, but he appears to move freely in N.
Kivu and has been seen in both Minova and Rutshuru in the
past several days. In late June, MONUC military sources
reported fighting in and around Walikale between two
battalions of Mai Mai (about 1000 troops) who were sent by BG
Padiri from the Orientale Military Region and ex-ANC soldiers
who appear to be loyal to N. Kivu Military Commander BG Obed.
On June 21, a MONUC military source reported attacks by the
Interahamwe in Virunga Park.

The Numbers Game
--------------
(Note: All numbers are estimates, based mostly on information
from MONUC and MOD sources. End Note.)


4. (C) As of July 1, the FARDC probably has about 14,000
regular soldiers in eastern Congo, including 2,900 FARDC
troops MONUC military sources reported had moved from
Mbandaka between June 16 and June 25. However, the MOD
reports that the 3,000 soldiers in the Ituri Brigade who are
still in Kisangani will not be moved. Most troops transited
the Bangoka airport in Kisangani en route to other cities in
eastern DRC. The garrisons at Beni, Kisangani, Kindu and
Kalemie have about 2,000 soldiers each, and Bukavu has about
1,500. This estimate includes about 5,000 soldiers sent east
by the MLC. It does not include the possible involvement of
up to 4-5,000 Mai Mai; should they decide to involve
themselves on the government's side (or take sides at all),
that would push the total number of potential pro-government
combatants to nearly 20,000. (Note: In trying to determine
exact government field strength it is important to keep in
mind the Congolese military tradition of exaggerating - and
sometimes doubling - numbers. DAO estimates about 14,000
total pro-GDRC forces in eastern Congo, to include 2
battalions of Mai Mai at Walikale. End Note.) Troop
discipline for all groups (with the possible exception of the
GSSP) continues to be a serious problem. Although the FARDC
did send foodstuffs, uniforms, and equipment with some
troops, its track record in terms of ongoing troop support is
very poor.

Breakdown of Government forces
--------------


5. (C) Since early June, the government has moved troops,
cash, supplies, weapons and ammunition eastward via
commercial, private and MLC airplanes. From June 16-25, 2,900
FARDC troops left Mbandaka, Equateur for the east. They have
also been deployed from Kinshasa, Western Kasai, and may be
gearing up to move out of Gbadolite. FARDC troop movements in

S. Kivu, Maniema and Katanga continue. The GDRC has sped up
formal integration of Mai Mai elements in Katanga.


S. Kivu: About 1,500 FARDC soldiers// 2,000 Mai Mai


N. Kivu: About 2,000 FARDC soldiers
Maniema: About 2,000 FARDC soldiers// 1,000 Mai Mai


N. Katanga: About 2,000 FARDC soldiers// 1,000 Mai Mai

Orientale: About 2,000 FARDC soldiers

Rebel Numbers
--------------

6. (C) Total Rebel Estimated Forces: POSSIBLE (and we
emphasize this) 6,000 ) 11,000


S. Kivu: 2,000 troops loyal to Nkunda


N. Kivu: 2,000 ex-ANC troops//5,000 Governor Serufuli's
Local Defense Force

Maniema: 100-500 ex-ANC troops


N. Katanga: 100-500 ex-ANC troops

Orientale: 100-500 ex-ANC troops

FDLR Numbers
--------------

7. (U) As of January 2004, MONUC estimated FDLR strength at
6-7,000 in N. Kivu and 6,000 in S. Kivu.

The Wildcards
--------------

FDLR
--------------

8. (SBU) FDLR troops in N. and S. Kivu have remained
suspiciously quiet throughout the recent buildup. There are
limited reports of Mai Mai/ FDLR collaboration in S. and N.
Kivu, but no reports of FDLR massing at the border or
mobilizing for any military operations. It was widely
reported that a small number of FDLR worked with Mai Mai in
the Kamanyola campaign. Although there are a large number of
FDLR elements in N. Kivu, their current activities and
loyalties are completely unknown.

Mai Mai
--------------


9. (SBU) Mai Mai units' quality and reliability depend on the
quality and interests of their commanders. They tend to have
local interests and concerns, bad equipment, little training,
and no discipline. In addition, certain commanders continue
to work very closely with their former FDLR allies.

Rebel Recruiting
--------------

10. (SBU) Nkunda has been recruiting in N. Kivu and in
refugee camps, which makes it difficult to pin down his
numbers. Human rights sources have reported recruitment at
the Cyangugu refugee camp. The new recruits were reportedly
being sent to Butare Training Camp in Rwanda. In addition,
UNHCR reports that things in the camp are 'not normal,' UNHCR
has limited control, and some Banyamulenge refugees who
wished to return were not allowed to return by extremist
elements within the camp. Nkunda has also visited at least
one camp in Rwanda for unknown purposes, and the whereabouts
of the 157 troops loyal to Mutebusi (including 12 officers)
who were brought to the Cyangugu Transit Center June 8 is
unknown. MONUC Child Protection sources report that certain
Mai Mai groups and troops loyal to Nkunda and Mutebusi have
forcibly recruited children. At the same time, some FARDC
units in Katanga and Equateur have demobilized children
before deploying.
Comment
--------------


11. (C) In the midst of a very fluid and unclear situation,
trying to figure out who has what support where and how
solidly they might be commited to the mission is extremely
problematic. What this exercise does demonstrate, however,
is that this is the most significant movement of government
forces (and allied elements) to and within the East in almost
two years. We remain concerned that despite professed good
intentions of avoiding war, having this many poorly trained
troops in a relatively small area during this tense period
could all too easily lead to a confrontation.
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