KEEPING PEACE NOT MAKING WAR: DRC WELCOMES QUAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001160

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2013
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL CG MONUC
SUBJECT: KEEPING PEACE NOT MAKING WAR: DRC WELCOMES QUAD
MEETING, VERIFICATION MISSION

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During June 22 meetings with President
Kabila, VPs Bemba (MLC) and Ruberwa (RCD),visiting DAS Don
Yamamoto and AF/C Director Al Eastham noted U.S. concern with
the security situation in Eastern Congo, including the
buildup of government troops; assured Congolese officials
that, in the USG view, Rwandan support for rebel forces or
Rwandan military intervention in the Congo are unacceptable;
asked for - and received - Congolese endorsement of joint
border patrols (with Monuc facilitation) in the Kivus, and
urged the government to move swiftly on long-overdue military
integration. Bemba was most hawkish, openly stating that MLC
forces are deploying to eastern Congo as part of the FARDC
mobilization, and implying they are there to counter a
possible Rwandan incursion. Ruberwa laid much of the blame
for developments in eastern Congo on shortcomings of the
transition in Kinshasa and the government's failure to
resolve the uncertain status of former RCD military
commanders. Nonetheless, he agreed the Nkunda and Mutebusi
constituted 'insurrectional elements' and that the best
solution would be for them to go into exile. President
Kabila said FARDC forces would defend Congolese territory and
that he had not ruled out a military solution to the
Nkunda/Mutebusi problem. He said efforts to restore
relations with Rwanda would take time. He said he had agreed
to meet Kagame in Abuja on June 25, and also welcomed
Yamamoto's suggestion that the next quadripartite talks be
held in Kinshasa o/a the week of July 19. The Yamamoto
delegation also met with SRSG Swing as well as French,
Belgian and British Ambassadors (and visiting British junior
minister) to ensure a coherent message among the principal
players. Belgium signaled the EU's intention to hold a
meeting in Belgium in early July to examine ways in which to
help address the economic crisis in Congo, and said the EU
will welcome U.S. participation. End Summary.


2. (C) During their June 22 flying visit, DAS Don Yamamoto
and AF/C Director Al Eastham informed their Congolese
interlocutors that Secretary Powell and NSC Rice had been in
contact with Presidents Kabila and Kagame to urge both to
deal with the serious security situation in the eastern Congo
with restraint. Yamamoto stressed that the success of the
transition remains a priority U.S. objective; that we believe
that joint border patrols in the Kivus would be a good first
step to help defuse eastern tensions; and that Monuc is an
essential partner to the transition and efforts to ensure
elections, and suggested that the next round of quadripartite
talks be held in Kinshasa on/about the week of July 19. He
also reminded Congolese officials of the importance of
maintaining the solidarity of the transition government,
maintaining good communications with Uganda and Rwanda,
beginning military integration and pressing forward on
elections preparations.

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Bemba, The Practical Hawk
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3. (C) MLC VP Bemba said that when the transition government
was formed last July, no one believed that there would be a
new rebellion in the East, but the debate on the appointment
of new provincial governors triggered the old Rwandan "game"
of trying to keep control of the eastern provinces,
particularly the Kivus. One unintended result of their
aggression, he confirmed, is an improved relationship between
the MLC and President Kabila. He said that the MLC (and
particularly he, personally) is convinced that Rwanda is
directly involved in the events in the East. The MLC is
completely committed to fighting this aggression, he said,
and if necessary will commit its entire 20,000 troops to the
effort. (Note: The MLC seems to have already dispatched
about 5,000 MLC troops to the East, and Bemba's own private
aircraft have been assisting in the airlift of these as well
as FARDC forces. End Note.) Bemba insisted, repeatedly and
forcefully, that Laurent Nkunda is a Rwandan, not Congolese;
said that he has known Nkunda since the days when Nkunda was
a Rwandan intelligence officer in Kisangani and Bemba was
starting the MLC forces there. As for the fate of Nkunda and
Mutebusi, Bemba bluntly said that Rwanda should take back its
officers or they would be killed. Likewise, Bemba insisted
that the FARDC is not capable of combating the Rwandans (we
agree),that only the MLC is able to respond quickly and in
concentrated numbers, i.e., use the Rwandan tactics against
them. He reminded his visitors that he "had trained" with
Museveni, who knows Rwandan tactics, and said that he had
personally advised President Kabila where the government
troops should be deployed. He said that to date, the
government deployment has only cost $4 million, and has been
funded without affecting the budget. He dismissed Uganda as
a possible security threat at this time, characterizing them
as less interested than Rwanda in maintaining their presence
in the Congo. (Comment: While we agree in principle, his
statement is a bit disingenuous, given his training in and
links to Uganda. End Comment.) Instead, he insisted that
the government had obtained a copy of a Rwandan plan to
attack the eastern Congo (note: Embassy also had heard this
from Presidential National Security Advisor, end note) and
that GDRC actions are preventive and defensive in nature,
responding to elements of this plan.


4. (C) Bemba emphasized the importance of the international
community's clearly and quickly telling President Kagame that
"the game is over." Referring to current Rwandan allegations
that the government is again arming the FDLR to fight Rwanda,
he questioned rhetorically how that would be possible, now
that Monuc is in touch with the FDLR and has been working
with them on voluntary repatriation. Bemba repeatedly
endorsed Yamamoto's call for joint Congolese-Rwandan border
patrols (with Monuc supervision/facilitation),calling this a
"perfect solution" to the Rwandan allegations of FDLR
buildups - and, on the Congolese side, to allegations of
penetration of DRC territory by Rwandan troops. Likewise, he
welcomed the second quadripartite meeting and urged that it
be held as soon as possible. He agreed that elections are
essential, noting that the government had been surprised by
the large mobilization of the Congolese public to protest
Monuc and government inaction. Meanwhile, current events in
the East have set back by at least one year his efforts to
attract investors to the Congo, he said, noting that even
good economic variables (4% inflation, 6% growth and a stable
exchange rate) are not enough to overcome a tenuous security
climate.

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Ruberwa, The Concerned Conciliator
--------------


5. (C) RCD VP Ruberwa, whose response to the crisis in the
East can best be characterized as confused dithering, tried
to portray himself as conciliatory toward government and MLC
exclusionary tactics. He bemoaned the current climate of
distrust, and noted that an alignment of some transition
elements against others could ultimately ensure the demise of
the transition. Events in the East, while troubling, pose
far less of a threat to the transition than does the current
way in which the government is operating. For instance,
deploying troops to the East without full and frank
consultations with all the government elements, and without
the consent of all the government elements, is not only very
troubling but does not send a good signal for the possibility
of military integration. He also noted that if foreign
troops again enter the DRC, it would be the end of the
transition. As to the eastern situation itself, in many ways
it was completely predictable -- officers (mostly RCD) like
Nkunda and Mutebusi have become restless because their
situation is too nebulous, their futures unclear, the absence
of military integration/restructuring is a major factor in
their decision to take the actions they have taken. Ruberwa
did, however, concede that Nkunda (and Mutebusi) represented
'insurrectional elements' and should probably go into exile
for 3-5 years, that this would be the best solution - but not
in Rwanda. (Note: Mutebusi had, earlier that day, crossed
into Rwanda with about 300 of his troops and given up his
arms (septel). End Note.) Their men, however, should not be
punished but rather broken up and integrated into the new
Congolese military. (Comment: This solution could
perpetuate the problem of alleged penetration of the
Congolese military by the Rwandan military. End Comment.)


6. (C) Ruberwa said that if the situation is to be defused,
both sides must recognize the other's concerns, i.e., Congo
considers that Rwanda is fueling aggression in the east, but
Rwanda views with concern recent alleged DRC re-arming of the
FDLR, therefore both states are acting from justifiable
motives of self-defense. (Note: There is no evidence at this
time of any large-scale FDLR involvement in the Kivus
situation, although a few -- around 40-60 -- FDLR troops may
be mixed into Mai Mai elements who are assisting FARDC troops
in south S. Kivu. End Note.) The U.S. can play a key role
in facilitating dialog and understanding, Ruberwa said. He
was less enthusiastic about the U.S. proposal for joint
patrols, but did acknowledge its potential usefulness. His
lukewarm reaction may have been related to his subsequent
criticism of Monuc for not having already utilized its
Chapter VII authority to attack the FDLR and drive them out
of the Congo, or, at the very least, to disarm them and
thereby eliminate their threat to Rwanda. Ruberwa cautioned
that although the RCD wants to stay in the transition
government, the confidence and communication issues must be
addressed to ensure the RCDs continued participation.

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President, In Control
--------------


7. (C) President Kabila began the meeting by saying that
everyone involved in setting up the transition government
seems to have underestimated the enormity and complexity of
the tasks to be accomplished in two short years, particularly
when the government would be encumbered with a bureaucratic,
heavy structure. However, he said, he had reassured both the
Secretary and NSC Rice that all other problems can be

SIPDIS
overcome, as long as the situation in the East is quickly
controlled. Rwanda's allegations of ethnic genocide, or its
current insistence on an FDLR plot, are pretexts. The real
problem lies in conflicting political, economic and social
interests, and geography doesn't help. Bukavu is only 100
kilometers from Kigali, but is 2,000 kilometers from
Kinshasa. As he sees it, there are four key elements in
dealing with the current situation: maintaining
communications with Rwanda (he pointed to the upcoming June
25 meeting in Nigeria between himself and Kagame); military
integration; ethnic relations, in which, he said, the
government will resolve the Banyamulenge situation, and
certainly refugees should return to the Kivus, as their
safety is assured; and, elections.


8. (C) The Congo doesn't want war, but a military solution
against Nkunda cannot be ruled out. The government has taken
appropriate steps to contain the problem and limit the
consequences for the transition, he said, and also will take
advantage of the presence of a large number of government
troops in the East to begin the process of military
integration, thereby advancing a second key objective. He
endorsed the concept of joint border patrols as a
verification and security measure (although Rwandan troops on
Congolese soil is completely unacceptable),and indicated
that if these are successful it could pave the way for a
broader improvement in Congolese-Rwandan relations, including
reopening of embassies and an exchange of ambassadors.
Fundamentally important, however, is a climate of mutual
respect. Kabila welcomed the proposed second round of
quadripartite talks in Kinshasa, and noted that these talks
could help lay the foundation for a successful Great Lakes
conference by helping to improve bilateral relations between
the DRC-Rwanda and the DRC-Uganda.


9. (C) He welcomed the U.S. message that the presence of
Rwandan troops in the Congo would be unacceptable, but
(somewhat stiffly) seemed to object to the broader message
than the presence of other foreign troops in the Congo, who
could be hard to get rid of, could endanger the transition.
He noted that Congo's friends in Belgium, S. Africa, Angola
and Nigeria have committed themselves to help defend the
Congo or train its security forces. He mused that Ruberwa
must choose what to do, since he finds himself in a situation
in which his cousins are fighting the government to which he
belongs. Kabila concluded by saying that the current
situation in the East is like turbulence during a long
airflight -- something to be expected but which must be
overcome so that the flight is not diverted.

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MONUC's Mandate
--------------


10. (C) SRSG Swing admitted that MONUC cannot handle two
crises at once. MONUC's June mandate renewal request will
focus on MONUC's current strategic objectives and request
more troops and civilian police. He understood that
peacekeeping funding is very competitive and agreed that
MONUC's mandate should be refined. Swing described MONUC's
proposal for a joint MONUC-DRC-Rwanda border verification
mechanism. He cautioned that Rwanda has so far opposed
MONUC's draft TOR for the mechanism. In the wake of recent
anti-MONUC demonstrations, MONUC is upgrading its physical
security, working to improve relations with Rwanda, and
seeking to improve its public image by meeting with more
Congolese groups and producing a flyer (in multiple
languages) to explain MONUC's mandate and activities.


11. (C) Yamamoto also met with French, Belgian, and UK
Ambassadors, and visiting British Junior Foreign Minister
Chris Mullen (who will also travel to Kigali) to ensure a
coordinated message to the GDRC and GOR.

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COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The Yamamoto visit underscored USG concern about the
current political/security environment in Congo. Along with
other diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the British) this
pressure may help to walk the Congolese and Rwandans back
from a potential confrontation. Although the situation
remains dangerous -- with continued rebel troop movements,
threatening statements by Rwanda, and a build-up of GDRC
forces -- we are mildly encouraged by Kabila's commitment to
meet with Kagame in Abuja and strong support for continuation
of the quadripartite dialogue begun in Washington in May.
HOOKS