NEPAL: UN OFFICIAL SEES LITTLE IMMEDIATE HOPE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000310

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP PHUM UN
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UN OFFICIAL SEES LITTLE IMMEDIATE HOPE FOR
CEASEFIRE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 0280


B. KATHMANDU 0279

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Tamrat
Samuel, Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs at the UN, said that the UN stands ready to
assist in mediation efforts between the Government of Nepal
(GON) and Maoists if asked by both sides, but indicated that
he saw little immediate prospect of that offer being
accepted. Despite maintaining contact with Maoist ideologue
Baburam Bhattarai, the UN finds it difficult to discern
whether Bhattarai's "forward looking" representations are
accurate reflections of the Maoist leadership's thinking.
Absent reconciliation between the parties and the Palace, the
GON will find it difficult to resume dialogue with the
insurgents from a position of strength, Samuel said. The
Ambassador and Samuel agreed that the National Human Rights
Commission, despite its deficiencies, should be provided
technical assistance to help it perform its constitutional
mandate. End summary.

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DESPITE OFFER, UN FORESEES
NO MEDIATION ROLE SOON
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2. (U) On February 12 Tamrat Samuel, Assistant to the
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the UN,
called on the Ambassador to exchange views on the domestic
political situation and the ongoing Maoist insurgency.
Samuel was accompanied by Matthew Kahane, UNDP Resident
Representative.


3. (C) The Ambassador described the security picture as
"mixed." On one hand, the Maoists have been unable since the
end of the ceasefire in August to mount a major successful
attack against the security forces. On the other hand, the
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) remains unable to reclaim territory
under Maoist influence. In addition, the Maoist presence has
expanded significantly into the previously unaffected lowland
southern Terai area along the Indian border. Maoist
extortion has skyrocketed, he noted. Government of Nepal
(GON) intelligence capabilities remain insufficient. The
Indian government's arrest of two high-ranking Maoists on
February 8 is a hopeful sign (Ref A),the Ambassador
observed, speculating that it may have been sparked by Indian
anger over Maoist publicity of a rally planned to be held in
New Delhi on Feb. 15. Although RNA ranks are swelling to
79,000 (up from 55,000 during the same time last year),the
growth has been primarily among the lower ranks, he said,
with no commensurate increase at the middle and upper levels.
This rapid growth has strained RNA command and control
capacity in many respects, he noted, including in the area of
ensuring respect for human rights.


4. (C) Samuel said he found the lack of movement back
toward dialogue "very worrying." It appears that since the
end of the ceasefire the GON has decided to focus on
military, rather than diplomatic, efforts to bring the
Maoists back to negotiations. The GON "seems to be thinking
what to do next," he opined, and might be persuaded that,
having achieved some military strength, now could be the
right moment to reconsider talks with the Maoists. If so, it
is important that the international community support that
inclination, he stressed. The UN stands ready to help to
mediate if asked, he asserted.


5. (C) As for the Maoists, Prachanda's statement of February
4 that the insurgents are willing to accept UN mediation is
"a little encouraging," Samuel said, but it remains difficult
to determine their sincerity and readiness for negotiations.
He indicated that the UN is in contact with Maoist ideologue
Baburam Bhattarai, who "always seems forward looking," but
without a clearer picture of the "internal dynamics and lines
of hierarchy" within the Maoist organization, it is hard to
tell if Bhattarai's comments represent accurately the
leadership's thinking, Samuel acknowledged. Based on some
exchanges with him, the UN believes that the Maoists may have
softened their insistence on the constituent assembly, Samuel
suggested, but added that their answers to direct questions
on this topic remain "vague." Maoist contacts have indicated
recently to UN interlocutors that while their bottom line
remains that the form of government must be decided by the
people, "the methodology (by which that decision is reached)
is not important." That possible shift in position offers
fresh ground for discussion and compromise if negotiations
resume, Samuel said, adding "these issues can be bridged if
there is good will" to reach an agreement.
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HUMAN RIGHTS
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6. (C) The human rights situation also is a cause for
concern, Samuel said. Human rights abuses continue by the
Maiosts and GON security forces, the Ambassador agreed,
adding that the Embassy has often counseled the RNA on the
need to improve its record. UN efforts to persuade the GON
to sign a proposed human rights accord and agree to human
rights monitoring will likely fail, he warned, unless the
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) makes
greater effort to convince the RNA of the merits of the
proposal. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) must
be strengthened in every sense, Samuel replied, including its
impartiality. The Ambassador replied that neither the
Maoists or the RNA view the NHRC as impartial. That said,
the NHRC is the constitutionally appointed body with a
mandate to monitor GON compliance with human rights
standards, he acknowledged; if the NHRC is falling short,
donors have a responsibility to improve its capacity.

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POLITICAL PARALYSIS
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7. (C) There remains no clear progress toward reconciliation
between the political parties and the Palace, the Ambassador
said. He noted that he and other envoys have made frequent
representations to the King urging him to make peace with the
parties, but there is "always some excuse" for the continued
lack of progress. The parties, meanwhile, rather than taking
the initiative themselves, are waiting for the King to make
the first move. The King's public address of February 8 (Ref
B) seemed only to have aggravated the polarization, he
observed; instead of imparting a message of conciliation, the
King used the opportunity to criticize the parties.
Nonetheless, the Ambassador said he does not believe the King
plans to reconsolidate royal power, as the parties allege.
Even if he wanted to do so, the King is well aware that
neither the international community or the Nepali people
would tolerate such a step, the Ambassador concluded. While
the King always reiterates his commitment to the
constitutional monarchy, some people find his interpretation
of that concept "questionable," Samuel observed. The
question now seems to be on which side falls the onus for
reconciliation: the parties or the Palace? Whatever the
answer, it will remain difficult for the GON to resume
negotiations with the insurgents without first achieving a
resolution of the deadlock between the parties and the King,
Samuel noted.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) Periodically over the past three years the Maoists
have announced their willingness to accept UN mediation in
the conflict; Prachanda's Feburary 4 press release is only
the latest installment. In our experience, these statements
are not followed by other, more tangible indications of
Maoist readiness for peace, e.g., an abatement in killings,
bombings, abductions, etc. This last statement seems to be
no exception. It seems to us that the Maoists' episodic
endorsement of a UN role is motivated by a self-serving
desire to appear more peace-loving and more palatable to the
international community, as well as by a cynical realization
that the GON, under Indian pressure, is unlikely to accept
third-party mediation.
MALINOWSKI