BHUTANESE REFUGEES: REPATRIATION INDEFINITELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000230

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS AND PRM/ANE, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY,
NSC FOR MILLARD, GENEVA FOR PLYNCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2013
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV BH NP
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: REPATRIATION INDEFINITELY
DELAYED, BUT REFUGEES STILL WANT TO RETURN HOME

REF: A. (A) 03 KATHMANDU 2501

B. (B) NEW DELHI 584

Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. From January 19-22, PRM/ANE Melissa Pitotti
and PolOff met with various Government of Nepal (GON) and
UNHCR officials and visited two of the seven Bhutanese
refugee camps to discuss the status of negotiations between
Nepal and Bhutan to find a durable solution for the refugees.
The repatriation of Bhutanese refugees from Khudunabari
Camp, originally scheduled for November 2003 and then for
February 2004, has been delayed indefinitely due to the
December 22 incident in Khudunabari Camp (reported ref A).
Discussions between the Government of Nepal (GON) and Royal
Government of Bhutan (RGOB) may resume on the margins of the
BIMSTEC conference in Thailand, but GON officials are not
optimistic that repatriation will begin in the near future.
Feelings in Nepal among GON officials, UNHCR and the refugees
are that the RGOB is intentionally discouraging large numbers
of refugees from voluntarily returning to Bhutan. The
primary obstacle to repatriation now appears to be a
deep-seated mistrust between the RGOB and the refugees. The
refugees need an avenue not only to communicate their
concerns to the RGOB and GON, but also to feel that certain
demands are being accommodated. International assistance in
opening channels of communication between the two sides might
go far to resolve the current impasse. End Summary.

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Reports on the December 22 Incident
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2. (C) Accounts from the GON, UNHCR and refugees regarding
the December 22 incident between the Bhutanese Joint
Verification Team (JVT) and Khudunabari Camp residents
differed greatly from accounts provided by the Royal
Government of Bhutan (RGOB) in press releases and during Ref
B meetings. All of the Nepal-based accounts agreed on the
following:

-- Neither the GON, UNHCR, nor the refugees were informed of
the substance of the Bhutanese JVT's presentation prior to
December 22.

-- The Bhutanese JVT briefed the refugees on conditions for
repatriation in much greater detail than what was contained
in the Terms and Conditions publicized in July 2003. These
details were not presented to the GON prior to the December
presentation.

-- Conditions outlined by the Bhutanese JVT included that
Category I returnees, or those "forcibly evicted" who had
sold their land would not receive any land or compensation;
Category II returnees would be treated "like foreigners,"
forced to reside in "detention" camps, not be permitted
freedom of movement, and only one family member would be
allowed to work as "a road laborer;" none of the appeals
submitted by Category III refugees would be overturned; and
Category IV returnees would be taken immediately into police
custody upon return to Bhutan while their families must
reside in separate camps.

-- The Bhutanese JVT spoke "good" Nepali during the briefing.
(According to GON officials, the RGOB spoke Nepali during the
verification interviews and in bilateral negotiations.)
However, on December 22, the Bhutanese JVT used the
dimunitive/lower status ("timi") form to address the
refugees, used other harsh language, and was intentionally
provocative.

-- The briefing seemed intended to discourage refugees from
voluntarily returning to Bhutan.

-- The refugees' angry reaction to the Bhutanese JVT's
presentation was spontaneous. Neither the GON, UNHCR nor the
refugees were aware that the Bhutanese JVT would brief the
refugees on repatriation conditions until the night before
the briefing.

-- Reports from inside the meeting hall suggested that no
violence occurred inside the hall, although a large number of
refugees, mostly youths, pelted stones at the Bhutanese and
tried to hit them with bamboo sticks while they attempted to
leave the camp. The Nepali JVT members present at the
briefing did not feel threatened and regarded the violence
and injury to the Bhutanese JVT members as unfortunate, but
minor.

-- It remains unclear who arranged the logistics for the
briefing at Khudunabari Camp: UNHCR assumed it was the GON's
Refugee Coordination Unit (RCU),but RCU officials suggested
it was the Bhutanese JVT.

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Government Officials:
Bilateral Process Is the Only Way Forward
--------------


3. (C) In a January 19 meeting, Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya
noted that, despite the December 22 incident, the RGOB has
expressed interest in "getting the process back on track."
He hoped that meetings between the two governments on the
sidelines of BIMSTEC in Thailand would help to move the
process in the right direction. Acharya indicated that the
GON had proposed sending mid-level officials to Thimpu to
resolve any misunderstandings over the December incident, but
had received no response from the RGOB.


4. (C) Acharya emphasized that, according to the GON-RGOB
agreement, the GON has no role or responsibility in
determining repatriation conditions or communicating them to
the refugees. He was disappointed that the December briefing
"did not meet expectations" and went "well beyond" the terms
and conditions outlined in July 2003. "Our sense of euphoria
is gone," Acharya said. He suggested that perhaps the RGOB
intentionally sought to discourage repatriation after
realizing that large numbers of refugees intended to return
to Bhutan. According to Acharya, the GON repeatedly has
encouraged the RGOB to involve the refugees and/or the
international community in the bilateral process, but to no
avail. Although the RGOB has said it remains committed to
repatriation, he said, the resumption of the bilateral
process will depend upon the RGOB revising the conditions of
return, particularly regarding access to property.


5. (C) Both Joint Secretary Sushil Rana, Head of the Nepali
JVT, and Basanta Bhattarai, Deputy Head of the Nepali JVT, in
separate meetings on January 20 and 23 indicated that the
Bhutanese had designed their briefing to provoke a negative
reaction. Rana was discouraged by the many deadlocks and
delays in the bilateral process. Like the other GON
officials, he opined that the RGOB appeared unwilling to
repatriate large numbers of refugees. Rana explained that
the GON's only role would be to ensure a voluntary
repatriation. The process is now in the hands of the RGOB
and the refugees, he said. But he believed both sides could
benefit from confidence-building measures.


6. (C) On verification, Rana noted that the RGOB had
responded negatively to the GON proposal that both
governments appoint a second JVT in order to complete
verification of the six remaining camps within two years.
Rana was uncomfortable with UNHCR's decision to phase-down
assistance in the camps and worried that this would harm the
repatriation process. He emphasized the continued need to
include a reliable third party in the process and to clarify
conditions of repatriation, which he believed would "not be
easy." Rana was extremely reluctant to discuss local
integration of refugees in Nepal, saying that repatriation
must precede plans for local integration.

-------------- --------------
UNHCR: Focused on Phased Withdrawal from the Camps
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) Reporting on security in the refugee camps, UNHCR
Sub-Office Head Milagros Leynes denied that there is any
connection between Nepal's Maoists and the refugees.
However, another UNHCR officer indicated that the Bhutanese
Communist Party (BCP) has launched recruitment efforts in all
seven camps, distributing leaflets and posters, mostly
targeting youths who are dissatisfied with camp life and have
little hope for the future. One refugee leader later
estimated that perhaps as many as 2,000 students in the camps
support the BCP cause.

8. (SBU) Because UNHCR is not involved in the verification or
repatriation process, it has focused its efforts on how
gradually to reduce care and maintenance in the camps.
Certain food products, such as turmeric and chiles, have been
cut already from the program because of their lack of
nutritional value, Leynes said. UNHCR has two teams on the
ground in Jhapa District in Eastern Nepal to plan a
socio-economic survey, which will assess the refugees' levels
of self-reliance, and a re-registration exercise, including a
head-count and family profiling. Through the re-registration
exercise, UNHRC will assess vulnerable refugees who might
best be served through third-country resettlement. (Note: In
a later meeting, UNHCR Protection Officer Giulia Ricciarelli
estimated that the head count and basic biodata could be
gathered by end-March, but that proper protection profiling
through individual interviews would not be complete until the
end of CY 2004. End Note.) Leynes commented, and members of
the UNHCR team from Geneva agreed separately, that few
refugees have shown specific interest in resettlement abroad
and most still wish to return to Bhutan.

-------------- -
Refugees: Want to Return, But Not At Any Price
-------------- -


9. (C) On January 21, Pitotti and PolOff met with refugee
leaders S.B. Subba and Hari Adhikari. Besides discussing the
December 22 incident in Khudunabari Camp, they outlined the
six core refugee demands: 1) repatriation to their own homes
with safety and dignity; 2) involvement of the international
community; 3) assistance from the Indian government; 4)
respect for their human rights by the RGOB; 5) restoration of
citizenship; and 6) safety, security and social welfare of
the returnees. They both felt that the RGOB should adopt a
"softer stance" than was portrayed by the Bhutanese JVT in
December and that a compromise solution could be found. The
refugee leaders preferred the Government of India (GOI) as a
third-party facilitator, but recognized that, in the
aftermath of the RGOB's crack-down on Indian insurgents in
Southern Bhutan, GOI's involvement was unlikely. Subba and
Adhikari also looked to the USG to press Bhutan to soften its
position and to the UN Human Rights Commission or Amnesty
International to act as third-party monitor. In their view,
ICRC would not be an impartial or effective third party
because that organization has been active in Bhutan since
1993 and is required to maintain confidentiality with host
governments.


10. (SBU) Refugees in both Khudunabari and Sanischere camps
expressed the view that the verification and repatriation
process has been designed in such a way to prevent the return
of refugees to Bhutan. They continue to reject the
categorization of refugees into four categories, arguing that
only two categories should exist: Bhutanese and
non-Bhutanese. Many refugees were also concerned about their
safety and security upon return to Bhutan. On one hand, the
refugees generally mistrusted the RGOB's intentions, but, on
the other hand, felt a sense of nationalism and love for
their homeland. Of utmost importance to the refugees was
involvement of a third-party. They felt strongly that a
meeting between the RGOB and refugee groups could go far to
further repatriation efforts.

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Comment: The Way Forward
--------------


11. (C) The December 22 incident in Khundunabari Camp has
exacerbated already existing tensions and mistrust between
the RGOB and GON on one hand, and the RGOB and the refugees
on the other. The refugees clearly have grievances they have
not been able to express through the bilateral process until
this unfortunate confrontation. Under the conditions
described by the Bhutanese JVT, it appears that few if any
refugees will decide to return voluntarily. The refugees
need an avenue not only to communicate their concerns to the
RGOB and GON, but also to feel that certain demands are being
accommodated. Detailed, written information on the terms and
conditions for both repatriation and local integration should
be provided to the refugees at the earliest opportunity.
Third-party involvement may be essential to assist in opening
channels of communication between the refugees and the RGOB.
End Comment.
MALINOWSKI