Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KATHMANDU1758
2004-09-02 09:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: INFO MINISTER MOHSIN ON THE PEACE PROCESS,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER KMDR PINS NP GON 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001758 

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR BELL
INR FOR JNOYON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KMDR PINS NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INFO MINISTER MOHSIN ON THE PEACE PROCESS,
BLOCKADE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1745

B. KATHMANDU 1698

C. KATHMANDU 1688

D. KATHMANDU 1667

E. KATHMANDU 1658

F. KATHMANDU 1644

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

=======
SUMMARY
=======

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001758

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR BELL
INR FOR JNOYON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KMDR PINS NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INFO MINISTER MOHSIN ON THE PEACE PROCESS,
BLOCKADE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1745

B. KATHMANDU 1698

C. KATHMANDU 1688

D. KATHMANDU 1667

E. KATHMANDU 1658

F. KATHMANDU 1644

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

=======
SUMMARY
=======


1. (C) Minister of Information and Communication Mohammad
Mohsin outlined for the Ambassador on August 31 the structure
of the newly-announced Peace Secretariat. Mohsin hoped the
new body would help prepare the government for any eventual
peace process with the Maoists, as well as build trust
between and among the parties, the palace and civil society.
Mohsin was flabbergasted by the international reporting of
the "blockade" of Kathmandu (reftels). END SUMMARY.

===============================
PEACE SECRETARIAT AND PROSPECTS
===============================


2. (C) Just after briefing the press on the structure of
Nepal's new Peace Secretariat on August 31, Minister for
Information and Communication Mohammad Mohsin told the
Ambassador that he was hopeful that the new body would help
rebuild trust in Nepal's political landscape. Lamenting the
state of the relationship between the palace, parties and
civil society, Mohsin emphasized the need for the political
forces to unify, to trust each other, and to solve the
country's most important issue, the insurgency. The new
peace structure would have a political committee (to include
the Prime Minister, Mohsin and the heads of the other three
parties in the coalition -- M.K. Nepal, Pashupati Rana, Badri
Prasad Mandal),but the secretariat itself would be led by
Nepal's Chief Secretary (the country's most senior civil
servant). The four political parties would also give policy
advice to the political committee through a separate channel.
Sub-committees of the Peace Secretariat would include
constitutional law experts, security and conflict management
experts and civil society members, along with a policy
analysis division, a conflict victims' relief and
rehabilitation division and a peace talks assistance

division.


3. (C) Prospects for successful peace talks with the Maoists
were less clear, Mohsin believed. It seemed as if the
political wing of the Maoists might be ready to talk, but it
was unclear if the Maoist military commanders would accept
compromise. After all, the Maoists wanted to create a
one-party state, and the government was unwilling to give up
on democracy. Moreover, Mohsin added, while the ultimate
role of the monarchy might be less than clear, at this point
in its history, Nepal needed the King as a symbol and force
for unity. Musing on possible paths to peace, Mohsin
mentioned that the GON might be willing to accept UN
mediation, but not until the Maoists demonstrated that they
were serious about peace, by forswearing violence and giving
up their arms.

=============================
BLOCKADE?? WHERE'S THE BEEF?
=============================


4. (C) Mohsin expressed his surprise at the exaggeration by
the foreign media of the Maoist "blockade" of Kathmandu.
Explaining that he had done everything he could to convince
the journalists of the reality in Kathmandu over the period
(that there were no physical roadblocks, that the army had
given convoy protection for trucks and buses),the Minister
mentioned that he had even taken a call from the New York
Times and invited them to send a team to Kathmandu to verify
his information. Still, he explained, despite his best
efforts, the foreign media, including the Indian media, had
misread reality. Actually, Mohsin argued, the "blockade" and
the exaggeration by the foreign media created two significant
benefits for the GON: first, the Nepali media reported the
story accurately, which had built trust between them and the
GON; and, secondly, the blockade, the over-reporting and the
killing of journalist Dekendra Raj Thapa (murdered after
several months in Maoist detention) had built a sense of
solidarity between the GON and the local media against the
Maoists. In any case, Mohsin added, if American media
visited Nepal, he would gladly meet with them.

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COMMENT
=======


5. (C) Mohsin, the senior of two palace appointees in the
cabinet (and only Muslim),is an important and influential
figure, representing the King within the government. At
first blush, the Peace Secretariat appears to contain the
necessary elements to provide the government technical and
policy information to prevent repeats of past mistakes.
There was, perhaps, no way to avoid heavy involvement of the
parties in the peace process. Fortunately, it appears that a
structural wall will separate the political and technical
sides.


6. (C) It is hard to disagree with the Minister's take on the
foreign press coverage of the blockade. While the foreign
media was discussing airlift operations or even foreign
military intervention to "break the blockade," the Nepali
media did a credible job of reporting the situation on the
ground. As one Embassy interlocutor shrugged and explained,
"It's hard to blame them (the foreign press). The last real
siege they could report on was Stalingrad." END COMMENT.
MORIARTY