NSC OFFICIAL ON THE MAOIST INSURGENCY, ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001705

SIPDIS

NSC FOR GREEN/DORMANDY
STATE FOR P, D, AND SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS PGOV NP IN
SUBJECT: NSC OFFICIAL ON THE MAOIST INSURGENCY, ELECTIONS

Classified By: Charge Elisabeth I. Millard, reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) The Maoist overall objective is the creation of a
single-party "People's Republic" in Nepal, according to Major
General Kul Bahadur Khadka, co-coordinator of Nepal's
National Security Council. Khadka told the Ambassador on
August 24 that the Maoist leadership would be willing to
achieve that objective by entering the political mainstream,
if their ultimate success were assured and if they did not
have to surrender all their weapons. Khadka thought the GOI
was being more helpful with respect to the insurgency, but
hoped New Delhi would arrest more Maoist leaders. He thanked
the U.S. profusely for security assistance to date, but noted
that Nepal needed more. Finally, he raised concerns
regarding the government's ability to conduct successful
elections at this time. End summary.


2. (C) General Khadka serves as co-coordinator of Nepal's
National Security Council. The NSC in turn serves as a
think-tank on security, political and economic affairs for
Nepal's National Security Committee, which consists of the
Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army
Staff (COAS). (Note: Prime Minister Deuba also serves as the
Defense Minister. End Note.) The National Security Council
also prepares tactical intelligence summaries from all
relevant agencies and distributes them twice daily through
the PM and the COAS.

The Maoists and Their Objectives
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3. (C) General Khadka began by stating that the Maoists have
9-10,000 armed guerilla fighters. In addition, the Maoists
have perhaps 25,000 militia and 75,000 political cadres.
Their ultimate objective, according to Khadka, is the
establishment of a single party Communist People's Republic.
To achieve that goal, Khadka continued, the Maoists were
attempting to disrupt and terrorize the regime and people at
large and to organize their own armed elements. A major part
of their efforts focused on collecting necessary funds
through extortion, and occasionally, outright robbery.


4. (C) Khadka noted that the Maoist leadership would like to
achieve the establishment of a single-party communist
republic by coming into the political mainstream. They
realized that staying in the jungle would probably lead
nowhere. Unfortunately, it was unlikely that a majority of
the armed militants shared these views. Most of the actual
Maoist fighters were not educated and they would have no
future without their weapons. Indeed, even if peace talks
succeeded, many of the militants would presumably try to
retain their weapons.


5. (C) Khadka believed that the Maoist leadership would be
willing to implement a long-term plan to achieve power. This
would involve initially coming into the government and then
contesting elections to try to get a majority in the
Parliament. The Maoists would also insist, however, on
keeping a certain amount of weapons to improve their
prospects at the polls. Interestingly, Khadka thought the
Maoist leadership unimpressive; Prachanda had been elevated
mostly because of a lack of anyone more charismatic, and
Bhattarai was brilliant but clearly very erratic.

Peace Talks
--------------


6. (C) The Government was moving ahead with preparations for
peace talks and had already established a Peace Committee (a
body of political leaders) and would soon establish a Peace
Secretariat, Khadka said. Nevertheless, the Maoists did not

SIPDIS
appear ready for serious talks at this time.

The International Environment
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7. (C) Gen. Khadka conceded that New Delhi was adopting a
more helpful attitude with respect to the Maoist insurgency.
Nevertheless, the open border with India remained a serious
problem and arms smuggling was occurring on a regular basis.
"With money you can buy anything in India, and the Maoists
have money," Khadka said. Khadka also pointed out that
India's federal system made it absolutely essential that the
GON work closely with the governments of the bordering Indian
states. He added that, while new Indian Foreign Secretary
Saran understood Nepal well and would be very helpful,
National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit was a devious man who
could prove problematic. Khadka also felt that the Indian
government could be doing more to arrest Maoist leaders
resident in India. Nepal's northern neighbor, China, was by
and large helpful on the insurgency and did not appear to
seek an active role in Nepal.

US Assistance
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8. (C) Khadka saluted U.S. military assistance to date,
noting that the M-16's, night vision goggles and body armor
were all making a big difference in the field. "Your
assistance to date has been great but unfortunately we need
more," Khadka said. He cited the difficulties of fighting
an insurgency with only 75,000 RNA troops, particularly in
light of Nepal's difficult topography and the RNA's limited
mobility.
Elections
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9. (C) Khadka confirmed that PM Deuba was obviously
interested in moving ahead with parliamentary elections,
perhaps beginning in April, even in the absence of any
agreement with the Maoists. Khadka noted that he had advised
the PM that, if the elections were held on a phased basis
with the army moving from one area of the country to another
to provide security, the RNA could ensure that the actual
balloting went off in a fairly safe environment. While it
would be more difficult, the army could also probably provide
security for candidates in the run-up to the election in
given areas. However, since the army would be rotating out
to new areas by phase, it would not be able to provide
security for voters after the election. The Maoists
presumably would do everything possible to disrupt the
elections, including intimidation, and therefore the turnout
could be very low and there could be a large spike in
violence and killing in the countryside. Khadka worried that
the credibility of elections under such circumstances could
be questioned.

Comment
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10. (C) Khadka's observations on the state of the insurgency
are obviously well informed and strike us as fairly
reasonable. The Maoists face the problem of turning their
growing influence in the countryside into anything resembling
real political power. Presumably, the Maoist leadership at
least will be interested in examining any plan that allows
them to achieve power by entering the political mainstream.
Khadka is also correct in pointing out the difficulties the
government will face if it decides to move ahead with
elections. We are reporting septel our conversation with the
Election Commissioner on this topic.
MILLARD