NEPAL: UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE ON BHUTANESE/TIBETAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001550

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE
BEIJING PLEASE PASS CHENGDU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL BT IN NP UNHCR
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE ON BHUTANESE/TIBETAN
REFUGEE ISSUES

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1096

B. KATHMANDU 1418

C. KATHMANDU 1479

D. KATHMANDU 1054

E. KATHMANDU 1147

F. KATHMANDU 4544

G. KATHMANDU 1288

H. KATHMANDU 1319

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: UNHCR Representative Abraham Abraham
expressed the hope to the Ambassador on August 4 that the
verification of Bhutanese refugees would resume. Meanwhile,
for the first time, some Bhutanese refugees had begun to ask
for immediate third-country resettlement. On Tibetans, UNHCR
was sending letters to border officials to encourage respect
for the "Gentleman's Agreement," was planning to quietly
establish a UNHCR border post, and was planning a seminar for
border officials on refugee issues by the end of the year.
END SUMMARY.

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BHUTANESE REFUGEES - PROCESS
============================


2. (C) During a call on the Ambassador on August 4, UNHCR
Representative Abraham Abraham noted that Embassy support for
UNHCR had visibly affected GON attitudes towards refugee
issues. On the Bhutanese refugee front, Abraham, who had met
on August 3 with State Minister for Foreign Affairs Prakash
Sharan Mahat, believed it likely the bilateral process would
restart. It appeared as though the Royal Government of
Bhutan (RGOB) was ready to leave the 22 December incident
behind and restart the process. Although he could not
confirm whether the next meeting would be at the Ministerial
or technical level, Abraham thought perhaps at the Joint
Verification Team (JVT) level. Mahat had sounded optimistic,
Abraham reported, even though no dates had been set for the
next step in the verification or repatriation process. The
Ambassador, who had spoken with Mahat on August 2, agreed,
and informed Abraham that he raised the refugees everytime he
saw Mahat. It was fair to be guardedly optimistic that a
16th round might occur; of course, that did not mean any real
progress would be made. However, Indian involvement with the
issue could make a real difference, and it appeared that the
GON had been actively courting the GOI to get involved.
Abraham noted that when he gave a talk at the think tank in
New Delhi in May, there appeared to be a recognition that
India had an important role to play regarding Bhutanese
refugees.


3. (C) Abraham stated that he had asked the GON (via Mahat)
to allow UNHCR to begin processing third-country resettlement
for the most vulnerable cases (i.e., families with a female
head-of-household, refugees that had suffered from
trafficking or abuse). Moreover, some refugees, no longer
willing to wait for the bilateral process to bear fruit, had
also started asking UNHCR for a third-country solution.
According to Abraham, Mahat stated that the repatriation
process would have to begin before any third-country options
were considered. Otherwise, resettlement could undermine the
credibility of the bilateral negotiation process, the RGOB
might be let off the hook and Nepal would be left with the
refugees. However, the Foreign Ministry would start internal
discussions on how to move quickly on the most vulnerable
refugee cases.


4. (C) UNHCR had been pressing the GON to allow UNHCR to
carry out a profiling of the refugees and a socio-economic
survey of the seven refugee camps and surrounding local
areas, Abraham noted. The profiling was designed to better
identify those in need of special protection (i.e., those who
might not safely return to Bhutan no matter the established
conditions of repatriation),and would provide the refugees
better identification. It was part of a new worldwide system
UNHCR was putting into place. Better identification would
help especially with security concerns that had arisen from
the Maoist insurgency. The survey would ideally give UNHCR a
better understanding of the refugees' economic conditions
compared to nearby Nepali locals, which would allow UNHCR,
working with donors, to design better programs for the
refugees. The survey would also help establish a baseline of
refugee needs. Moreover, it would help those willing donors
to design development programs for the surrounding
communities; this could alleviate economic imbalances and
tensions between the local areas and the refugees. UNHCR
also planned to develop an information campaign about the
rights and responsibilities of the refugees. Thus far,
however, the GON had demurred on the survey. Abraham
insisted that there was no intention of reducing levels of
support to the refugees; the intent was to better direct the
support to refugee needs. UNHCR Nepal was also responding to
directions from Geneva to look at ways to hand off
maintenance of the refugees to other partners, to retain
UNHCR's primary focus on protection. Meanwhile, Abraham had
met with NGOs who had been interested, but wanted support
from donors and a blessing from the GON to participate. The
Ambassador understood that the GON may fear the survey
because it could look like the beginning of local integration
into Nepali society and reduce the pressure on the RGOB.
Abraham understood, and added that at the same time the
profiling was important to get a head count of the refugees,
it might also reveal much fewer refugees in the camps,
possibly as low as 80,000.

================
TIBETAN REFUGEES
================


5. (C) Turning to Tibetan refugees, Abraham explained that to
date the GON had not responded to UNHCR's request to issue
instructions regarding the terms of the "Gentleman's
Agreement" to its border officials. (NOTE: The Ambassador
has raised this issue with the Prime Minister and Home
Ministry, but also did not receive a clear response. END
NOTE.) Despite this, Abraham had been penning letters
explaining the GON's obligations and the practice used to
bring Tibetan refugees to Kathmandu, and had sent these
letters to border officials each time his staff (or those
from the Tibetan Refugee Resettlement Center) made border
visits. He also planned to send more staff for longer visits
to the Kodari border crossing point, ultimately to establish
quietly a more permanent UNHCR office. It would be ideal if
the U.S. could provide assistance to staff such a post,
Abraham added. Increasing UNHCR's border presence would
ideally reduce the chances of refoulement. Meanwhile, UNHCR
had hired a local lawyer to join the border missions.
Additionally, UNHCR planned to hold by the end of the year a
seminar for border officials (i.e., Ministry of Home, Army,
Armed Police Force, civilian police) on international law and
regulations protecting refugees. Meanwhile, the efficiency
of processing refugees for onward transit to India had been
improved by adding additional UNHCR staff at the Tibetan
Refugee Resettlement Center, and by the agreement of the
Indian Embassy to interview increasing numbers of cases each
day.

====================
AHMADIS IN KATHMANDU
====================


6. (C) Abraham also mentioned increasing numbers of Ahmadis
arriving on the direct flight from Karachi seeking UNHCR
protection and resettlement. About 160 Ahmadi asylum seekers
had thus far arrived in Kathmandu, and according to reports,
many were also appearing in Hong Kong and Sri Lanka. UNHCR
Nepal may request extra support from Geneva to interview them
to determine the possible refugee status of this latest group
of asylees.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) UNHCR continues to design and test potential solutions
to the difficulties the organization faces operating here,
such as the plan to eventually open an office at the Kodari
border crossing where most Tibetans transit and asking donors
to support a development program in areas surrounding the
Bhutanese refugee camps. However, there is little UNHCR can
do to help with the strictly bilateral verification process
on Bhutanese refugees. Should some repatriation eventually
occur, it remains unclear who would provide monitoring and
protection to the refugees in Bhutan. Abraham noted that the
RGOB had not allowed UNHCR to open a country office in
Bhutan, a sign that UNHCR would not be able to fulfill its
protection mandate in Bhutan under any eventual repatriation.
It remains to be seen how many of the Bhutanese refugees
would be willing to voluntarily return without UNHCR in
Bhutan to verify their safety.
MORIARTY