Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KATHMANDU1418
2004-07-26 01:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: DEUBA PLANS ELECTIONS ABOVE ALL ELSE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PINS PREF NP GON 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001418 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PREF NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEUBA PLANS ELECTIONS ABOVE ALL ELSE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1080

B. STATE 153894

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001418

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DEPT FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR XDORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PREF NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEUBA PLANS ELECTIONS ABOVE ALL ELSE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1080

B. STATE 153894

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During their first meeting on July 23, Prime
Minister Deuba reiterated to the Ambassador Nepal's gratitude
to the U.S., and especially to President Bush, for supporting
Nepal's development and counter-insurgency efforts. Deuba
emphasized the need for a coalition of democratic forces, to
include the palace, to force the Maoists into genuine
negotiations. However, despite many in the Nepali Congress
party wanting to join the government, Koirala would not,
Deuba feared. Secret negotiations with the Maoists could
occur but no ceasefire would be offered, and phased elections
would go forward even absent an agreement with the Maoists.
While personally in favor of a Royal Nepal Army force to
protect the UN in Iraq, the PM said he needed cabinet
consensus for an affirmative reply. Finally, Deuba affirmed
the need for Indian help to send the Bhutanese refugees home
"with dignity;" he likewise affirmed Nepal's continued policy
to allow Tibetans refugees to transit to India. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) As he did when called upon by the Charge on June 10
(Ref A),Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba began his meeting
with the Ambassador by warmly thanking the United States for
its development and counter-insurgency support to Nepal.
Deuba, in particular, singled out his 2002 Oval office
meeting with President Bush where he had heard the
President's views on violence, and stated, "I was really
impressed by him." Deuba asked the Ambassador to convey to
President Bush his warmest regards. (NOTE: Deuba is the
only Nepali Prime Minister to have met an American President
at the White House, a source of significant pride for Deuba,
and an important event in recent Nepali political history.
END NOTE.)

===================================
INSURGENCY - DEUBA'S WAY FORWARD...
===================================


3. (C) The Prime Minister believed it was important for the

political parties and the King to form a bloc with a
consensus position to face the Maoist threat to Nepal.
However, despite his many meetings with the leader of the
Nepali Congress Party (NCP),Girija Prasad Koirala, and
despite the desire of many "friends" in the NCP to join the
government, it did not appear Koirala would allow the NCP to
join. Meanwhile, Koirala's public statements regarding his
interactions with the Maoists were "inconsistent," according
to the Prime Minister.

===============
NEGOTIATIONS...
===============


4. (C) Deuba noted he was working to form a bottom-line
consensus position among the parties and the King so he could
move forward to test the Maoists' seriousness about
negotiations. International pressure on the Maoists from all
quarters was important to prepare the ground for productive
negotiations. Increased pressure on the Maoists by the
Nepali security forces would also help. Meanwhile, the
government was close to completing an MOU with the UN
Commission on Human Rights as well, to deal transparently
with human rights criticisms leveled at the GON and Nepali
security forces.


5. (C) Multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy could
not be up for negotiation, Deuba cautioned, or the King would
not accept it. Moreover, the Maoist call for a
constitutional assembly was also not acceptable to the King.
Noting he was caught between the parties and the palace,
Deuba stated a strong preference for secret negotiations, and
insisted that a ceasefire, which would allow the Maoists to
regroup as they had done during previous ceasefires, would
not be called. Meanwhile, the government had budgeted for a
"Peace Secretariat," intended to improve the institutional
knowledge and negotiation techniques of the government should
negotiations come to fruition. The Ambassador stated that
the U.S. would help wherever possible, but urged that the
Peace Secretariat be as "apolitical" as possible, to prevent
it from becoming a political football of the parties.

============
ELECTIONS...
============


6. (C) Dialogue with the Maoists was the priority, Deuba
stated. Nevertheless, uncertain about whether the Maoists
really meant to lay down their arms and give up their
one-party state vision meant the government must prepare for
elections, peace or no peace. Repeating the Natwar Singh
mantra of, "If elections could go forward in Kashmir, why not
here?" Deuba stated he planned to talk to the security forces
to develop a plan for phased elections starting no later than
April 2005. Agreeing that the Maoists would try to prevent
free elections from occuring, Deuba believed that security
could be provided that would allow people to feel safe to
vote freely. In any case, he noted, without an elected
parliament it made no sense to have a Prime Minister.

====
IRAQ
====


7. (C) Deuba stated that he was personally in favor of a
Nepali Army force to help protect the UN in Iraq, but he
would have to have consensus agreement in the cabinet for the
decision to go forward. He would raise it in the cabinet,
but also asked Ambassador Moriarty to help push a positive
decision with the Prime Minister's coalition partners,
especially the UML party members. (NOTE: The Ambassador will
meet with the senior UML-party member of the government,
Deputy Prime Minister/Finance Minister Bharat Mohan Adhikari,
on July 26. END NOTE.)

========
REFUGEES
========


8. (C) Deuba insisted that Nepal wanted to see the Bhutanese
refugees return home to Bhutan "with dignity." To that end,
the GON would do whatever it could to move the process
forward. However, Indian encouragement of the GOB would
help. Turning to Tibetan refugees, Ambassador Moriarty
raised the importance of Nepali border officials being
clearly informed of Nepal's "Gentleman's Agreement" to allow
Tibetan refugees to safely transit to India. Deuba agreed,
adding that GON officials should already know correct
procedures. Despite pressure from China, Deuba insisted,
Nepal was working in close cooperation with UNHCR.

=======
COMMENT
=======


9. (C) Deuba, having successfully formed a four-party
coalition government, now faces the difficult task of
creating consensus between the member-parties and the palace,
in an environment where little trust exists. While Deuba
focuses on phased elections in a seriously questionable
security environment, many other actors, such as the CPN-UML,
appear solely focused on participating in talks with the
Maoists in hopes of winning the role as successful
peacemaker. While free and fair elections are unlikely to be
attainable, all indications are that until the Maoists face
more serious threats to their own well-being and ability to
influence in Nepal, negotiations are also likely to be
nothing more than a dead end.


10. (C) It was heartening to hear Deuba's reactions on both
refugee communities in Nepal. Despite external pressures,
the GON does appear committed to walking a tightrope between
the West and China on the Tibetans; unfortunately, as with so
many things in Nepal, a gap exists between the government's
intentions and the practical realities on the ground. END
COMMENT.
MORIARTY