NEPAL: ARMY CHIEF'S READ-OUT ON THE INSURGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001408

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR XDORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014
TAGS:
SUBJECT: NEPAL: ARMY CHIEF'S READ-OUT ON THE INSURGENCY

REF: STATE 153894

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pyar Jung
Thapa told the Ambassador and ODC Chief on July 22 that while
the security situation in Nepal had stabilized, changing
Maoist tactics, such as assassination squads in the Kathmandu
Valley, were a cause for concern. The Royal Nepalese Army
(RNA) was taking human rights issues seriously and was
investigating alleged violations of rules of engagement
during combat operations. The COAS stated that he supported
providing RNA troops to protect the UN in Iraq, but a
decision by the cabinet would be required before such a
mission could be executed. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) COAS General Thapa described the security situation in
Nepal as having stabilized. The Government of Nepal (GON),
the monarchy and district headquarters were all intact, and
the economy was growing. However, the RNA had released 1,600
prisoners during the last cease-fire, and the inability of
the judicial system to bring Maoists to trial due to judges,
fears of retribution remained a significant problem. Thapa
noted that former Attorney General Sushil Kumar Pant had
suggested using the Special Court provision of "faceless
judges" as a possible means of overcoming this hurdle.

============
RNA DOCTRINE
============


3. (C) The COAS stated the GON had given the RNA the mission
to disarm the Maoists and bring them back into mainstream
politics, but not necessarily to defeat them militarily. To
date, most Maoists had died while attacking the RNA, not
during RNA attacks. The RNA had successfully repelled a
Maoist attack on the Myagdi District Headquarters of Beni on
March 20, 2004 despite the failure of the INSAS rifles during
the 30 or so human wave attacks launched by the Maoists.
(NOTE: The defensive obstacles placed by engineers within the
barrier plan made the critical difference during this battle.
Lack of confidence in the INSAS family of weapons led RNA
soldiers to retain their old self-loading rifles (SLRs) even
after being issued with INSAS rifles. END NOTE) The RNA
lacked local intelligence prior to the attack, and Thapa
emphasized that the citizens of Rolpa, Rukum and other
districts had told him that they could not offer the RNA
support due to fear of Maoist retribution. Meanwhile, the
COAS believed development projects like roads would drive out
the Maoists, and the RNA is employing civilian workers under
RNA management for the approximately 15 ongoing road projects.


4. (C) The COAS stated insufficient numbers of troops had led
to the RNA,s inability to maintain security with a forward
presence. RNA soldiers were currently under tremendous
stress; in addition to being in combat, Maoists were
threatening RNA family members. (NOTE: The RNA consisted of
approximately 46,000 soldiers in 2001; current strength is
72,000 with 6,000 more currently in training. 3,000 are
outside Nepal on UN peacekeeping missions. END NOTE.) The
RNA supported the idea of village defense committees (VDC) to
offset the lack of manpower. However, the Europeans had
convinced the GON that VDC's were a bad idea.

5. (C) The security situation in the Kathmandu Valley was of
particular concern, the COAS indicated. To date, the RNA had
caught a handful of Maoist Special Task Force (STF)
assassination teams (consisting of 25 members each from the
student wing of the Maoists) in the Valley, and had defused
many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well. The RNA
believed a Maoist battalion (estimated strength: 300 to 400
people) lined the valley rim in support of these STFs.


6. (C) The COAS stated that the written materials captured
from the Maoists indicate that cease-fires, peace talks and
the notion of a constituent assembly were "merely talk," and
that the Maoists would resume fighting if they did not get
their demands. The Maoists were getting substantial
financial support through extortion, especially in the
Kathmandu Valley. The COAS believed that the Europeans
hesitated to pressure the Maoists because of U.S.
involvement, but he did not understand why Nepal,s "oldest
friend," the UK would not offer more help, as Nepal had
fought alongside the UK in many wars.

============
HUMAN RIGHTS
============


7. (C) The COAS explained that he had given instructions to
let Maoists escape if it meant saving the life of innocent
civilians. The RNA had tried 20 to 30 soldiers to date via
court martial for violations of military law. The COAS
believed if a civilian was killed by mistake, then
compensation should be offered; if a killing appeared
intentional, then the RNA would investigate and raise charges
if required. (NOTE: Compensation has been awarded in many
cases. END NOTE) Meanwhile, while the RNA was taking flak
for alleged human rights abuses, the RNA was the only GON
entity attempting to take accountability for abuses, and much
progress had been made, the Chief argued.


8. (C) Grateful for U.S. military assistance thus far, the
COAS acknowledged the need to keep assistance low-key to
allay Indian concerns. While M-16s combined with Belgian
Minimis had proven extremely successful, the RNA needed more
mobility and firepower. The RNA would be interested in U.S.
M-249 Squad Automatic Weapons (SAW) to offset the canceled
delivery of additional Minimis, if funding could also be
provided. The COAS also noted the need for more
mine-protected vehicles (MPVs) to counter the frequent Maoist
roadside IED attacks on the security forces.

====
IRAQ
====


9. (C) When Ambassador Moriarty raised the idea of the RNA
sending troops to Iraq to guard UN sites, the COAS affirmed
that the RNA supported the mission "to help to pay back the
U.S. for assistance given to Nepal." The COAS had spoken
with the Prime Minister on the issue, and was waiting for the
cabinet decision to go forward. The COAS also stated the
draft Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was
stuck in the bureaucracy (Indian concerns were also a
factor),but that he would look into it. The COAS
recommended ADM Fargo bring up both the Iraq and ACSA issues
with the PM and King during his visit in August 2004.

=======
COMMENT
=======


10. (C) The fact that the Chief of Army Staff raised human
rights in the meeting -- without prompting -- is a positive
sign. All indications, to include observations made by U.S.
members of a recent Defense Institute for International Legal
Studies (DIILS) seminar, indicate the RNA is serious about
establishing and following rules of engagement during combat
operations based on Nepalese and international law.


11. (C) Lack of mobility remains a major issue for the RNA,
but until the GON directs the RNA to conduct offensive
operations to defeat the Maoists, fear will continue to grip
Nepal. No question exists that U.S. assistance thus far has
made a big difference in the security situation; if the
Engineer company at Beni had only been armed with unreliable
INSAS rifles, Beni might very well have been the first
district headquarters in Nepal to fall to the Maoists.
However, the current level of US security assistance funding
falls short of exploiting the success we have already
witnessed and opens the possibility of a protracted and
destructive counter-terrorist campaign. In coordination with
the UK and particularly with India, resources front-loaded
provide the best hope of giving the GON the momentum
necessary to force Maoist leaders into meaningful dialogue
and a political solution to the insurgency.
MORIARTY