Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KATHMANDU1353
2004-07-16 10:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: KING OFFERS VIEWS AT AMBASSADOR'S

Tags:  PREL ODIP PGOV PINS PTER PHUM NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001353 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2014
TAGS: PREL ODIP PGOV PINS PTER PHUM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: KING OFFERS VIEWS AT AMBASSADOR'S
CREDENTIALS CEREMONY

REF: A. STATE 82853

B. KATHMANDU 1097

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001353

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2014
TAGS: PREL ODIP PGOV PINS PTER PHUM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: KING OFFERS VIEWS AT AMBASSADOR'S
CREDENTIALS CEREMONY

REF: A. STATE 82853

B. KATHMANDU 1097

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a 20-minute one-on-one after I presented
my credentials on July 16, Nepal's King Gyanendra told me
that he wanted to be a constitutional monarch, and would take
a "hands-off" approach now that Prime Minister Deuba had
formed a government. The King described ongoing U.S.
assistance to Nepal as "invaluable." While unsure whether it
was time for negotiations with the Maosists, the King
promised to keep us informed of any major shifts in policy.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) After presenting my credentials to Nepal's King
Gyanendra on July 16, I spent approximately 20 minutes in a
one-on-one meeting with the King. King Gyanendra began by
passing his regards to President Bush and expressing thanks
for the "invaluable" U.S.-provided development and
insurgency-related assistance to Nepal, which he hoped would
be continued or or even increased. I responded that indeed
the USG was looking at additional ways of supporting Nepal;
in that context, however, it would be very important that
credible claims of human rights abuses by the security forces
be transparently and thoroughly investigated. The King
agreed.


3. (C) India and China were also being helpful, the King
noted. Three years earlier, he recalled, he had warned India
regarding the security threat the Maoists posed to both Nepal
and India, but the Indians had dismissed his concerns. Now,
though some in Nepal believed India was not doing enough on
its side of the border, India had visibly increased it
cooperation with and assistance to Nepal.


4. (C) Turning to the domestic political scene, the King
explained that he "stepped back" because he genuinely wished
to be a constitutional monarch. Noting the numerous
in-country trips he had taken in the past year, the King
explained that he had hoped his visits to different parts of
the country would spur development. However, perhaps because
the parties pushed against his efforts, or because of the
inefficiency and the inability of Nepali government services
to follow in his wake, it had not worked. Nevertheless, he
stepped back just the same: Prime Minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba, shrewd enough about Nepali politics to "know how he
has been used by those above him," had shown sufficient skill
and wherewithal to put together a four-party coalition. I
commended the King for bringing four of the five major
legitimate political parties back into the governing process,
and asked whether he thought Koirala could be convinced to
join his Nepali Congress Party to the government. The King
responded that Dueba was "running things now;" whether
Koirala would join the coalition was a question for the Prime
Minister. Meanwhile, the King thought Deuba was doing well,
and only worried that Deuba sometimes appeared to be in too
much of a rush to "fix things."


5. (C) When I asked whether the time was ripe for
negotiations, the King responded that it was very hard to
tell. Negotiations before the Maoists were sincere and ready
to make concessions would be a mistake, the King offered, and
it was not clear whether the Maoists had reached that point.


6. (C) The King stated he had a very positive relationship
with my predecessor and frequently sought Ambassador
Malinowski's advice. The King hoped that sort of close
relationship could continue with me. To that end, the King
stated that he would inform me of any planned major shifts in
policy, and that I should feel free to contact him at any
time.


7. (C) COMMENT: King Gyanendra appeared bright, charming and
genuinely appreciative of U.S. support. Gyanendra's
political machinations over the past few years clearly
contributed to the political instability which the Maoists
have exploited. Still, he was not forced to reinstate Prime
Minister Deuba; another palace appointed Panchayat-era Prime
Minister could have easily been the choice. His decision is
therefore a positive sign of his intent to see whether the
political parties can resume governing. And while the King
does not have all of the answers to ending Nepal's
insurgency, he at least appears to want to do right for
Nepal. END COMMENT.
MORIARTY