Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KATHMANDU1319
2004-07-14 09:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: DEPARTING INDIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS HIS

Tags:  PREL PTER PINS PINR PREF BH PK NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001319 

SIPDIS

DEFT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS PINR PREF BH PK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEPARTING INDIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS HIS
VIEWS ON NEPAL

REF: KATHMANDU 1030

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001319

SIPDIS

DEFT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS PINR PREF BH PK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEPARTING INDIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS HIS
VIEWS ON NEPAL

REF: KATHMANDU 1030

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Ambassador Moriarty on July
13, outgoing Indian Ambassador to Nepal (and future Indian
Foreign Secretary) Shyam Satan stressed that a negotiated
settlement with the Maoists resulting in multiparty democracy
could only be achieved if there were political unity between the
parties and the Monarchy. Negotiations should only be resumed
when the Maoists are genuinely ready to compromise.Third-parties
could help the process, but premature and unbalanced involvement
would further strengthen the Maoists' hand. To help pressure the
Maoists, India had increased its assistance to Nepal over the
past six months, and would continue to do so. Successful arrests
of Maoists in India were the result of the improved security and
intelligence relationship. Meanwhile, the coalition government
was a stepforward and a blow to Maoist plans. On the larger
South Asia front, Satan indicated that India had become directly
involved in the Bhutanese refugee issue, and hoped New Delhi's
rappraochement with Pakistan would continue.
END SUMMARY.

================================
NEPAL'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE
================================


2. (C) Saran complimented Prime Minister Deuba's success in
forming a broad-based coalition of mainstream political parties.
India had strongly pressured King Gyanendra to bring the parties
back into the political process, and although it appeared the King
would step back in if he believed things were going awry, the
results were thus far positive. Prior to resuming negotiations
with the Maoists, the legitimate political forces should agree
that the desired outcomes must be a negotiated settlement resulting
in multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy. The next
piece to the puzzle was to get Girija Prasad Koirala and his Nepali
Congress to join the government. This would complete the inclusion
of the larger mainstream political parties in the governing process,

and would create a formidable and unified pro-democratic force in
opposition to the Maoists. Since the formation of the four-party
government in early July, Koirala had flirted with the Maosists,
Satan stated, but as Koirala had no status and nothing to offer
them, ultimately Koirala would have to join the government or risk
becoming irrelevent. During his recent visit to New Delhi, Indian
officials, includi ng the Foreign Minister, had consistently urged
Koirala to join the coalition. (NOTE: Satan was categorical that
India had not encouraged contact between Koirala and the Maoists,
but added "we were aware that there was telephone contact between
them while Koirala was in India." END NOTE).


3. (C) Turning to the Monarchy, Satan described the King as a
bright man and sharp tactician, but was unsure whether the King
possessed a longer-term strategic vision for Nepal. Still, the
King had correctly brought the parties back into the political
process, and was at least doing what he believed best for the
country. The Crown Prince, on the other hand, was a disaster and
an embarassment. (NOTE: Local media reporting following the
weekend of July 10 carried two stories related to Crown Prince
Paras, one describing a drunk and "infuriated royal family member"
firing a pistol into the air outside a disco after a celebration
for the King's Birthday on Friday; the other, describing security
forces almost opening fire on the Crown Prince after he crashed his
speeding car near an intersection in Pokhara early Sunday morning.
END NOTE).
It was hard to ever imagine him sitting on the throne, and even the
Royal Nepal Army had expressed discomfort at that thought.

==================================
THE INSURGENCY AND THE WAY FORWARD
==================================


4. (C) Satan believed that a complete military victory over the
Maoists was not possible, particularly given the physical terrain
of Nepal. While a negotiated settlement was therefore required,
however, the Maoists believed they were still gaining ground and
would thus not engage in good-faith negotiations.
(Satan had been told that in the last round of negotiations, the
government had even accepted the Maoist's fundamental demand of
holding a constituent assembly as long as the fundamentals of
multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy remained
non-negotiable; the Maoists had, however, walked away from this
concession.) Until the Maoists were forced to realize they could
not win, they would not be willing to make any meaningful concessions.
Maintaining military pressure on the Maoists and avoiding political
factionalization --that could give the Maoists something to exploit
-- was critica1. The constellation of anti-Maoist forces was coming
together; pressure was building through the formation of the coalition
government and the military was making some progress.


5. (C) Several obstacles could derail this progress, Satan cautioned.
For example, while there would clearly be roles for outside powers to
play in the future, external involvement and any pressure to force
premature negotiations would be disastrous. Unless the Maoists were
willin g to make concessions and the government was fully prepared
intellectually to undertake negotiations, negotiations would fail or
an externally-forced settlement might lead to an eventual Maoist
takeover of Nepal. Most European capitals were probably aware of
this danger, Satan believed, but the UN's Political Department was
extremely problematic. Representatives from the UN Political
Department had been in regular contact with the Maoists and were
focused on keeping the channel open and on brokering a deal. Afraid
to alienate the Maoists, UN Political Department representatives
refused to criticize the horrendous human rights abuses the Maoists
had engineered, while at the same time being hypercritical of the
government. Given this history, it was doubtful whether the UN could
ever play a mediating role in the conflict.


6. (C) Satan stressed that the Maoists represented a problem for both
India and Nepal: India therefore had and would continue to increase
its military and intelligence assistance to Nepal. Over the past six
months, for example, security and intelligence forces on both sides of
the border were improving cooperation, and a recently established
defense cooperation body to oversee the hardware, training and
intelligence in the bilateral security assistance relationship would
also help. While the Nepalis had initially been skeptical of Indian
intentions and reticent to share intelligence, improved intelligence
sharing had led to the arrests of high-level Maoists in India,
creating many true believers in the GON. Now the GON was enthusiastic
about the cooperation, and each of the three Nepali army divisions
along the border were feeding intelligence directly to a counterpart
Indian intelligence center. "Instead oflooking for a needle in a
haystack, we now have the intelligence necessary to make arrests,"
Satan stated. (NOTE: Saran stated that he had sent a strong
recommendation to the GOI to give the U.S. access to Maoist Kumar
Dahal as requested Reftel. END NOTE).

==================
BHUTANESE REFUGEES
==================


7. (C) Saran stated that the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal were
becoming a breeding ground for Maoists and further delay in
resolving the refugee problem represented a security threat to India.
As a result, India was pressuring both sides to find a compromise
on the language of the GON's report on the December 22 incident at
the Khundunabari refugee camp. Unfortunately, NGO's and UNHCR
representatives taking an absolutist and uncompromising approach to
the problem had made India's efforts towards compromise more difficult.

========
PAKISTAN .
========


8. (C) Soon-to-be Indian Foreign Secretary Satan cold the Ambassador
that India was worried about a recent increase in infiltrations in
Kashmir, concerned it might signal a Musharraff decision to appease
fundamentalists in Pakistan following the sacking of Prime Minister
Jamali. Nevertheless, Satan made it clear that India hoped the
rapprochement with Pakist an would continue if at all possible.

=======
COMMENT
=======


9. (C) COMMENT: Saran had an excellent relationship with this Embassy
and proclaimed his eagerness to continue working closely with the U.S.
in his new position. His assessment of Nepal's political lands cape
at the end of his busy tour here is valuable, and largely tracks with
our own. The formation of the Deuba-led coalition government appears
to have weakend the Maoist position, and any further possible
coalescing of pro-democratic forces -- such as the entry of Koirala's
Nepali Congress into the coalition -- would further reduce Maoist
options. However, while we will try to nudge Koirala in that
direction, the likelihood of his joining the Nepali Congress Party to
the coalition is anything but clear. Should Koirala remain outside
the government, his machinations will only strengthen the Maoist
resolve not to compromise. Meanwhile, Satan's concerns vis-a-vis the
Crown Prince are reflected in every quarter in Nepal; ordinary Nepalis
quietly loathe Paras, and it is debatable whether he will ever become
King. END COMMENT.
MORIARTY