NEPAL: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON FOREIGN SECRETARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001288

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DEPT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM IN BH NP UN
SUBJECT: NEPAL: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON FOREIGN SECRETARY
ACHARYA

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1080

B. KATHMANDU 1147

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Moriarty made his first official
call on Foreign Secretary Madhu Acharya on July 8. Acharya
stated that the UN offer to mediate with the Maoists was
appreciated, but third-party mediation from any quarters
would not be accepted for the time being. Meanwhile, India's
help with the insurgency was increasing and improving, but
India's reluctance to become involved with the Bhutanese
refugee issue was regrettable. On the Bhutanese refugees,
Acharya indicated that the GON would not allow a UNHCR
socio-economic survey to proceed, adding that the Nepali
government strongly resisted any ideas that might distract
from the voluntary return of the refugees to Bhutan. END
SUMMARY.

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THE INSURGENCY
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2. (C) Acharya opined that now that a government had been
formed in Nepal, the foremost priority was a peace process
with the Maoists, if talks were possible. Nepal could learn
lessons from other countries' experiences with insurgency,
such as Columbia or Peru, Acharya agreed. (NOTE: Acharya
himself has extensive UN experience, and served in South
Africa, Cambodia and Liberia during conflict resolution
efforts. END NOTE.) However, Acharya made clear that at the
present the GON was not interested in UN or other third-party
mediation in any eventual peace process. Acharya explained
that the GON would keep the possibility of UN mediation as an
option, but was loathe to risk legitimizing the Maoists, or
making them co-equals by introducing a third party.
Meanwhile, the GON appreciated the offer, and did want UN
"assistance and understanding" in some areas. For example,
the GON had "created space" for the UN in development
efforts, and was expecting to sign an MOU with UNCHR for
assistance to Nepal's National Human Rights Commission and to
allow the UNCHR a role to monitor human rights in Nepal. The
Maoists, however, were a homegrown problem, and a homegrown
political solution was possible, Acharya stated. Of course,
UN assistance in areas such as disarmament and reintegration
might be needed, once a peace agreement was in place. The
Ambassador assured Acharya that U.S. support for the GON's
efforts to ameliorate the effects of, and to end, the
conflict would continue.

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INDIA'S ROLE
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3. (C) Turning to India, the Foreign Secretary agreed with
Ambassador Moriarty that India had been increasingly helpful
to Nepal in the past months. Acharya explained that, while
there was always some cooperation from India, India's
concerns vis-a-vis the effects of the Maoist insurgency on
its own security had drawn India's eyes northward. Thus, on
the official level, India was better vocalizing its support,
helping with equipment and training for the Royal Nepal Army
(RNA) and arresting Maoists in India. Acharya noted that
while stronger Indian political will to help existed, because
of corruption and the fractured nature of the Indian
political system, improvements were less visible on the
operational levels (police, border security, etc.). But
India was sending warning messages to the Maoists in
political meetings, and even targeting its intelligence
assets against the problem, Acharya believed. Acharya added
that, since the Maoists had targeted Indian businesses,
schools and transporters (after the arrests of 12 Maoists in
Bihar State on June 2),much of the Indian support was being
carried out quietly, so as to avoid Maoist retaliation. The
Indianswere, for example, quietly allowing Nepali access to
arrested Maoists and in some cases, renditions to Nepal.

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BHUTANESE REFUGEES
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4. (C) However, Acharya continued, when it came to the
approximately 103,000 Bhutanese refugees in eastern Nepal,
India remained reticent to become involved, perhaps in part
because of the presence of other ethnic Nepali populations in
India itself. Although India was becoming more concerned
about Maoist infiltration of the camps, and what that might
mean for Indian security, the Foreign Secretary lamented
India's mantra that the problem required a bilateral
solution; Acharya asserted that Indian involvement could lead
to a quick, durable and equitable solution. Giving the
Ambassador background on recent events, Acharya explained
that the GOB had yet to formally respond to Nepal's report on
the December 22 Khundunabari incident (when Bhutanese members
of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) had been pelted with
stones). Acharya noted that, in its report of the incident,
the GON said they would give the JVT more security in the
future, but had also included a paragraph asking the GOB to
be more liberal in its interpretation of the conditions of
return. This paragraph appeared to be the sticking point for
the GOB, Acharya believed.

5. (C) Acharya stated that he had met with the seven camp
secretaries (refugee representatives) on June 25, and that

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the GON and the secretaries had agreed on three main points.
First, there must be some international observer with a
protection mandate in Bhutan to monitor the return of the
refugees, be it UNHCR, ICRC or another body. Second,
refugees that had been forced to abandon land in Bhutan
should be able to return to their homes, not merely to move
from one refugee camp to another. Thirdly, both the GON and
refugee representatives hoped that the GOB would agree to a
liberal interpretation of Bhutanese law; after all, Acharya
added, since Bhutan traditionally had such good legal
documentation, most refugees had clear evidence of one form
or another of property ownership or even citizenship.
Ideally, the GOB would be liberal in accepting such evidence,
and would be willing to give back citizenship to those who
were forced out of Bhutan, rather than making them live for
two years in a camp while their citizenship status was
"considered." Thus, if the refugees were willing to take
some risks, the GON would firmly support their desire to
return to their homes in Bhutan. (NOTE: Under the JVT
exercise, of those 12,183 refugees considered in the
Khundunabari Refugee Camp, only 2.4 percent are considered
"Category 1" and entitled to receive full citizenship upon
their return to Bhutan. "Category 2" refugees make up 70.55
percent of the camp; they would be allowed to return but
would have to live in a camp in Bhutan for two years while
their appeals for citizenship were considered -- based on
numerous conditions. END NOTE.)


6. (C) Acharya reacted strongly to the suggestion that UNHCR
be allowed to undertake a socio-economic survey of the camps.
(NOTE: UNHCR-Nepal forwarded a proposal for an "Individual
Profiling Exercise" to the Nepali Foreign Secretary on July

1. END NOTE.) Acharya feared the survey would muddy the
waters, in that it implied eventual absorbtion of some of the
refugees into Nepal. This might lesse the pressure on the
GOB to take back the refugees. Voluntary repatriation is the
solution, and the refugees want to go back, Acharya opined.
Thus, while the GON was reviewing UNHCR's proposal for the
survey, it was unlikely to give its consent. Acharya pointed
out that the GON had sent its report on the December 22
incident only to the GOB, and yet sections of the report had
been quoted to Acharya by Indian officials during Indian
Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's recent visit. India was
clearly in the loop with the GOB and could be the key to
moving the whole process forward, Acharya implied.


7. (C) COMMENT: Foreign Secretary Acharya was clearly
pleased to welcome Ambassador Moriarty to Nepal and stressed
the positive tone of U.S.-Nepal relations. Acharya similarly
stressed the GON's decision to put off for now UN offers to
mediate with the Maoists. This buttresses the assertion that
PM Deuba made to the Charge on June 10 that elections would
be the first priority for his government: the influence of
the UML in the cabinet could at some point, however, shift
the priority to the peace process (Ref A).


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Meanwhile, as noted Ref B, the
notion of local integration and third-country resettlement
for the Bhutanese refugees will be an uphill battle here in
Kathmandu, and will be an issue that we will have to revisit.
As for improving the terms of voluntary repatriation with
the GOB, Acharya's comments on GOB flexibility seemed more
wistful than optimistic during the meeting with the
Ambassador. Indeed, in a meeting later the same day with the
DCM, Acharya responded unequivocally in the negative when
asked specifically whether he sensed any positive movement
from the GOB. END COMMENT.
MORIARTY