Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KATHMANDU1080
2004-06-10 21:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: PM DEUBA'S PLAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER NP GON 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001080 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM DEUBA'S PLAN

Classified By: Charge Janet Bogue for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001080

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM DEUBA'S PLAN

Classified By: Charge Janet Bogue for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During a warm 40-minute courtesy call by the
Charge on Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba on June 10,
Nepal's new Prime Minister broadly outlined the challenges he
faces in building a new government, dealing with the Maoists,
and restoring democratic processes in Nepal. Deuba's stated
priorities include forming a multiparty government, holding
phased elections and secret negotiations with the Maoists.
The new Prime Minister appears determined to succeed, but
faces significant challenges. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge met Prime Minister Deuba on June 10 for about
40 minutes. Deuba expressed thanks to the United States for
the military assistance to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) as well
as for declaring the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
terrorists. In particular, the Prime Minister expressed
thanks to President Bush for meeting him at the White House
in May 2002.


3. (C) The Prime Minister opined that the United
Marxist-Leninist (UML) party is a tough negotiator, but he
hoped to be able to bring them into the government soon.
Smiling, Deuba asked the Charge for "any help" the Embassy
could offer to convince the other parties to join the
government, in particular G.P. Koirala's Nepali Congress.
Further demonstrating the challenges ahead, Deuba requested
any help the Embassy could offer to convince King Gyanendra
to roll back the King's right of approval for any
Ambassadorial appointments or transfers of senior civil
servants -- instituted by decree after Deuba had been fired
as prime minister in October 2002. Deuba doubted aloud
whether he could convince the various parties to join his
government unless the King gave some ground. The Charge
responded that the Embassy would continue to press all
parties for restoration of democratic processes and for a
multiparty democratic front to deal with the Maoists.


4. (C) Deuba lamented the Maoist recruitment of children,
kidnapping of teachers for indoctrination, extortion of
businesses and damage to Nepal's infrastructure. When asked
when Deuba planned to negotiate with the Maoists, Deuba did
not reveal timing, but opined that because open negotiations
had failed twice, he would proceed with secret negotiations.
However, he emphasized, his first priority, after forming a
multiparty government, would be to hold elections. "I never
thought I would be the one appointed," Deuba stated. "The
King sacked me as incompetent (for not holding elections). I
will not be incompetent again." Mentioning the Indian
experience in Kashmir, Deuba believed that phased elections
could proceed in Nepal, regardless of the Maoists. (NOTE:
In a seperate meeting on June 7, MFA Joint Secretary for
South Asia Madan Bhattarai commented to the DCM that India's
election experiences in Kashmir and Punjab had been one of
Foreign Secretary Natwar Singh's talking points with the GON.
END NOTE.)


5. (C) Deuba mentioned that the King would announce the first
two members of the cabinet that evening: Prakash Man Singh as
Minister of Physical Planning and Works; and Bimalendra Nidhi
as Minister for Education and Sports as well as Minister of
Industry, Commerce and Supplies. (NOTE: Bios of the new
ministers will be provided septel. END NOTE.) Deuba added
that his cabinet would be smaller and more manageable this
iteration; in addition, only a few ministers would be
appointed today to leave room for the other parties.


6. (C) COMMENT: Deuba finds himself in the unenviable
position of having to overcome a series of hurdles just to
form his government. While it appears the UML is on the cusp
of joining, many of the parties, perhaps to include the UML,
want to see a tangible show of respect for democratic
practices by the King, and may hold out for just that. Other
wild cards are whether G.P. Koirala, the leader of the other
faction of the Nepali Congress, will continue to play the
spoiler and whether the King will be satisfied to be a
constitutional monarch. All of these questions must be
answered before any serious attention can be focused on
elections or the Maoist problem.


7. (C) Deuba's determination to succeed as Prime Minister was
palpable. His goals are clear: a broader-based government,
including especially the UML, a small cabinet (his last was
huge and unmanageable),secret negotiations with the Maoists
(his belief that public posturing by both sides had led to
previous failures),and quick elections (the failure to hold
elections being the basis for which he was previously
removed) reveal his thinking. The political challenges in
this many-cornered polity are formidable, however, and sucess
in meeting his goals will take much determination, work and
outside support. END COMMENT.
BOGUE