Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KABUL1381
2004-05-15 04:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE
how-toO 150409Z MAY 04 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5055 INFO ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE NATO EU COLLECTIVE 0538 AMEMBASSY ALMATY AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BISHKEK AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY TASHKENT AMCONSUL DUBAI AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL PESHAWAR NSC WASHDC DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-3// CJCS WASHINGTON DC USMISSION USUN NEW YORK COMJTF180 BAGRAM AFG//CG/C3/C9/POLAD// SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/J3// USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5/POLAD// USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL USMISSION USNATO USMISSION GENEVA CJTF 180CMDGRP USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL USCINCENT MACDILL AFB
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001381
NSC FOR RBLACKWILL
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CJTF180 FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014
TAGS: MASS PGOV PINR PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001381
NSC FOR RBLACKWILL
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CJTF180 FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014
TAGS: MASS PGOV PINR PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary. VII Corps General Wasiq met with the
Ambassador on May 10 to discuss major initiatives to bring
stability and promote economic and political progress in
northern Afghanistan. Key topics included: northern
disappointment with the perceived slow pace of reconstruction
efforts in the north; VII Corps objections to Phase II of the
Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR)
program; and reports of covert Iranian funding of Shia
elements in the Mazar-e-Sharif area. End Summary.
2. (C) General Wasiq, one of Tajik Jamiat leader Usted
Atta,s top field officers, noted the northern perception
that there did not appear to be adequate international
assistance allocated to northern Afghanistan. The Ambassador
outlined several major USG initiatives under way in northern
Afghanistan, such as programs to build and revamp schools and
clinics and irrigation projects. Wasiq added that
construction of a new Balkh University campus had just begun.
The Ambassador expressed interest in hearing more about
progress on the university.
3. (C) Wasiq outlined VII Corps objections to including its
1st and 26th Divisions in Phase I DDR. He claimed that
General Dostum deserved 95 per cent of the blame for recent
hostilities. Wasiq said that if VII Corps gives up its
weapons, Atta and his followers might as well pack up and
leave Mazar-e-Sharif. The Ambassador replied that it was not
feasible for Dostum to attack. Any such action would not be
ignored and would not be tolerated.
4.(C) Wasiq reiterated Atta,s position that Phase II DDR is
not fair. Wasiq remarked that he thought Minister of Defense
Fahim had not paid a lot of attention to this matter. The
Ambassador noted that Atta appears to have a DDR agenda that
he has coordinated with Fahim Khan. The Ambassador stated
that DDR is the top priority and that if Phase I DDR is not
completed on time, it could delay the national elections.
5. (C) Wasiq also noted that Mohaqeq,s return to the
national government would benefit the government, but would
have a negative impact on his political support. Wasiq
suggested that this would undercut Mohaqeq,s strategy of
presenting himself as sticking to his principles in support
of his people,s interests.
6. (C) Wasiq then said he had reliable information that
Iranian agents had been covertly funding Shia groups in the
Mazar-e-Sharif area. This assistance reportedly including
the provision of some arms. The Ambassador indicated we take
such matters seriously and would look into it.
--------------
Comment
--------------
7. (C) This was a useful discussion that covered Jamiat views
on urgent issues that dominate political debate in northern
Afghanistan. It provided an opportunity to spotlight
significant U.S. initiatives in the region.
8. (C) The allegations about Iranian agents, activities in
the Mazar-e-Sharif warrant further examination. Iran has a
history of involvement in the region; local suspicions were
rekindled when Iran reopened its consulate general in
Mazar-e-Sharif earlier this year. End Comment.
Khalilzad
NSC FOR RBLACKWILL
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CJTF180 FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014
TAGS: MASS PGOV PINR PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary. VII Corps General Wasiq met with the
Ambassador on May 10 to discuss major initiatives to bring
stability and promote economic and political progress in
northern Afghanistan. Key topics included: northern
disappointment with the perceived slow pace of reconstruction
efforts in the north; VII Corps objections to Phase II of the
Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR)
program; and reports of covert Iranian funding of Shia
elements in the Mazar-e-Sharif area. End Summary.
2. (C) General Wasiq, one of Tajik Jamiat leader Usted
Atta,s top field officers, noted the northern perception
that there did not appear to be adequate international
assistance allocated to northern Afghanistan. The Ambassador
outlined several major USG initiatives under way in northern
Afghanistan, such as programs to build and revamp schools and
clinics and irrigation projects. Wasiq added that
construction of a new Balkh University campus had just begun.
The Ambassador expressed interest in hearing more about
progress on the university.
3. (C) Wasiq outlined VII Corps objections to including its
1st and 26th Divisions in Phase I DDR. He claimed that
General Dostum deserved 95 per cent of the blame for recent
hostilities. Wasiq said that if VII Corps gives up its
weapons, Atta and his followers might as well pack up and
leave Mazar-e-Sharif. The Ambassador replied that it was not
feasible for Dostum to attack. Any such action would not be
ignored and would not be tolerated.
4.(C) Wasiq reiterated Atta,s position that Phase II DDR is
not fair. Wasiq remarked that he thought Minister of Defense
Fahim had not paid a lot of attention to this matter. The
Ambassador noted that Atta appears to have a DDR agenda that
he has coordinated with Fahim Khan. The Ambassador stated
that DDR is the top priority and that if Phase I DDR is not
completed on time, it could delay the national elections.
5. (C) Wasiq also noted that Mohaqeq,s return to the
national government would benefit the government, but would
have a negative impact on his political support. Wasiq
suggested that this would undercut Mohaqeq,s strategy of
presenting himself as sticking to his principles in support
of his people,s interests.
6. (C) Wasiq then said he had reliable information that
Iranian agents had been covertly funding Shia groups in the
Mazar-e-Sharif area. This assistance reportedly including
the provision of some arms. The Ambassador indicated we take
such matters seriously and would look into it.
--------------
Comment
--------------
7. (C) This was a useful discussion that covered Jamiat views
on urgent issues that dominate political debate in northern
Afghanistan. It provided an opportunity to spotlight
significant U.S. initiatives in the region.
8. (C) The allegations about Iranian agents, activities in
the Mazar-e-Sharif warrant further examination. Iran has a
history of involvement in the region; local suspicions were
rekindled when Iran reopened its consulate general in
Mazar-e-Sharif earlier this year. End Comment.
Khalilzad