Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04JERUSALEM171
2004-01-20 05:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

HOW HAMAS IS WORKING TO REPLACE THE PA AND THE PLO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER KDEM KPAL KWBG IS 
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O 200500Z JAN 04
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
WHITE HOUSE NSC
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000171 


NEA FOR BURNS/SATTERFIELD
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM KPAL KWBG IS
SUBJECT: HOW HAMAS IS WORKING TO REPLACE THE PA AND THE PLO

Classified By: Consul General David D. Pearce. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

This cable has been cleared by Embassy Tel Aviv.

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000171


NEA FOR BURNS/SATTERFIELD
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM KPAL KWBG IS
SUBJECT: HOW HAMAS IS WORKING TO REPLACE THE PA AND THE PLO

Classified By: Consul General David D. Pearce. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

This cable has been cleared by Embassy Tel Aviv.


1. (C) Summary: A range of Palestinian thinkers and
activists are reporting that Hamas is moving with
unprecedented boldness to establish itself as an alternative
leadership to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and PLO. Hamas
leaders are publicly arguing that stalled roadmap
implementation, the weakening of the PA, and the building of
the separation barrier all vindicate the movement's long-held
position that a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not possible. PA ministers
have told us in January and December that Hamas effectively
controls several strongholds in the Gaza Strip. Hamas
representatives at cease-fire talks in December refused to
recognize the PLO and PA as institutions representative of
the Palestinian people. They called for an entirely new
political leadership. Meanwhile, Hamas has won significant
victories in student council and syndicate elections across
the West Bank over the past several months. Hamas leaders
also appear to be emphasizing an ability to conduct
Palestinian foreign policy on their own. Hamas leaders in
Gaza have made a point of receiving Egyptian envoys in
meetings that paralleled those the Egyptians are holding with
the PA. The Hamas foreign policy -- based on a rejection of
any final peace agreement with Israel -- is aimed at
escalating the Intifada, burying the roadmap, and undermining
the PA. End summary.

Hamas Throws Down the Gauntlet in Cairo
--------------


2. (C) A range of Palestinian thinkers and activists are
reporting to us that Hamas is moving with unprecedented
boldness to establish itself as an alternative leadership to
the Palestinian Authority and PLO. Fatah contacts raised the
first alarm bells on this subject in December when they
returned, shocked, from failed cease-fire talks in Cairo.
Fatah negotiator Ahmad Ghnaym told us he was unnerved that
the Hamas delegation had not only rejected the PA's
cease-fire plan, but also announced that it did not consider

either the PA or the PLO to be institutions representative of
the Palestinian people. For years, Hamas had said it would
compete with secular, nationalist parties like Fatah if it
were allowed to stand on equal footing within the confines of
existing institutions. Hamas leaders said they wanted to
join the PLO, but they insisted upon 40 percent control of
the PLO National Council as their price. This time, Hamas
delegates in Cairo refused to approve a statement that would
have confirmed the authority of the PA and the legitimacy of
the PLO. When one left-wing activist suggested adjusting PLO
decision-making to give Hamas a greater voice, Hamas
delegates countered that the Palestinian people needed a new
leadership body altogether, with a new charter and political
program.

Hamas Establishes
Bases of Control in Gaza
--------------


3. (C) PA ministers have told us that Hamas effectively
controls several strongholds in the Gaza Strip. PA Minister
of Local Government Jamal al-Shobaki recently exclaimed in a
conversation with Poloff, "I just visited Gaza. Hamas is in
control there. There is no Authority in Gaza." Prime
Minister Abu Ala'a mentioned to visiting Senator Bill Nelson
on January 7 that his aides had advised him against even
attempting to visit Rafah. In an audacious challenge to the
PA, masked and armed Hamas militants on December 29 waylaid
PA Housing Minister Abd al-Rahman Hamad and Arafat office
director Ramzi Khuri as they rode in a convoy toward the
Rafah crossing in southern Gaza. The militants held Hamad
and Khuri for about four hours and took them on a forced tour
of IDF damage inflicted on the Rafah area, demanding to know
why the PA had failed to defend and provide aid to its
constituents.

Establishing Itself As
The Mainstream Palestinian Representative
--------------


4. (C) Throughout December and January, Hamas has worked to
assert itself as a representative of the entire Palestinian
people, not just one Islamist faction.

-- Leading the Resistance: Hamas delegates in Cairo
deliberately staked out a position for the movement as the
leader of Palestinian resistance. Hamas delegates rejected
the PA and Fatah's cease-fire plan in Cairo, and then, when
the talks foundered, returned home implying that they held a
deeper commitment to the Intifada than other factions.

-- Making Independent Foreign Policy: Hamas leaders in
recent weeks appear to be emphasizing an ability to conduct
Palestinian foreign policy on their own. Hamas leaders in
Gaza made a point in December of receiving Egyptian envoys in
meetings that paralleled those the Egyptians are holding with
the PA. An Egyptian embassy official told DPO on January 15
that Hamas envoys in Egypt are attempting to discuss
cease-fire issues independently of the PA. Hamas political
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi claimed January 15 to have
rejected what he said were secret U.S. contacts calling for a
cease-fire. Hamas political leader Musa Abu Marzuq similarly
recently claimed that the movement had secret contacts with
the U.S. in the past.

-- Broadening Its Ideology: Hamas Spiritual Leader Shaykh
Ahmad Yasin January 13 publicly revived a long-dormant
proposal to offer Israel an extended truce in exchange for a
withdrawal to the June 1967 lines. The statement appeared to
be an effort to broaden the appeal of Hamas to Palestinians
who are reluctant to support the movement because of a
doctrine that promises seemingly never-ending war.

A Sharpened Propaganda Campaign
Against the Palestinian Authority
--------------


5. (C) Hamas is complementing these efforts to assert itself
with a sharpening of its long-running public campaign to
undermine faith in the PA. Al-Risalah, a weekly Gaza
newspaper linked to Hamas, ran an "exclusive" story on
January 8 that offers a telling example of anti-PA
propaganda. The article editorialized that the PA "is absent
from the political and the social arena." The article quotes
an unnamed Legislative Council official as saying, "There is
no such thing as a government... Since the government's
formation it has not made a single political or domestic
decision." The article cites the opinions of "young men" who
allegedly believe that "charity organizations offer aid and
assistance to the population long before the PA does." The
article concludes by quoting a PLC member who says that the
current crisis necessitates more than a new cabinet, but a
"review of the Palestinian situation as a whole, especially
the political system."

Building Influence in
Quasi-Governmental Bodies
--------------


6. (C) Hamas activists also dealt a blow to Fatah, and with
it the PA, in a series of strong showings in student council
and syndicate elections in December. Hamas deepened its
control of the Bir Zeit University student council, a Fatah
stronghold before the Intifada. Hamas candidates won control
of the Ramallah Mens Training Center and of the Engineers
Syndicate Elections in Gaza. Hamas rivaled Fatah without
completely prevailing in several other elections where its
influence was previously negligible. At Bethlehem University
-- a largely Christian institution -- Hamas rose from
negligible support to take seven seats to Fatah's 13. In the
West Bank Engineers Syndicate elections, Fatah headed off a
Hamas victory by agreeing to share power in the steering
committee.

Comment: A Vulture Circles the PA
--------------


7. (C) Hamas's effort to sideline the PA and PLO and dominate
Palestinian politics is an evolutionary effort, not a
revolutionary one. "They want power, but they don't want a
civil war," Jerusalem's Arab Thought Forum Director Abd
al-Rahman Abu Arafah emphasized to Poloff in a meeting on
January 15. Hamas is aiming to perpetuate violence and
instability and claim power as the central authority of the
PA recedes. This tactic has already helped Hamas build
strongholds in Gaza. Victories in syndicate and student
council elections have also won it a significant foothold in
the West Bank. With reportedly undisputed control over most
mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hamas is positioned
to spread its message even as it remains outside of
Palestinian political institutions.


8. (C) Many analysts of Palestinian politics have devoted
excessive attention to polls in assessing the power balance
in the West Bank and Gaza. By the polls, Hamas and Fatah are
rivals with about 20 percent support each (but with Fatah
almost always slightly higher). (The vast majority of
Palestinians register their dissatisfaction with either
group.) But in a Palestinian political environment that is
increasingly anarchic, a well-organized minority like Hamas
can exert influence far beyond its numbers. More
importantly, the separation barrier is proving to be an
unexpected but crucial boon to the organization. As the
route of the barrier leads Palestinians to conclude that a
two-state solution is impossible, Hamas leaders are claiming
that their long-time opposition to accommodation with Israel
is being vindicated. More importantly, as the barrier and
checkpoints isolate and divide the West Bank and Gaza, the
PA's central institutions are losing their reach and local
organizations are rising in importance. Hamas has long
devoted its efforts to building a wide network of local
welfare services, precisely the type of institutions
Palestinians are coming to rely upon as IDF-imposed internal
closures deny them freedom of movement. Meanwhile, the PLO,
which put most of its efforts into building a centralized,
authoritarian PA, laments it is boxed in and unable to act
effectively.


9. (C) When Abu Ala'a gave up on the Cairo cease-fire talks
in December following Hamas's rebuff, a new political dynamic
was born. Hamas, long a critical outsider, had demonstrated
an ability to veto a central plank of a PA government. Now
the movement is attempting to pocket that veto, press its
advantage, and begin to actually direct Palestinian policy.


PEARCE