YUDHOYONO: A MAN FOR ALL PARTIES

S E C R E T JAKARTA 000711


NSC FOR KAREN BROOKS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ID
SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO: A MAN FOR ALL PARTIES

REF: A. JAKARTA 76

B. 03 JAKARTA 8778

(U) Classified by Political Officer David R. Greenberg,
reason 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Coordinating Minister for Political and Security
Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has stated openly his
intention to run for the presidency in 2004. He has not yet
declared allegiance to any particular political party,
however, and, consequently, is both widely courted and
criticized as indecisive. Yudhoyono's many options
illustrate his broad appeal and potential to become the
consensus candidate of a broad but not-yet-extant coalition.
If he fails to make the right choice at the right time,
however, he may wind up with little or no chance to win high
office. End Summary.

THE WAITING GAME
--------------


2. (C) Yudhoyono, who competed in 2001's People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) election for the vice presidency
as the Muslim Sovereignty Union (PDU) nominee, long has
appeared as a potential presidential candidate for 2004. He
directed the creation of the Democratic Party (PD) in 2002,
although refusing to take a party position or to encourage
publicly the perception that he would be PD's presidential
nominee. As the 2004 elections approached, other parties
began to consider Yudhoyono a potential standard-bearer.
Credible polls enhanced his appeal, as he rose in popularity
throughout 2003, often placing second only to President
Megawati. In early January 2004, press articles quoted
Yudhoyono saying he intended to run for the presidency and,
accordingly, would resign from the cabinet when parties must
nominate their candidates (early May 2004). He declined to
identify his political party of choice, however.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PD): THE BIRD IN THE HAND
-------------- --


3. (C) PD is a newcomer to the political scene and is widely
seen as Yudhoyono's political machine; Yudhoyono's image
graces the business card of party Chairman Budhisantoso as
well as banners and stickers throughout the party
headquarters. Yudhoyono himself designed the party logo and
drafted the by-laws. In founding PD, Yudhoyono reportedly
had the encouragement of 100 appointed members of the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and many local officials
in conflict areas, such as Aceh and Papua. Budhisantoso
claimed PD has issued six million membership cards, although
he admitted that he was uncertain of winning that many votes
and twice mentioned to us he and the party suffered from a
lack of funds. PD has no distinctive ideological appeal and
is reportedly hurt by weak organization. Most of our
contacts from other political parties readily dismiss PD's
prospects of passing the threshold required to nominate a
presidential candidate. (Note: the threshold is three
percent of the seats in the House of Representative or five
percent of the popular vote. End Note.)

THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB)
--------------


4. (C) Some of Yudhoyono's advisors tell us the Coordinating
Minister recognizes PD's weaknesses and is holding out for
the nomination of one of Indonesia's larger parties. The
party of choice, according to TB "Benny" Silalahi, a former
Minister of State for Administrative Reform and now a member
of Yudhoyono's campaign team, is the National Awakening Party
(PKB). In this scenario, former President (and PKB overlord)
Abdurrachman Wahid, realizing that he cannot campaign
credibly after his 2001 impeachment, decides to support
Yudhoyono. Several PKB contacts close to Wahid, including
his daughter Yenny, have told us Yudhoyono is the figure most
likely to gain Wahid's support if Wahid decides to withdraw
-- a development no one guarantees. According to Silalahi,
20 of PKB's 30 provincial boards were supportive of a
Yudhoyono nomination, with the remaining 10 likely soon to
fall in line. Silalahi claimed one main stumbling block for
Yudhoyono was Wahid's high price for shifting roles from
candidate to kingmaker. Wahid reportedly wanted Yudhoyono to
choose a PKB running mate and reserve half of his cabinet
positions for PKB.

PD: WE CAN SHARE, BUT WE DON'T LIKE RADICALS
--------------


5. (C) Noting that his main goal was to promote Yudhoyono's
election, PD Chairman Budhisantoso told us he saw PKB more as
a potential partner than as a rival for Yudhoyono's
attention. He said he had received positive signals from
various factions within PKB and hoped to meet soon with
former President Wahid. He asserted that "hundreds" of
Ulamas (senior Islamic figures) had expressed their support
for Yudhoyono's candidacy. Other Islamic parties aside from
PKB also appear to view Yudhoyono positively; National
Mandate Party (PAN) Chairman Amien Rais publicly named
Yudhoyono as a possible running mate, and even officials of
the staunchly Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) have
suggested that they could support Yudhoyono. But
Budhisantoso was cool to an alliance of Islamic parties
coalescing behind Yudhoyono; he warned that radical Islamists
were the main enemies of Indonesia as a unitary state, and
they would be difficult to control if Yudhoyono depended on
their support.

GOLKAR
--------------


6. (C) Golkar party Chairman Akbar Tandjung in February 2003
raised the possibility of Yudhoyono becoming Golkar's
presidential nominee, when he provided the media with a short
list that included the Coordinating Minister. Yudhoyono did
not register for Golkar's presidential convention process,
however, and several Golkar Vice Chairmen have privately
dismissed the idea of their party choosing Yudhoyono over
other high-profile figures who have been courting Golkar's
provincial, city, and regency boards for the past eight
months. Nevertheless, both Silalahi and Yudhoyono advisor
Denny J.A. separately told us that, because of Yudhoyono's
popularity, Akbar Tandjung had indicated a willingness to let
Yudhoyono head Golkar's ticket, with Akbar as his running
mate. They added that Akbar might also continue to pursue
his own presidential campaign and offer Yudhoyono the vice
presidency.


7. (C) Budhisantoso confided that potential Golkar
presidential nominee Wiranto had dispatched a retired
four-star General with a message that Yudhoyono should not
run in the 2004 election. Budhisantoso said this message was
not intended as a threat. He noted Yudhoyono felt no
particular loyalty to Wiranto, citing Wiranto's once having
blocked Yudhoyono from assuming a military command in
Sumatra. Budhisantoso also said Yudhoyono had no reason to
fear Wiranto, as Wiranto, when accused of human rights
violations in East Timor, had sought "protection" from
Yudhoyono in his capacity as Coordinating Minister.

PDI-P
--------------


8. (S) Yudhoyono also has drawn the attention of leading
Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P) figures
dissatisfied with Megawati's leadership. Vice Chairmen
Arifin Panigoro and Roy Janis -- both lead significant
factions of PDI-P -- have told us of their interest in
supporting Yudhoyono instead of Megawati (ref A). According
to Denny JA, Yudhoyono also has the support of some
senior-generation nationalists within PDI-P, such as
parliamentarian Abdul Madjid. And Budhisantoso said
grassroots-level PDI-P party cadres were seeking to defect to
PD, specifically mentioning a group of 3,000 in Lampung
province. Budhisntoso said he was wary of taking in
sympathizersfrom other parties because, at this stage,
Yudhoono did not want to antagonize other political leaders.

A RUNNING MATE
--------------

9.(C) Many presidential hopefuls have considered tapping
Yudhoyono as their vice-presidential running mate, drawn by
his ethical image, intellectual prowess, military background,
Javanese ethnicity -- and, perhaps most importantly, his
reputation for loyalty. Silalahi said Yudhoyono had told him
that Megawati had offered him the vice presidency, but he was
reluctant to accept . First, he did not respect Megawati,
due to her lack of education and vision, plus her husband's
corruption. Second, he feared a recurrence of the 1999
"Anyone But Mega" dynamic, which might drag him down along
with the President. PD Chairman Budhisantoso also told us
Yudhoyono had long assured his advisors that he would not
settle for the Vice Presidency. If his ambitions were
limited to the number two position, Budhisantoso pointed out,
why go through all the effort required to build his own party?

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Many Indonesians consider Yudhoyono indecisive and
interpret his failure to date to announce his presidential
candidacy as a further indicator of his cautious temperament.
Nevertheless, we believe Yudhoyono has played his cards
well. The Democratic Party offers him a fallback option and
a degree of bargaining leverage as he waits for a larger
party's nomination. PD should easily go along with any
arrangement that would boost Yudhoyono's prospects, even if
it means another party takes the lead. Delaying the
announcement of his candidacy makes it easier for Yudhoyono
to remain in place as Coordinating Minister, a position that
offers him constant and generally positive media exposure.
He likely recalls that Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid
received a burst of coverage when first announcing his
candidacy but has been largely dismissed after his clumsy
entry into and then withdrawal from Golkar's process (ref B).


11. (C) Yudhoyono's many options reflect his positive image
in the eyes of top politicians. His personal popularity
implies that his impact in the presidential race, assuming he
can secure nomination by a qualifying party or coalition,
would exceed the vote tallies garnered by his political
vehicle in the legislative election. So long as matters in
political parties appear unsettled or open to change,
Yudhoyono will keep popping up on candidate short lists.
However, as the pieces of the various puzzles fall into
place, Yudhoyono will find avenues closing off, and he will
have to show he can act decisively, or he might find rival
candidates have locked up large constituencies. But a few
deft moves, combined with some lucky breaks, could allow
Yudhoyono to pull together key social and political groups in
support of a powerful presidential run.


Boyce