Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04JAKARTA12662
2004-12-21 11:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

KALLA WINS CHAIR OF GOLKAR, EMERGES AS POWERFUL

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KISL ID 
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O 211133Z DEC 04
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7300
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
XMT AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 012662 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: KALLA WINS CHAIR OF GOLKAR, EMERGES AS POWERFUL
POLITICAL FORCE

REF: A. JAKARTA 12317 (UPCOMING GOLKAR CONGRESS)

B. JAKARTA 11289 (MOVEMENT ON DEADLOCK)

C. JAKARTA 5280 (ISLAMISTS AROUND SBY)

Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason: 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 012662


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: KALLA WINS CHAIR OF GOLKAR, EMERGES AS POWERFUL
POLITICAL FORCE

REF: A. JAKARTA 12317 (UPCOMING GOLKAR CONGRESS)

B. JAKARTA 11289 (MOVEMENT ON DEADLOCK)

C. JAKARTA 5280 (ISLAMISTS AROUND SBY)

Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason: 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Vice President Jusuf Kalla won the chairmanship of
Golkar, Indonesia's largest political party, during a
December 16-19 Party Congress, which we observed first-hand.
Kalla's team paid enormous bribes to secure votes from party
branches, but Golkar's draw toward executive branch power
represented another important factor. Kalla has dramatically
increased his degree of influence in political life, and many
politicians expect him to try to upstage President Yudhoyono
and pave the way for his own presidential bid in 2009. Many
around Yudhoyono are nervous about Kalla's ascendancy.
Yudhoyono should reap an immediate dividend, however: the
relegation of the formal opposition "National Coalition" to
minority status in the parliament. Kalla's rise in Golkar
will severely diminish the influence of former President
Megawati, who had joined with Golkar in the National
Coalition. Kalla's victory also leaves retired General
Wiranto with no apparent vehicle for his presidential
ambitions. Although former Chairman Akbar Tandjung's corrupt
reputation will no longer burder the party, Golkar's new
Central Board includes disreputable businessmen and retired
General Prabowo Subianto, credibly implicated in Suharto-era
human rights violations. End Summary.

AKBAR LOYALISTS WARN US ABOUT KALLA
--------------


2. (C) In the days leading up to the Congress, our contacts
described increased momentum behind Jusuf Kalla's bid for the
Golkar chairmanship (ref A). Kalla cemented his position as
incumbent Chairman Akbar Tandjung's lead rival late on
December 15, when he held a joint press conference with House
of Representatives (DPR) Chairman Agung Laksono and media
mogul Surya Paloh -- two figures who had publicly declared
their interest in the Golkar chairmanship. At the press
conference, Agung and Surya Paloh demonstrated their support
for Kalla's candidacy. Kalla announced that he had the
support of 28 of Golkar's 33 provincial branches. (Note:
Since Golkar's provincial branches controlled 33 of the 36

votes under the original rules of procedure, this claim
indicated Kalla was on track to replace Akbar. Our contacts
told us Kalla's claim was exaggerated, but that Akbar had
solid support from only six or seven provincial branches.
End Note.)


3. (C) Prior to the Golkar Congress opening ceremonies,
Golkar Deputy Secretary General Bomer Pasaribu -- one of
Akbar's closest allies -- warned us about Kalla's candidacy.
Bomer expressed a common concern that Kalla was too close to
radical Islamists (ref C). He also warned that Kalla's
control over Golkar would provide the Vice President with too
much power, placing him on a par with President Yudhoyono.
(Comment: We recognize irony in a Golkar official telling us
that the Golkar Chairman should not be too powerful. Bomer's
warning was clearly based on his and Akbar's sense of
self-interest. End Comment.)


4. (C) Contacts told us that retired military figures in
Golkar had privately expressed concern about Kalla,
reflecting a wariness of Islamist sentiment that appears
common among older generation Indonesian soldiers. Akbar
himself reportedly privately referred to Kalla as a
"Taleban." Subtle differences between the Congress' opening
ceremony and elements of other Golkar functions we have
attended indicated Akbar Tandjung's desire to remind Golkar
delegates of the party's secular orientation. The woman who
led participants in the Golkar pledge of allegiance shunned
the Muslim headscarf she normally wears. Figures
representing all five Indonesia's official religions stood
together during the opening prayer -- previously, only the
Muslim leading the prayer took to the stage. Former
President Megawati Soekarnoputri -- one of Indonesia's
leading symbols of nationalist sentiment -- attended the
opening ceremony.

AKBAR'S APPEAL
--------------


5. (U) In his opening speech, as well as in subsequent
remarks from the podium, Akbar Tandjung reminded delegates
that he had led Golkar through a difficult adjustment period.
He cited the party's reorientation in accordance with the
reform movement that energized Indonesia in the late 1990's.
He recalled fighting for Golkar when President Wahid called
for the party's dissolution, and when party offices were
burned in acts of political violence. He highlighted
Golkar's regaining a plurality in the DPR during the 2004
elections, and its disproportionate share of DPR commission
chairmanships. The recent elections had given Golkar much
influence, even though the party did not occupy strategic
positions in the executive branch, Akbar noted, delivering a
subtle jab at Vice President Kalla, who did not receive
official party support for his election campaign.

USING THE RULES TO AKBAR'S ADVANTAGE
--------------


6. (C) During December 16 debate over the Congress' rules of
procedure, Akbar Tandjung and his allies on the Congress
Steering Committee pushed through a critical change,
expanding voting rights for the mass organizations associated
with Golkar and offering voting rights to the party's 440
district-level branches. The total number of votes in play
therefore rose from 36 to 484, with one vote each for the
Central Board, 33 provincial branches, 440 district branches,
and 10 mass organizations. This move proved widely popular,
as the newly empowered delegates knew that candidates for the
chairmanship would offer handsome financial incentives.
While the revision boosted Akbar's popularity, his team
members acknowledged he was forced to change the dynamic,
because he lacked sufficient support among the provincial
branches.


7. (C) Several contacts on Akbar's side told us that Kalla
lacked the Golkar experience required to fulfill the
eligibility criteria required by draft rules of procedure.
Steering Committee members (disproportionately pro-Akbar)
engineered the ratification of the rules with few changes.
Afterwards, Akbar's team members jubilantly told us that
Kalla would be disqualified; Kalla's backers, however,
insisted they remained confident and could document that the
Vice President had the necessary experience, thanks to a
period of service on South Sulawesi's provincial board in the
1970's. (Note: Kalla's curriculum vitae in the 1999-2004
parliamentary directory listed no such experience. End Note.)

BOTH SIDES' LAST-MINUTE MANEUVERS FAIL
--------------


8. (C) As the vote drew closer, however, Akbar's team became
more somber. Offering voting rights to the district level
boards had given the beleaguered Chairman a new lease on
life, but his close associates confided to us that he could
not afford to match the incentives Kalla offered, even as he
twisted associates' arms, exhorting them to raise funds.
Furthermore, Kalla's team appeared undaunted by the
eligibility criteria, and it became clear that a substantial
number of delegates would riot in the event of the Vice
President's disqualification by a verification team
consisting of Akbar loyalists. (Incidentally, the rule of
procedure also disqualified retired General Wiranto from
contesting the chairmanship.)


9. (C) On the night before the chairmanship vote, Akbar's
associates lobbied to break up Kalla's team, aiming
particularly to secure the defection of Agung Laksono.
(Agung, they noted, helped to offset Kalla's reputation as
overly Islamic.) Meanwhile, Kalla courted retired General
Wiranto, who had sided with Akbar. Akbar had offered Wiranto
the chairmanship of Golkar's Board of Advisors, which would
hold enhanced power; Wiranto also would secure seats on the
Central Board for his loyalists (up to 40 percent of the
Central Board's seats, according to one source). Both
coalitions held up until the end, however.

THE VOTE
--------------


10. (U) As the vote approached, on the night of December 18,
facing a storm of anxious interjections from Kalla's
supporters, Congress Chairman Abdul Gafur announced that the
verification team had difficulty confirming Kalla's
eligibility for the chairmanship. Kalla's nomination for the
Vice Presidency by parties other than Golkar, along with his
having been sanctioned by the Central Board prior to the
presidential runoff election, called into question whether
Kalla met the subjective requirements concerning dedication,
loyalty, and acceptability. Ultimately, however, the
verification team deferred to the delegates, who would decide
the matter with their votes.


11. (U) Four candidates passed the verification phase: Akbar,
Kalla, Golkar Vice Chairman Slamet Effendy Yusuf, and Golkar
Vice Chairwoman Marwah Daud Ibrahim. The Congress proceeded
to determine which candidates had the necessary backing (a
minimum of 150 votes) to compete for the chairmanship.
Slamet Effendy Yusuf announced prior to this stage that he
would withdraw from the competition. Marwah decided to press
on, however. The nomination process (by sec-ret ballot)
showed Kalla in the lead, with 269 votes, while Akbar
received 191. Marwah pulled in 13 votes, while two voters
abstained and seven ballots were spoiled. (Two branches
failed to complete the necessary processes to vote.)


12. (U) After the nomination phase, Akbar delivered a brief
speech tracking closely with his opening remarks (para five).
He also highlighted his support from Wiranto, noting that
the pair provided balance as representatives of Javanese and
non-Javanese ethnic groups, with one being a civilian and the
other having a military background. Subtly reminding the
delegates of Kalla's other responsibilities, he pledged to
devote all his time to the party. Kalla delivered brief
remarks, departed from the podium, but then immediately
returned onstage to acknowledge his top backers, calling on
(in order) media mogul Surya Paloh, DPR Speaker Agung
Laksono, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, former Minister of Justice
Muladi, Economic Coordinating Minister Aburizal Bakrie,
retired General Prabowo Subianto, and House of Regional
Representatives (DPD) Chairman Ginandjar Kartasasmita.


13. (U) Around 5:30 a.m. on December 19, the final vote tally
showed that the Congress elected Kalla to a five-year term as
Golkar Party Chairman, 323 votes to 156. In Kalla's victory
speech, the Vice President thanked Akbar Tandjung for his
service to the party and pledged that Golkar would continue
to act as a counterweight to the Yudhoyono administration,
consistent with a system of checks and balances, although the
party would do so in an "objective" fashion.

VOTE-BUYING
--------------


14. (C) According to multiple sources close to the major
candidates, Kalla's team offered district boards at least
200,000,000 Rupiah (over 22,000 USD) for their votes.
Provincial boards -- which had the same voting right but also
could influence subordinate district boards -- received
500,000,000 Rupiah or more. According to one contact with
prior experience in such matters, board officials received
down payments from both sides and would expect full payment
from the winner, in cash, within hours of the vote. With 243
votes required to win a majority, the Golkar Chairmanship
likely cost well over six million dollars, not counting the
cost of luxury hotel rooms, plane tickets, and other expenses
that the candidates offered to cover. One contact claimed
that Agung alone -- not the wealthiest of Kalla's backers --
had allocated (if not actually spent) 50 billion Rupiah (over
5.5 million USD) on the event. According to rumor, Economic
Coordinating Minister Aburizal Bakrie spent 70 billion Rupiah
(almost 8 million USD).


15. (C) Money did not represent the sole factor in the
chairmanship election, however. Our contacts widely
acknowledged that, besides cash, Kalla offered Golkar
officials the chance to move from the uncomfortable role of
opposition party to the more familiar position of supporting
(and receiving support from) the administration. Many of the
district and provincial board leaders have their eyes on
regent and governor positions that will be up for election in
2005, and they likely hope that the Vice President, as party
Chairman, can help their reelection efforts in symbolic or
concrete ways that an opposition figure cannot.

THE NEW GOLKAR TEAM
--------------


16. (U) In his appointments to Golkar's Central Board, Kalla
stacked the Board of Advisors with his key backers. Media
mogul Surya Paloh chairs the Board of Advisors. Members
include Economic Coordinating Minister Aburizal Bakrie,
Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, Manpower Minister Fahmi Idris,
retired General Prabowo Subianto, 2004 Vice Presidential
candidate Siswono Yudo Husodo, and Kalla associate Tanri
Abeng (a former Minister for State Owned Enterprises
implicated -- but never charged -- in the 1999 Bank Bali
scandal). DPR Chairman Agung Laksono became Central Board
Deputy General Chairman (a newly created position). Former
Justice Minister Muladi, former Communications Minister
Syamsul Muarif, DPR Commission I Chairman Theo Sambuaga,
Joyokusomo (the younger brother of Sultan Hamengku Buwono X)
and Agus Kartasasmita (the son of Ginandjar) are among the
party's Vice Chairmen.


17. (C) Former Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, who was
recently purged from Golkar along with Fahmi Idris, failed to
return to the Central Board. Marzuki told us Kalla held
lingering resentment against him because he (Marzuki) had
served as then-President Abdurrahman Wahid's messenger when
Wahid fired Kalla (from his position as Minister for Industry
and Trade) in April 2000. Rival candidates for the
chairmanship Slamet Effendy Yusuf and Marwah Daud Ibrahim
were both excluded from the new Central Board. After the
announcement of the new Board's composition, a former Golkar
executive (not included in the new Board) told us many Golkar
officials were disappointed with the Board's composition.

AKBAR'S FATE
--------------


18. (C) Former Golkar Chairman Akbar Tandjung has lost his
formal role in party affairs. While his most loyal
associates were purged from the Central Board, Akbar retains
strong ties to Golkar's faction in parliament, having played
a key role in constructing the party list. While it is
unclear how Akbar might try to return to power in Golkar,
many expect him to begin plotting with that aim in mind. One
contact told us, "Even if Akbar dies, you have to wait a week
to be sure he doesn't come back."

RAMIFICATIONS FOR MEGAWATI
--------------


19. (C) The Congress outcome has dire ramifications for
former President Megawati Soekarnoputri. As one of the
co-founders of the National Coalition, Megawati worked with
Akbar Tandjung to control a majority of the seats in the DPR.
Prior to the Party Congress, the National Coalition
consisted of parties representing 58 percent of the DPR.
While Kalla stopped short of declaring the National Coalition
dead, virtually all of our contacts are certain of Golkar's
defection, which would leave the National Coalition with only
Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P),
Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB),and two
smaller parties -- all in all, 186 of the DPR's 550
legislators (just under 34 percent).


20. (C) The failure to maintain a majority in the DPR will
reflect poorly on Megawati; her reported drive to destroy
Yudhoyono (politically) leaves PDI-P out in the cold so long
as Yudhoyono is President and Megawati chairs the party.
PDI-P's Party Congress is scheduled for the end of March.
While no other figure in PDI-P can match Megawati's name
recognition and appeal to grassroots voters, her opponents
likely sense that the new political map has made her more
vulnerable than before. One PDI-P Central Board official,
citing former Minister for State Owned Enterprises Laksamana
Sukardi as her source, claimed that Megawati's husband,
Taufik Kiemas, was hospitalized in serious condition upon
hearing the news of Kalla's victory.

WIRANTO NEEDS NEW STRATEGY
--------------


21. (C) The Congress has dealt another setback to third-place
presidential contender Wiranto. According to former close
associate Muladi, Wiranto took the unusual step of teaming up
with Akbar -- who was widely recognized as having undermined
Wiranto's presidential candidacy in the 2004 election --
because Wiranto saw he would more likely be able to use
Golkar as his vehicle in 2009's presidential election if
Akbar controlled the party, rather than Kalla. Muladi also
claimed Wiranto was influenced by former Golkar Chairman
Harmoko, who dislikes Kalla.


22. (C) Several of Wiranto's sidekicks were at the Congress
site, including retired Generals Suaidi Marasabessy, Fachrul
Rozi, and Tulus Sihombing. Tulus told us after the vote that
Wiranto's path to the presidency now appeared unclear. He
estimated that the team would take a month to recover from
the defeat and then reexamine Wiranto's options for the 2009
election. (Note: During the Congress, we received further
confirmation that Wiranto remained discredited by unpaid
debts to Golkar officials -- ref A. End Note.)

YUDHOYONO HAS A NEW PROBLEM
--------------


23. (C) Some representatives of political parties that backed
Yudhoyono when the National Coalition held a majority
publicly indicated concern that Kalla's victory would lead to
an unhealthy combination of executive and legislative branch
power. Indeed, the Vice President, in his capacity as Golkar
Chairman, now has the authority to fire Golkar legislators
(including DPR Chairman Agung Laksono) if they defy the party
line. However, it is by no means clear that Golkar will back
Yudhoyono's interests, should they conflict with Kalla's. At
the conclusion of the Congress, one Golkar legislator close
to Agung even told us he hoped the DPR would proceed with
earlier plans for Yudhoyono's interpellation (ref B).


24. (C) Numerous contacts have mentioned Kalla's strong
influence during the cabinet-building process. One source
recounted that Kalla had pounded on the table and threatened
to resign as Vice President if Yudhoyono failed to include
Aburizal Bakrie as Economic Coordinating Minister. With his
new control over Golkar and the party's faction in
parliament, Kalla has added to his influence over cabinet
members and his strong network in the business community.
Numerous contacts cautioned that Kalla would prove more
powerful than Yudhoyono -- particularly given his aggressive,
hard-charging personality, which contrasts with Yudhoyono's
more cautious approach (but also rubs against the grain of
the dominant Javanese political culture).

HOW YUDHOYONO DEALT WITH THE CONTENDERS
--------------


25. (C) In the lead-up to the Congress, we heard credible
accounts that Yudhoyono supported first Surya Paloh, then
Agung Laksono for the Chairmanship (ref A). He also was said
to have offered support for Kalla's candidacy, as Kalla
appeared increasingly strong. Finally, we heard that Wiranto
felt betrayed by Yudhoyono, because he, too, thought he had
the President's backing. These accounts indicate that, while
Yudhoyono wanted to see Akbar Tandjung overthrown, he also
sought to avoid a firm commitment (to a potential loser) and
maintain maximum flexibility.

COMMENT
--------------


26. (C) Yudhoyono now has a Vice President must more capable
of aiding his administration, or acting independently on his
own agenda. Our contacts consistently distinguish between
the interests of Yudhoyono and Kalla. The Vice President's
winning control of Golkar represents his own further
accumulation of power, which he may or may not deploy on
behalf of Yudhoyono's administration. Given Kalla's blunt,
no-nonsense style, we expect clear, early indications of
Golkar's new orientation.


27. (C) Confronted with Kalla's growing influence, Yudhoyono
has several options to help offset his deputy's prestige. He
could strengthen his ties to Indonesia's Islamist parties,
whose leaders have supported him up until this point and
appear to fear being displaced by Golkar. He could hope that
an ally replaces Megawati in March's PDI-P Party Congress, so
that Yudhoyono can strengthen his ties to that party and
expand his secular base, as Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (PD)
holds only 10 percent of the DPR's seats. Finally, as a
retired military officer, he could enhance the prestige of
the Armed Forces, which lacks a formal role in domestic
politics but nonetheless possesses substantial influence.


28. (C) It is quite possible, however, for Kalla to decide
that he is best off throwing his and Golkar's support behind
the administration, at least for now. As a businessman, he
likely realizes that he, his family, and associates gain more
from stability and effective governance than from political
deadlock. Additionally, Kalla's ethnic background, a Bugis
from South Sulawesi, is a disadvantage for him seeking the
presidency in a nation still dominated to an extent by the
majority Javanese. While we believe Kalla has an eye on the
2009 election and we expect him to continue building up his
political base, to some degree at Yudhoyono's expense, he
would benefit from projecting an image as a constructive
force rather than a disloyal upstart.


PASCOE