Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ISTANBUL376
2004-03-10 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

ISTANBUL KURDS FOCUS ON IRAQI "KURDISTAN"

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PTER IZ TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000376 

SIPDIS


POST FOR HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL KURDS FOCUS ON IRAQI "KURDISTAN"

REF: A) 03 ANKARA 6163 AND 4315 B) 03 ANKARA 4499


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b & d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000376

SIPDIS


POST FOR HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL KURDS FOCUS ON IRAQI "KURDISTAN"

REF: A) 03 ANKARA 6163 AND 4315 B) 03 ANKARA 4499


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b & d)



1. (C) Summary: Previously polarized and defined by their
degree of support and sympathy for the PKK (later KADEK, now
KONGRA-GEL) and imprisoned former PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan,
Istanbul Kurds tells us they have increasingly adopted Iraqi
Kurds and their experiment with autonomy as their new cause
celebre. The ongoing efforts by the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) to
secure a high degree of autonomy within a federal Iraq enjoy
widespread support among Kurds in Istanbul. This shift
appears to have undermined some support in Istanbul for the
PKK and for those who have traditionally adopted anti-U.S.
positions (Embassy Note: We have not seen a similar shift
among Kurds in Ankara or the Southeast. End Note). Our
Istanbul Kurdish contacts remain concerned, however, about
the plight of their "children in the mountains" and disparage
the Turkish government's inadequate PKK-related Reintegration
Law and its overall policy on the Kurdish issue. Pessimistic
about the ongoing EU reform process and short-term prospects
for a positive shift in government policy, moderate Kurds in
Istanbul hope that when Ankara sees that an official Kurdish
entity (as part of a federal Iraq) represents no threat to
its interests, the Turkish Government and State will
eventually be more forthcoming in response to local demands
for Kurdish cultural rights. End Summary.


Istanbul: The Largest Kurdish City in the World
-------------- --

2. (C) With up to 2 million Kurds, Istanbul is, by most
accounts, the largest Kurdish city in the world. While many
Kurds here and in other large Turkish cities enjoy more
economic opportunities and a less oppressive political
climate than Kurds in the Southeast, most of our contacts
still say that "in their hearts" they aspire to an
independent Kurdish state. Few would ever choose to leave
western Turkey, however, to return to an independent

Southeast. One Kurdish lawyer from Diyarbakir said,
moreover, that if many in the Southeast were forced to choose
between being able to hop on a bus to Istanbul and being
confined to an "independent Kurdistan," they too would
reconsider their separatist aspirations. Educated Kurds we
have talked to are generally realistic and admit that they
would be satisfied with true protection of their cultural and
human rights, something to which they are convinced, however,
that Ankara remains uncommitted.


"Winning the Peace": Kurdish Cultural Rights
--------------

3. (C) The widespread view of Kurds in Istanbul is that the
Turkish State distrusts the Kurds and systematically
discriminates against them (ref A reports on similar views
among Kurds in the Southeast). They argue that the State and
successive governments have never paid more than lip service
to protecting Kurdish cultural rights. Our Kurdish contacts
see the recent reforms to allow Kurdish language instruction
and broadcasting as the bare minimum required for Turkey's EU
membership. Moreover, they note that there has been little
progress in implementing even these insufficient reforms.
Sefik Beyaz, Chairman of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute (an
organization that seeks to bring together disparate Kurdish
groups to promote Kurdish culture) and also a left-wing
alliance mayoral candidate for his home town Bitlis in
Eastern Turkey, told poloff that implementation of these
reforms is not "sincere" and that there have been no "real
steps" taken. On the importance of the language issue,
however, Beyaz added that "if you accept only one language
(i.e., Turkish),you are condemning Kurdish and Kurdish
culture to death." (Note: Despite recent reforms, no Kurdish
language schools have begun classes to date, although this is
expected to happen soon. There are also no Kurdish-language
broadcasts as yet under these reforms. End Note).



4. (C) ConGen's Kurdish contacts believe that neither the
ruling AKP nor the opposition CHP have demonstrated a
forward-leaning position or any creative thinking on the
Kurdish issue. Kemal Parlak, a former Istanbul Chairman of
the Kurdish political party DEP, said that "Kurdish Kurds"
were largely kept off the November 2002 party lists by both
AKP and CHP. Mustafa Ayzip, a prominent Kurdish lawyer and
occasional human rights advocate, acknowledged current
Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu's Kurdish origins, but
pointed to his previous work as a police chief and governor
in dismissing him as a "product of the state." (Note: Aksu's
son Murat confessed to poloff separately that the family
never spoke Kurdish at home. End note.) This political
disenfranchisement has contributed to a stifling of the
public debate among the Kurdish community in Istanbul.
Moderate Kurds who engage in political activity are routinely
harassed, arrested, and often brought to trial by the state
on little more than suspicion of affiliation with the PKK.
Ironically, these same people are castigated and discredited
within the Kurdish community by leftist, radical PKK
sympathizers for their moderate policies. As a result, there
is a dearth of moderate leaders and an exchange of ideas
within the Kurdish community.


The PKK and Ocalan: Previously the Only Game in Town
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Until now debate among our Kurdish contacts in
Istanbul has focused on the PKK and its now-imprisoned leader
Abdullah Ocalan. Istanbul reps of successive Kurdish
political parties, including DEP, HEP, HADEP, and now DEHAP,
are openly sympathetic to the PKK's separatist agenda and are
widely believed to have informal links with the PKK itself.
Other Kurdish organizations based in Istanbul, despite
official harassment and legal challenges, have generally
maintained their distance from the PKK, but remain
battlegrounds for Kurdish intellectuals arguing over the
extent to which they should show sympathy to a separatist
agenda. Hasan Kaya, the former chairman of the Kurdish
Institute, told us last year that he resigned under pressure
from more extremist members for his criticism of the Kurdish
party DEHAP/HADEP and for not pursuing a more pro-PKK agenda.
DEMOS, a group of Istanbul Kurdish intellectuals that first
came together in 1998 to seek a solution to the "Kurdish
issue," has been criticized and torn apart by debate on the
same issue. "Ninety-five percent of Kurds do not agree with
the PKK (and its methods),but many feel compelled to support
(it) to a certain degree," Kaya claimed. The PKK's lack of
hard-core support, Kaya continued, is immediately obvious
when one examines the public turnout for pro-Ocalan rallies
(usually no more than a few thousand) and the annual Newroz
(Kurdish New Year) celebrations (as many as 500,000). That
being said, "even I don't want to be characterized as
anti-PKK," Kaya confessed.


A New Cause Celebre: Iraqi Kurdistan
--------------

6. (C) According to Kaya, Ayzit, Parlak and others, the
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq has now completely changed the
debate within the Kurdish community. Although our contacts
say that cultural and linguistic differences continue to
separate them from Kurds in Iraq, they see Iraqi Kurdish
aspirations for an ethnic federation as a proxy for their own
unrealized ambitions. The tantalizing prospect of a
permanent, legal Kurdish autonomous entity (albeit within an
Iraqi federation) has proved to be an inspiration and
unifying cause for Turkish Kurds, our contacts assert. Many
of our contacts in Istanbul now also feel more comfortable in
challenging the PKK's rhetoric. Kemal Parlak indicated, for
example, that he and others had disagreed with the PKK and
HADEP when they labeled the PUK and KDP as "collaborators and
traitors." Still others told us that the new focus on Iraq
has undermined support in the Kurdish community for the PKK
and for those adopting anti-U.S. positions. Rusen Cakir, a
columnist for Vatan newspaper and an expert on the Kurdish
issue, told poloff that while support for the PKK among
Turkish Kurds has decreased, Kurdish nationalism, including a
sub-current of separatism, appears to be on the rise.



7. (C) This sympathy for Iraqi Kurds underlies the logic that
our contacts assert led most Istanbul Kurds to support the
U.S.-led intervention (although most Turks did not),but to
oppose a parliamentary measure that would have allowed Turkey
to deploy troops to northern Iraq. (Embassy Note: Embassy
Kurdish contacts in Ankara and the Southeast asserted that
Kurds in the Southeast opposed the invasion, if only out of
fear of a Turkish crackdown in the Southeast and Northern
Iraq. After the Iraqi regime was routed, without a Turkish
military incursion and with Kurdish support, they began to
tell us it had been a good thing after all End Note).
Istanbul Kurds also split with their fellow Turkish citizens
upon hearing reports of ethnic clashes between Iraqi Kurds
and Turkmen in Kirkuk. Many Istanbul Kurds were upset that
Turkey appears to be cooperating with Syria and Iran to
oppose Kurdish demands in Iraq and are now worried about
reports that the U.S. may pressure the Kurds to back down as
well. More than one Kurdish contact has remarked to us that
"nobody" seems to question Palestinian demands for an
independent state or Turkish Cypriot demands for an
"ethnically-divided confederation," but that Kurdish
aspirations are always seen as overreaching.


"Our Fates Are Intertwined"
--------------

8. (C) Looking forward, our contacts are nervous that Kurdish
aspirations may once again be frustrated, but are also
cautiously optimistic that developments in Northern Iraq
could have a positive impact on their situation in Turkey.
The "positive scenario" that our contacts have laid out
envisions Turkey at peace with a "Kurdish neighbor" within a
federal Iraq. Our contacts say that when Turkey's worst
fears about Kurdish separatism go unrealized, they hope that
the Turkish state will change its fundamental approach
towards its own Kurdish population. The "negative scenario"
centers on a clash between Iraqi Kurdish demands for autonomy
and/or Kirkuk and Turkey's opposition. The ethnic conflict
that may ensue if the Iraqi Kurds feel that they are being
forgotten "once again" will exacerbate tensions among the
Istanbul Kurdish community and harden Turkey's stance on the
Kurdish issue.



9. (C) Most Istanbul Kurds we have spoken with believe that
the U.S. will play the determining role as this drama
unfolds. "We have cast our lot with (the U.S.)," Mustafa
Ayzit explained. Our contacts are less specific, however,
when it comes to the details of the Kurdish demands for
autonomy in northern Iraq. Kirkuk appears to be a powerful
symbol of Kurdish identity, but most stopped short of
insisting that its inclusion in a Kurdish region was a sine
qua non (one mentioned interim international administration
of the city as a possible compromise). The unresolved issue
of PKK militants in Iraq is also a major concern. While many
we spoke to harbor little sympathy for the PKK leadership,
most feel that any military action against their "children in
the mountains" (i.e., the rank and file) would prompt
widespread outrage and condemnation among the Kurdish
community here. Despite the failure of last year's
Reintegration Law (ref B),all of our Kurdish contacts
expressed the firm belief that a "genuine" amnesty would
solve the problem.



10. (C) Comment: Most Kurdish contacts in Istanbul credit the
U.S. with giving Iraqi Kurds an opportunity to achieve
long-standing aspirations for cultural identity. Our
contacts believe that the outcome of the ongoing developments
in Iraq will be more significant for their own future in
Turkey than any ongoing domestic reforms or even Turkey's EU
membership process.


BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ARNETT