Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ISTANBUL1279
2004-08-16 09:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

GREEK, ARMENIAN PROPERTY WOES PROMPT COMPARISON

Tags:  PHUM PGOV TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 001279 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2014
TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU
SUBJECT: GREEK, ARMENIAN PROPERTY WOES PROMPT COMPARISON
WITH "GOOD OLD OTTOMAN DAYS"

REF: A. 02 ANKARA 6116


B. 02 ANKARA 7290

C. 02 ANKARA 8586

D. 03 ISTANBUL 202

E. 03 ANKARA 2909

F. ISTANBUL 843

G. 02 ISTANBUL 1778

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Stuart Smith for Reasons 1.4 (b&d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 001279

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2014
TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU
SUBJECT: GREEK, ARMENIAN PROPERTY WOES PROMPT COMPARISON
WITH "GOOD OLD OTTOMAN DAYS"

REF: A. 02 ANKARA 6116


B. 02 ANKARA 7290

C. 02 ANKARA 8586

D. 03 ISTANBUL 202

E. 03 ANKARA 2909

F. ISTANBUL 843

G. 02 ISTANBUL 1778

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Stuart Smith for Reasons 1.4 (b&d)


1. (sbu) Summary: Turkey's Istanbul-based minority religious
communities report that while recent legislation has enabled
them to "legalize" ownership of numerous properties already
under their control, the new law is inadequate in that it
does not permit the community foundations (mostly Greek
Orthodox and Armenian) to reclaim properties that were seized
by the state over the last 30 years. In addition, community
representatives note that they continue to face outright
discrimination, in violation of the Lausanne Treaty, as their
religious foundations must meet requirements not imposed on
other foundations in order to acquire new properties. While
these institutions operated more freely during the Ottoman
period, our contacts note that the problems they face today
stem directly from a xenophobic, paranoid, "deep-state"
mentality that continues to pervade the bureaucracy, courts,
and military. Interestingly, a decision taken by the Jewish
community in the 1930s appears to have left it in a much
better position than its counterparts. End Summary.

A Tough Place to Be a Religious Minority
-------------- --------------

2. (u) Legal problems aside, the most grave injustices
committed against the minority communities are unlikely to
ever be redressed. The post-WWI population exchange between
Greece and Turkey, the WWII wealth tax that forced many
Greeks, Armenians, and Jews to sell their businesses and
properties (and sent those who could not pay to labor camps),
the 1955 anti-Greek riots that destroyed thousands of Greek
businesses, and subsequent Greek-Turkish tensions in the
1960s and 70s all created conditions in which members of the
minority communities were forced to sell their properties at
firesale prices or abandon them altogether. This cable
examines only those properties to which the minority
community foundations have legal claims through acquisition
(usually by donation) or prior ownership.

Ottoman Era: Benign Neglect

--------------

3. (u) The complex challenges faced by the communities stem,
in part, from the historical context of the transition from
the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. During the
Ottoman period, the minority religious communities had no
"foundations" and ran themselves under their own laws
concerning church or synagogue matters. Their churches,
synagogues, schools, monasteries, seminaries, and other
properties either pre-dated the Ottoman Empire or were
granted and authorized by the Sultan himself. It wasn't
until 1935 and 1936 that Turkey imposed rules and regulations
on these institutions by defining them as "foundations"
(although this confused them with the many thousand Muslim
"vakifs" or foundations that operated under different rules),
by placing them under the supervision of the General
Directorate for Foundations (GDF),and by requiring them to
submit declarations listing their extant properties.

Modern Turkey: Regulate and Control
--------------

4. (u) In 1974 a Turkish high court decided that the minority
religious foundations had no right to acquire property beyond
those listed on their 1936 declarations, thus initiating a
process that has continued almost to this day by which the
state began to seize communal properties under various
pretexts. Such properties included those that had fallen
into disuse, disrepair, or, according to the authorities, had
insufficient "documentation" to establish firm legal
ownership. When the local population in specific areas fell
below the statutory requirements, two Greek Orthodox
foundations were taken into custody by the state in their
entirety. Almost all of the properties confiscated since
1974 were rent-generating apartments and stores (not
churches, synagogues, monasteries or other core communal
institutions) that previously belonged to members of the
community and had been bequeathed to the community
foundations.

On the Road to the EU: A New Era?
--------------

5. (c) As part of the 2002 EU Copenhagen criteria reforms,
the Turkish parliament passed a law which in principle allows
the minority religious communities to acquire, sell, and
apply to register properties (ref A). According to this
initial reform, subsequent changes, and implementing
regulations (refs B-E),minority foundations may indeed in
principle acquire (either by purchase or donation) and sell
properties, but only with the prior approval of the GDF.
They may also apply to register properties under their
control to which they do not already have clear legal
ownership. The laws do not permit them, however, to reclaim
any of the properties acquired since 1936 that were
expropriated following the 1974 court decision. The Greek
Orthodox and Armenian communities also both complain that
these reforms do not address their other core concerns on
obtaining recognition of legal personality for their
Patriarchates, educating their clergy, and other issues.
Huseyin Hatemi, an Istanbul University law professor and
adviser to both communities, told poloff that the law does
not turn the clock back to 1974 (when the communities freely
acquired properties without special permission),much less to
1935 (when they were almost totally unregulated).


6. (c) Ata Sakmar, a Galatasaray University law professor and
another adviser, agreed with Hatemi and noted to poloff that
the root of the problem is a deeply frozen, xenophobic,
paranoid, "deep state" mentality that stems from the events
of World War I, the Treaty of Sevres, and what the Greeks
refer to as the "Asia Minor Catastrophe." Turkey only
grudgingly accepted the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (guaranteeing
freedoms and protections for non-Muslims) and ever since has
tried, without any legal basis, to link its treatment of
minorities with Greece's treatment of the Muslim population
in Thrace. Sakmar said this mentality is pervasive in the
bureaucracy and even the courts. In an ongoing expropriation
case of the Greek Orthodox orphanage on Buyukada, for
example, a civil court judge discarded the entire civil code
and applied an irrelevant administrative code to reach a
decision against the Patriarchate, something Sakmar likened
to having a U.S. small claims court decide to impose an
involuntary divorce on a plaintiff. Sakmar said the same
attitude was exhibited by the new interministerial commission
tasked to resolve minority issues in their January meeting
with the Ecumenical Patriarch (ref f).


7. (c) Not all of the minorities are complaining, however.
Silvio Ovadya, the newly appointed President of the Jewish
Community, told poloff that they are pleased with the new
reforms. To date, they have won approval to purchase some
land, to sell some properties, and to legalize their
ownership of properties, including the Italian synagogue in
Istanbul. Founded for and used by non-Turks, the synagogue
was deliberately excluded on the community's 1936
declaration. With the disappearance of that element of the
community, however, Istanbul's remaining Jews have maintained
the property. Establishing ownership in a similar pending
petition for properties in Izmir is more problematic and
Ovadya did not seem to expect a positive response. Unlike
the Greek Orthodox and Armenians, however, the Jews have few
property grievances. When they were asked to list their
properties in 1935-6, in what now seems to have been a
prescient decision, they simply formed associations,
transferred most rent-generating properties to the
associations, and left them off the list.


8. (c) Adnan Ertem, the Acting Director for the GDF in
Istanbul and the senior official responsible for implementing
the new laws, argued to poloff, however, that enormous
strides had been made over the last two years. He claimed
that his office has rapidly and liberally implemented the new
laws. Although the regulations allow for a more narrow
reading, Erdem asserts that his office has decided that even
rent-generating properties will be deemed to meet the
"cultural and religious" needs of the communities (presumably
the rents will ultimately go to that purpose). He asserts
further that no application to acquire new property has yet
been refused (Note: This was an early concern for the
communities, ref g). With regard to the almost 2000
applications to legalize existing properties, Erdem claimed
to have kept rigidly to the 2-month limit for considering
such cases. Roughly one-third have been approved, one-third
sent back for more documentation (of those that have been
resubmitted, Ertem claims that 90 percent have been
approved),and one-third refused (on the grounds that they
legally "belong" to third parties -- i.e., they were
expropriated or are simply listed in the names of other
individuals -- for the most part these were not under the
control of the foundations and therefore ineligible for
legalization under the new laws).


9. (c) Asked about other problems encountered by the
communities -- but not addressed in the new laws -- Ertem
evinced an accommodating attitude. He agreed, for example,
that there is no need to restrict participation in elections
for foundation boards to small geographic districts.
Allowing anybody in Istanbul to participate, for example,
would allow foundations in neighborhoods in which the
community no longer resides to continue to operate (Note:
Ertem suggested that we might want to raise this in Ankara
where the foundation law is being rewritten). Asked about
the recent appropriation of the Greek Orthodox community's
Buyukada orphanage, Ertem averred that solutions could have
been found to keep the orphanage in the community's hands,
but argued that the Patriarchate is more interested in
preserving the original deed which is in its name (Note:
Because Turkey does not recognize the Patriarch as a legal
entity, the GDF challenged the deed and won a court ruling to
expropriate the property). Finally, Ertem disputed
allegations that minority community foundations face
discrimination, arguing that other foundations also require
GDF approval to acquire and sell properties (in fact they
require additional court approval to sell). Ertem agreed
that having two separate sets of laws is inappropriate and
said that he hopes the new draft foundation law will apply
equally to all foundations.


10. (c) In an off-the-record postscript, Ertem told poloff
that the Jewish and Armenian communities have good working
relationships with his office. The Greek Orthodox, however,
never raise their problems with him, instead taking them
directly to the Prime Minister, his cabinet, other countries,
and even the European Court of Human Rights (Note: The
Turkish press reported widely on August 10 that the ECHR had
agreed to consider a petition by a Greek Orthodox foundation
in Istanbul). Ertem speculated that this may be because the
Greek Orthodox community is primarily motivated by political,
not administrative, concerns. Specifically, the Patriarchate
wants legal status for itself, something with which Ertem
claimed to have no personal problem, but which can only come
from being recognized by the Turkish government.


11. (u) Neither the Greek Orthodox nor the Armenians ever saw
the 2002 reforms as a solution to their problems and both
continue to lobby government officials to address their
concerns. Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II met with FM Gul on
July 16 and presented him with a letter detailing his
community's grievances. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew,
meanwhile, gave interviews this month to the BBC, Associated
Press, and Reuters, in which he explained his problems.
(Note: Bartholomew's interview with Reuters generated
critical local press coverage when he was misquoted as
calling on EU countries to "pressure" Turkey on these
issues).

Comment: The Real Problem
--------------

12. (c) Even the fiercest critics of Turkey's inability to
resolve the problems of its minority religious communities
admit that the AKP government seems determined to tackle the
issue (an opinion expressed by both Hatemi and Sakmar,
although Hatemi wondered whether FM Gul's appointment of
notorious hardline nationalist Ambassador Bolukbasi-- who
narrowly escaped assassination by the Armenian terrorist
group ASALA years ago and whose nickname is Ambassador No --
to the interministerial commission was intended to sabotage
the effort). If Ertem is correct, the new laws on property
are being implemented in a timely fashion. The reforms
adopted so far, however, have two fundamental flaws. First,
the laws do nothing to address the principal Greek Orthodox
and Armenian grievances on property issues -- specifically,
to allow them to reclaim properties that were seized since

1974. Second, the narrow reforms fail to address the wider
political concerns of the communities.


13. (c) The Armenian Patriarch, concerned about the long-term
viability of the 60,000-plus member community, has focused
primarily on his ability to find Armenian-capable teachers
for their schools, train priests and reopen churches, and
preserve the historical legacy of the community. The
Ecumenical Patriarch, with fewer than 3,000 Greek Orthodox
left in Turkey, is more concerned with obtaining recognition
of his Ecumenical status and reopening the Halki seminary to
train new generations of clergy loyal to the Patriarchate.
Both also seek a relaxation of strict rules on electing
foundation board members and recognition of their "legal
personality" as a means to securing their leadership
positions in their respective communities.


14. (c) Ertem's accommodating attitude notwithstanding,
anecdotal evidence provided by our interlocutors and our
personal observations of public reactions to minority issues
support charges that the root of the problem lies in a
xenophobic paranoia that pervades the bureaucracy. As such,
the problems that continue to afflict the communities' are
unlikely to be resolved with piecemeal reforms and countless
ongoing appeals to the GDF and the courts. Instead, it seems
to us that a solution will only be possible when the Turkish
government faces the fundamental issues head-on, takes a firm
decision that these communities are an asset and not a threat
to Turkey, and resolves to do whatever it takes to help them
survive.

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