A/S JONES MEETING WITH IRAQI FM ZIBARI AND IRAQI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001019

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ TU NATO
SUBJECT: A/S JONES MEETING WITH IRAQI FM ZIBARI AND IRAQI
MOD SHA'ALAN


Classified By: A/S Elizabeth Jones for Reasons 1.5 (b&d)


1. (C) Summary. During the run-up to the Istanbul Summit
June 27, A/S Jones and CPA Foreign Policy Director Ronald
Neumann discussed Iraq's security challenges and a new
NATO-Iraq relationship with Iraqi FM Zibari and Iraqi MoD
Sha'alan. Jones and Zibari agreed that their informal
meeting with NATO foreign ministers June 27 would be an
important event both symbolically and practically. Zibari
said that Iraq had lost much time due to the occupation, but
that he believed the new Iraqi cabinet members
were willing to "risk everything" to overcome the terrorist
threat and build the new Iraq. Zibari and Sha'alan stressed
the Ministry of Defense desperately needed equipment, as well
as training, for Iraq's security forces. Zibari also said
that Iraqi PM Allawi recently clarified that the Iraqi
Interim Government (IIG) did not want Turkish units on Iraqi
soil, but that Turkish training officers and headquarters
staff were welcome. End Summary.

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Important Beginning
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2. (C) Prior to the informal Foreign Ministers Meeting June
27, Jones told Iraqi FM Zibari and Iraqi MoD Sha'alan that
Iraqi PM Allawi's letter to NATO Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer requesting Alliance support for Iraq was a very
important beginning to the new NATO-Iraq relationship. The
informal NATO meeting was an important event, both
symbolically and practically, as NATO Allies would have the
opportunity to hear views from Iraqis directly. Jones said
that although NATO was already providing support to the
Polish-led Multinational Division, Allied leaders would
decide at the Istanbul Summit June 28 to ask NATO to take on
a collective mission to train the Iraqi security forces. A
NATO training mission was significant because it would lead
to a comprehensive approach; Iraqi authorities could
coordinate directly with NATO, which would help match
training requirements with member-state capabilities. Jones
said that the NATO Military Committee had ideas on how NATO
could support Iraq, but that those ideas were not worth
anything unless Iraqi leaders are engaged in developing them.

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To Rule is To Decide
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3. (C) Zibari said he is finding that "to rule is to decide"
and he believes that the new cabinet is made up of people who
are willing to "risk everything" to fight in the struggle to
build the new Iraq. Zibari said that terrorists,
anti-democratic forces, Ba'athists and many regional
countries are trying to make the new Iraq fail. He said they
would not win, but they would delay progress and make it
difficult to succeed.

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IIG Progressing, Gaining Political Support
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4. (C) FM Zibari thanked Jones and the State NEA Bureau for
efforts to overcome difficulties over the past year. He was
pleased that the hard work on smaller issues had now opened
the way to address more strategic decisions. Zibari agreed
that the informal Foreign Ministers meeting was important and
said that Allawi had prepped him to request training and
other types of support. He also said that this meeting --
similar to the recent G-8 Sea Island Summit and the
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference -- would
have a big impact in Iraq and a political statement by the
Alliance was important to recognize the progressive and
positive stage the IIG had achieved.

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Water Under the Bridge
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5. (C) Zibari said that he had warned the U.S. not to move
from liberator to occupier, and that even the closest friends
of the U.S. had gone back on it. He complained that Iraq had
lost time, lost men, and lost money, but that this was "water
under the bridge" and the IIG now has a new opportunity to
address the country's needs. According to Zibari, it is
vital to demonstrate that the transfer of sovereignty is
real, i.e. that ministries are spending money, purchasing
equipment, and reaching out to other countries. No one wants
the return of Saddam, or a "little Saddam"; no one wants
extremists or a theocracy, but people want the confidence
that they can build their own future.

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Up to Iraqis
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6. (C) Zibari said Iraq needs security to make this goal
happen. He said that CPA had encouraged Iraq's leaders to
open their borders and relax their rules to encourage
investment, but that without security, efforts to revitalize
the economy would fail. To achieve these goals, Zibari said
they would need NATO's support.


7. (C) Zibari said that in the end, however, Iraq's future
will depend on Iraqis and that it will be crucial to have the
right Iraqi leaders. He regretted that most Iraqis were
trained with weapons and that even the opposition had to take
up arms. Zibari said the key was to find the right people to
stand up and challenge this. He said the cabinet was aware
of the risks -- car bombs, assassins, plots -- but that it
could not give up.
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...And Equipping?
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8. (C) Jones shared highlights of the draft Political
Statement on Iraq to which Allied leaders would agree at the
Istanbul Summit. Zibari asked why the statement only
mentioned that Allies had decided to provide training, but
not equipment. Jones said that the U.S. concept included
both training and equipping Iraqi security forces, and she
encouraged them to tell NATO Foreign Ministers of their
priorities for assistance.


9. (C) Zibari said that the Iraqi army needs
counterintelligence training and equipment so that it can be
a visible deterrence force. Iraq has thousands of police,
but not enough weapons, cars, or communications. Zibari said
NATO could help in many areas, but that he understood some
Allies wanted to "settle certain scores" and were reluctant
to send troops to Iraq. Zibari said Allies could help in
other ways, such as with training and equipment; his contacts
tell him that Italy and Germany were open to this type of
support. However, U.S. support was most critical in his view.


10. (C) MoD Sha'alan added that the Ministry of Defense is a
new ministry and is "in need of everything." According to
Sha'alan, Iraq's security forces need weapons, light
aircraft, vehicles, and command and control communications
equipment. He said that Iraq faced serious threats from
border infiltrations, and that training on NATO's high-tech
border control techniques, modern communications, and
leadership training would be crucial. Sha'alan stressed that
weapons training required weapons, however, and that Iraq
needed NATO's help in this area. He asked for help in
pressing Gulf states to finance Iraq's equipment needs.
Jones said that a new NATO International Cooperation
Initiative (ICI),which would be launched in Istanbul, would
open the door to security cooperation with Gulf states and
other countries. She suggested that this new framework might
help to bring support to Iraq from Gulf states.

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Time and Turkey
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11. (C) Zibari stressed that time was an important factor
and that they could not afford a lengthy process for
assistance. Jones said that according to the Alliance
decision, NATO must develop modalities "on an urgent basis"
for implementing the decision. Zibari also said that PM
Allawi recently clarified that the IIG did not want Turkish
units on Iraqi soil, but that Turkish training and
headquarters staff were welcome.


12. (U) This cable was approved by A/S Jones.
ARNETT