REENERGIZING SADC AND SOUTH AFRICA ON ZIMBABWE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000541

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P AND AF; NSC FOR SR ADVISER FRAZIER; BRUSSELS
FOR USEU; LONDON FOR GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI SF
SUBJECT: REENERGIZING SADC AND SOUTH AFRICA ON ZIMBABWE

REF: PRETORIA 1338

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Joseph G. Sullivan for reasons
1.5 b/d


1. (C) We endorse the well-considered and timely proposal of
Embassy Pretoria in reftel to make an urgent effort to
reenergize SADC and South Africa on Zimbabwe. Such an effort,
particularly if we can find a way to engage the EU, SADC and,
most importantly, South Africa could help unlock an
increasingly frozen political crisis based on ever increasing
repression. While there is no assurance that Mugabe would
respond positively to a US or regional initiative, a combined
initiative would have greater prospects of success and the
absence of African, and particularly South African
involvement in the effort would give Mugabe all the excuse he
would need to refuse compromise.


2. (C) Timing is urgent because Mugabe is proceeding apace to
utilize violence, intimidation, ballot stuffing, and rigging
of the electoral rules and media coverage to ensure that
ZANU-PF wins an overwhelming majority in the March,2005
parliamentary elections. The GOZ's withdrawal last month of
an earlier request for UN assistance in organizing next
year's elections was the giveaway to Mugabe's intentions to
win through whatever means necessary and to renounce any
pretense of engaging in dialogue with the opposition or
utilizing the 2005 elections to address Zimbabwe's political
crisis. The GOZ's violent conduct of this past weekend's
by-election in the Harare suburb of Zengeza(septel) signal
ZANU-PF's intention to use violence and intimidation and to
ignore international (read Western) opinion/protests and the
will of its own populace. While we think that MDC is unlikely
to boycott even a rigged election, such an unfair contest
will only ensure that Mugabe or a hand-picked successor,
rubber-stamped through a constitutional amendment by the new
parliament continues until 2008, prolonging for years
Zimbabwe's multi-faceted crisis.


3. (C) Establishing a healthier environment for next year's
elections will take time and considerable effort and should
be a central priority for all with an interest in resolution
of Zimbabwe's political crisis. The tepid response of SADC
and other regional governments to our demarches on Zimbabwe
underscores their sensitivity to taking on a "liberator" of
Mugabe's stature. Framing the issue around the primacy of
the election environment and SADC-Parliamentary Forum norms
and standards may be a useful means of de-personalizing the
issue and attracting SADC members on their own terms.


4. (C) With respect to Embassy Pretoria's specific proposals,
we endorse the recommendation of sending an emissary to talk
with President Mbeki and other African leaders, ZANU-PF and
MDC officials to determine the status of the putative
dialogue and steps needed to resolve Zimbabwe's political
crisis. We do not expect the GOZ to welcome this initiative,
but they would not be able to ignore renewed US engagement,
and if we were able to engage President Mbeki and other
African leaders in the effort, it would be much more
powerful. Indeed, such an effort would depend for its force
on Mbeki and other Africans telling Mugabe at the end of the
day that he must agree to compromise. We also find the idea
of a continuing contact group positive, believe the
engagement of UNSYG Annan could be helpful along with perhaps
another African leader. Nor would we object to discussing
changes in US and EU sanctions with regional leaders, since
these sanctions alone are unlikely to produce positive
change, provided the quid pro quo of establishment of a free,
fair and fully monitored election is fully agreed to by
African interlocutors and then signed onto by the GOZ.
Pretoria's final proposal for joint meetings with Zimbabwean
parties aiming for a comprehensive agreement on elections,
political change and economic recovery has merit, since a
serious good faith dialogue among the Zimbabwean parties
would be the best way to resolve the country's crisis, but is
unlikely to happen without coordinated international pressure.


5. (C) Timing a US emissary's arrival for shortly after the
South African election may be additionally propitious.
ZANU-PF fears that a newly elected Mbeki might be more ready
to press Mugabe harder. Moreover, ZANU-PF is going through
its own internal turmoil, fueled by exposure of high-level
corruption and Mugabe's obsession with his wife's infidelity.
On their own, Mugabe and ZANU-PF are likely to hang
together, but a new international initiative could open new
opportunities.
SULLIVAN