MDC OFFICIAL ON POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, CHALLENGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002071

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AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2009
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC OFFICIAL ON POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, CHALLENGES
TO PARTY

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY: MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs
Gandhi Mudzingwa on December 15 updated poloff on MDC
priorities and activities in the run-up to the March
parliamentary elections. He identified steps ZANU-PF had
taken that were leading to a more open political
environment, but said the progress to date was insufficient
and that the MDC faced a dilemma as a result: how to
exploit these new opportunities without conceding their
participation in the elections. He reported that Nigerian
President Obasanjo recently told opposition leader Morgan
Tsvangirai that he would engage South African President

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Mbeki and Mauritius President Berenger about Zimbabwe and
favored a negotiated settlement. Mudzingwa also said that
Tsvangirai did not want to put off a visit to Washington

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until February, when he may need to be immersed in
campaigning, but recognized the need for flexibility. END
SUMMARY

The Dilemma of Opening Political Space
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2. Mudzingwa noted that the regime's moderating public
tone was being matched by some opening of political space:

-- He confirmed previous reports that the party generally
was more successful in getting its public political
gatherings approved by the police nationally, although
significant problems remained. (Note: A few days later,
police denied approval for major MDC meetings in Harare and
Chitungwiza and police broke up a meeting Tsvangirai was
holding in Masvingo. End note.)

-- In many areas, police were enforcing the law in a less
obviously partisan manner. Police had arrested 18-20
ZANU-PF perpetrators of violence during the last six to
eight months, an unprecedented level of enforcement against
the ruling party at the local level. Mudzingwa asserted
that at least a couple of ZANU-PF partisans had been
convicted and other prosecutions were going forward.
(Note: The vast majority of those arrested for political
violence over the past few years have been MDC members but,
like those ZANU-PF members arrested over that period,
detainees usually had charges dropped, were acquitted, or
were released upon payment of a fine. End note.)

-- The GOZ had not withheld food or other assistance on a
partisan basis "for months." (Note: A visiting team from
Human Right Watch told poloff last week that the
organization had been unable to confirm any reports of the
GOZ using food as a "weapon" since the first half of the
year. End note.)

-- The MDC was having a greater impact in Parliament. The
ruling party still controlled the legislative agenda but
was exhibiting more inclination to compromise.

-- In this vein, ZANU-PF had agreed to some (not all)
potentially significant compromises on the election bill,
including one provision that would require opposition
parties to get access to the state media.

-- Minister for State Security Goche had told MDC Shadow
Minister for Youth Affairs Nelson Chamisa that "a decision
had been taken" to permit the independent daily newspaper,
The Daily News (TDN),to publish again. (Note: Publisher
Strive Masiyiwa three days later reportedly sold TDN to the
newspaper's management team, headed by Editor Sam Nkomo.
End note.)

-- The party leadership was pleasantly surprised that
Tsvangirai retained his passport and ability to travel --

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an important asset for a party. (Note: The GOZ had seized
Tsvangirai's passport in connection with his first treason

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trial, preventing his international travel for over a
year. Upon his acquittal the GOZ returned the passport and
so far has opted not to retain it during the pre-trial
portion of his second treason trial. End note.)


3. (C) Mudzingwa stressed that these positive developments
cumulatively did not come close to giving the MDC a fair
chance in March. The MDC thus faced a dilemma: how to
exploit the new opportunities that had opened up without
conceding MDC participation in the elections. The party
had yet to decide whether to participate and was hoping for
more concessions but any public acknowledgement of
progress, however insufficient, risked giving ZANU-PF and
SADC additional ammunition in their efforts to depict the
elections as free and fair. The dilemma was vexing party
tacticians. Mudzingwa said the party, for example, had not
planned a media campaign yet, although it would be able to
"within days" once a decision had been taken to pursue
one. (Note: We have been unable to confirm a Washington
Times report on December 21 that the state-controlled
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation had recently refused to
air MDC campaign advertising. End note.)

Key Factors for MDC : Community Empowerment ...
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4. (C) Mudzingwa said that a key to electoral success for
the MDC lay in empowering communities -- giving citizens a
sense that they could act politically without retribution.
Whether the opposition would re-enter the election race
would hinge on several factors all of which boiled down to
one thing: the political will of the ruling party to let
the MDC connect with the electorate. For instance, while
the opposition was demanding the repeal of repressive
legislation it recognized that more important in the short
term was how the GOZ applied the laws. He claimed that MDC
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube and Justice Minister

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Patrick Chinamasa had discussed a practical accommodation,
which would permit each side to go forward without losing
face. Mudzingwa added that voter education and "peace
committees," which would mediate between the parties at
local and national levels, were also potentially critical
to community empowerment.

... And GOZ-ZANU-PF Separation
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5. (C) Another central issue for the MDC in weighing a
return to the race would be the extent to which state
machinery could be divorced from ruling party control.
Having the GOZ resources behind ruling party efforts,
including the impunity for ruling party violence, was a
huge practical and psychological obstacle for the MDC,
particularly in the rural hinterland. The GOZ's use of
food and other official largesse for political advantage
may have lessened but still presented a problem for the
election environment. The GOZ was, for instance, now
taking its limited largesse and distributing broadly it in
key districts to reinforce the message that the ruling
party was delivering the goods.

Obasanjo Engagement
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6. (C) Reporting on Tsvangirai's mid-December trip to
Nigeria, Mudzingwa said President Obasanjo had undertaken
to approach South African President Mbeki and Mauritius
President Berenger about the Zimbabwe situation. According
to Mudzingwa, Obasanjo said he wanted to see a "political
solution" not a "legislative one" in Zimbabwe. This meant
some negotiated interim arrangement, an approach that was
acceptable to Tsvangirai. However, the MDC doubted the
ruling ZANU-PF party's political will to reach such a
negotiated solution. Obasanjo and Tsvangirai agreed that
a greater degree of tolerance between the parties and more
open political space would be primary factors in generating
progress in Zimbabwe.

Tsvangirai's Washington Visit

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7. (C) Turning to Tsvangirai's planned visit to
Washington, Mudzingwa advised that the Tsvangirai's
calendar revolved around the elections, a date for which
had yet to be announced. If it were scheduled in the first
two weeks of March, Tsvangirai may be compelled to remain
on the campaign trail in Zimbabwe throughout February and
would then prefer to visit Washington in late January.
That said, he understood the scheduling challenges posed by
inauguration and other Washington priorities and would
remain as flexible as possible; the Washington visit was a
high party priority.

Comment
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8. (C) The MDC cannot have its cake and eat it too: to
retain credibility with the electorate and in the region,
it will have to hazard pursuing the limited opportunities
presented by the GOZ, even if that would superficially
bolster the ruling party's case for legitimacy with SADC.
The opposition's dilemma alludes to a related USG policy
challenge: is there a point at which our leverage and
credibility will be served by acknowledging positive GOZ
gestures while maintaining credible pressure for further
meaningful change?

DELL