MDC SHADOW MINISTER OF JUSTICE RECOUNTS PARTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001600

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2009
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC SHADOW MINISTER OF JUSTICE RECOUNTS PARTY
TACTICS, CONSTRAINTS

REF: (A) HARARE 1562 (B) HARARE 1157

Classified By: Ambassador Chris W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 20 discussion with the
Ambassador and USAID Director, MDC MP and Shadow Minister for
Justice, Parliamentary and Legal Affairs David Coltart urged
the USG to exert strong pressure on the international
community to engage the GOZ meaningfully on its election
administration. Dismissing GOZ electoral reforms as largely
superficial, Coltart maintained that the opposition was
strongly united in its support for an election boycott should
conditions not improve. He reaffirmed the opposition's hope
that the boycott would yield international condemnation of
the GOZ's sham election and force the ruling party to the
negotiating table. END SUMMARY.

Ruling Party's Lies and Dishonesty
--------------


2. (C) Over dinner in his parliamentary district of
Bulawayo, Coltart excoriated the ruling party for "the five
lies" on which it tried to sell itself to domestic and
international audiences: (1) the economy is getting better,
(2) land reform has been a success, (3) ZANU-PF is combating
corruption, (4) ZANU-PF is invincible, and (5) the MDC is
dead. Coltart expressed concern that relentless official
propaganda was beginning to exact a toll on domestic and
international audiences. Growing engagement with the GOZ by
Canada and Nigeria, for example, signaled their conclusion
that ZANU-PF was going to win the election regardless of
international efforts. He urged the USG to coordinate with
others, including SADC, to keep the pressure on the GOZ and
not to re-engage. In the same vein, he urged the USG to use
the UN Security Council or UNGA to increase pressure on the
GOZ. Coltart predicted that ZANU-PF would not relent in
repressive trends even after winning a rigged election.


3. (C) Central to the ruling party,s campaign to legitimize
its rule was the dishonesty of its "election reforms," which
Coltart dismissed as superficial. He acknowledged that
reducing the voting period from two days to one day was a
potential boon to the MDC, but maintained that the partisan
alignment of the new electoral commission and the
delimitation commission were clear indications of the ruling
party,s disingenuousness. He expected the delimitation
commission to weight redrawn districts heavily in favor of
rural constituencies in contradiction of the clear urban
drift of the population. Recent high-level front-page
admonitions against violence targeted only intra-party
violence and were in no way meant to stem violence directed
against the MDC. He maintained that the judiciary was
&completely compromised8 and he had little positive to say
about the MDC,s experience in running the majority of
Zimbabwe,s cities in the face of relentless ZANU-PF
interference.

Best Case Scenario: Forcing Negotiations
-------------- --------------


4. (C) According to Coltart, the best realistic scenario the
MDC could hope for under the circumstances was that a massive
stay-away by voters in March would delegitimize the elections
sufficiently to provoke resounding condemnation by the
international community, including regional players. This
would force Mugabe to come to the negotiating table. Coltart
stressed the likely difficulty of evaluating the fairness of
the upcoming elections if it were contested, especially in
view of the isolation and remoteness of many rural
constituencies. He urged donors to support local election
observation efforts with funds for cameras and video
equipment.


5. (C) Coltart reported that, although he had initially had
doubts himself, he now joined in the remarkably united
consensus within the MDC backing the leadership,s decision
to boycott the elections. The decision further burnished the
party,s credibility with civil society. Nonetheless,
limited access to media constrained the party,s ability to
exploit the boycott and associated issues with the
electorate. Coltart predicted that publicized GOZ plans to
afford the MDC access to the media would stall or yield
insubstantial access.

Assistance Needed
--------------


6. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's inquiry on how the USG
could be helpful, Coltart expressed gratitude for USG
generosity to democratic forces in Zimbabwe and lamented the
relative parsimony of others, including the UK. He urged the
USG to broaden its support for civil society, singling out
the Amani Trust, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the
Legal Resources Foundation, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, and
the Zimbabwe Election Support Network as particularly worthy
aid recipients.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) One of the MDC's most intellectual and energetic
interlocutors, Coltart has been hardened by years of human
rights representation in the courts and bitter legislative
combat in the Parliament. He may overestimate the influence
of international pressure on the ruling party and probably
sells the judiciary and MDC municipal administration short.
His strict rejectionist line on GOZ electoral reforms mirrors
the MDC,s public posture but makes little allowance for the
potential opportunities or nuance recently articulated by
Tsvangirai aide, Gandhi Mudzingwa (ref A). Indeed, the

SIPDIS
GOZ,s mixed bag of projected electoral reforms - more
opposition access to official media, sharing of voter rolls,
one-day voting, high-level public speaking against partisan
violence - will continue to vex the MDC tactically and may
require additional adjustments in the party's approach. For
now, the opposition leadership will feel obliged to
accentuate continuing shortcomings and abuses to fuel
international pressure on the GOZ, even as it tries to
exploit openings afforded by reforms to energize the
electorate. Within the leadership, Coltart's role will
likely continue to revolve around efforts to stimulate
international pressure while others engage the ruling party
and press on the domestic front.

Dell