OPPOSITION GIRDS FOR TREASON TRIAL VERDICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001201

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NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2009
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GIRDS FOR TREASON TRIAL VERDICT

REF: (A) HARARE 1157 (B) HARARE 1149

Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section


1. (C) SUMMARY: The MDC is preparing for the possibility
that its President, Morgan Tsvangirai, will be found guilt
of treason in a verdict scheduled to be issued July 29.
Tsvangirai told the Ambassador July 19 that the party woul

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boycott elections and not negotiate with the ruling party
should he be convicted; mass action was a possibility. If
found guilty, Tsvangirai faces the death penalty and could
be incarcerated for a lengthy period while his appeal is
heard. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Tsvangirai told the Ambassador that he had recentl
met with the MDC leadership to discuss contingencies in
connection with the scheduled July 29 announcement of a
verdict in his treason trial. If a guilty verdict is
would likely boycott next March's scheduled parliamentary
election and would refuse to negotiate with the ruling
party until the conviction were overturned. The party
already was taking soundings regarding a possible
mobilization for mass action in response to a conviction.
Tsvangirai emphasized that he did not plan to go into exil

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to save himself from imprisonment or a possible death
sentence. The party was in touch with others in the regio
and intended to send a delegation to Mauritius to meet wit
other government representatives on the margins of the SAD
summit next month. (NOTE: We understand that MDC
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube is planning to attend the

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Democratic National Convention and participate in a world
leadership forum and that Shadow Minister of Justice David
Coltart has been in Washington this week. END NOTE.)


3. (C) According to Tsvangirai, a conviction might be
followed by consideration of mitigating circumstances
before final sentence were pronounced. It was difficult t
predict how long such consideration could take, or how lon
an appeal to the Supreme Court would take. However, the
state could incarcerate Tsvangirai upon rendering a guilty
verdict and could hold him without bail.


4. (C) Turning to electoral reforms, Tsvangirai reported
that Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa and Ncube had
spoken a few days earlier. Chinamasa indicated that the
GOZ wanted the MDC's support for proposed electoral
reforms. Tsvangirai said he feared that the bishops and
civil society (ref A) may be giving the GOZ the impression
that they and the MDC would be satisfied with narrow
electoral reforms without normalization of the election
environment by ending restrictions on public assembly and
expression. Tsvangirai emphasized that the party might
support the reforms as necessary steps but regarded them a
wholly inadequate to the task of correcting Zimbabwe's
fundamental imbalance of power. He was concerned that the
ruling party would exploit civil society's and some MDC
members' positive statements on the reforms to walk back
from key issues such as the repeal of laws repressive of
basic freedoms.


5. (C) Tsvangirai said he had seen a second draft to the
SADC election principles being honed for adoption in
Mauritius. He reported that they were largely consistent
with the original norms and standards adopted by the SADC
commit more to each government's discretion. He said that
the GOZ would be working hard to nail key provisions down
to its advantage in a gathering scheduled in Victoria Fall
next week.
It would be important for NGOs and the
international community to keep SADC's feet to the fire on
these matters.


6. (C) COMMENT: A guilty verdict -- possibly compounded b
a death sentence -- next week could force a decisive
challenge on the opposition. The MDC and civil society
have been unable to get traction with the public on effort
to stimulate mass action since the "final push" more than
year ago. A provocative trial verdict would spark outrage
particularly among a restive and youthful party rank and
file. Whether such outrage would overcome the apathy,
disillusionment, and alienation that have overtaken the
Zimbabwean populace at large over the past year, though,
remains problematic. Though not lacking in intellectual
firepower and grass roots support, the party lacks a leade
of national stature to take Tsvangirai's place as a
presidential figure.


7. (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): A sham conviction also would mar
the ultimate blow to Zimbabwe's once respected judicial
system. Judges and legal scholars have told us for the
last several years that the one blow the judiciary would
not take would be to convict a clearly innocent person of
capital crime. In recent months these same legal scholar
have been less certain that this remains the case.

8. (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): Shackling Tsvangirai with a
conviction, incarceration, and even execution, would be
consistent with President Mugabe's overarching priority to
crush the opposition at all costs and his current disdain
for western opinion. Provoking an MDC boycott, which
would offer some in the region cover to endorse the resul
of a meaningless election, may be precisely what the
ZANU-PF leadership has in mind. At a minimum, a convicti
would disqualify Tsvangirai as a presidential candidate f
all purposes and, with the opposition in disarray, might
allow the ruling party to move the presidential election u
from 2008 to a combined presidential-parliamentary electi
in 2005, as reportedly pushed by South Africa and the MDC
itself. Such a choreographed affair would be in keeping
with historical ZANU-PF tactics of aggressively building
political chips to cash in later when the GOZ perceives t
Tsvangirai's fear of mixed signals, we are satisfied that

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the bishops and civil society attach appropriate priority
on the insufficiency of proposed electoral reforms. We do
not discount the possibility, however, that the ruling
party would disingenuously distort and exploit their
balanced critiques to party advantage, particularly in
exchanges with South African and regional players.


9. (C) COMMENT (CONT'D) The GOZ's efforts to influence th
AU (ref B) on human rights and SADC (ref A) on election
standards underscore the importance it attaches to regiona
opinion. Indeed, its follow-through on a Tsvangirai
verdict may yet be influenced significantly by regional if
not domestic reaction.
SULLIVAN