(C) DIFFICULT POLITICS OF ARTICLE 98 PASSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001361

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SHANNON, DOD FOR OGC ALLEN.
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, PM/B, L, T, P, D, IO, S/WCI,
S/P/PM/AT, OSD/ISP/NP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL GT
SUBJECT: (C) DIFFICULT POLITICS OF ARTICLE 98 PASSAGE

REF: GUATEMALA 1055

Classified By: Acting PolChief Erik Hall for reasons 1.5 (b&d).


1. (C) Summary. As reported reftel, the GOG signed an
Article 98 agreement on April 28 but requested that we keep
the agreement confidential while it devises a strategy to
gain Congressional approval. MFA Vice Minister Skinner-Klee
told DCM on May 25 that the GOG remains absolutely committed
to Article 98 ratification, but does not want to submit it to
Congress for ratification during the current special session
for a variety of reasons, including:

-- the political imperative of getting fiscal reforms
approved demands the GOG's full attention;

-- Article 98 is too sensitive/controversial to be
spotlighted in an extraordinary session of Congress;

-- shifting political alliances within Congress make
vote-counting difficult right now, and the GOG needs to see
how the alliances settle out before they will be able to
count the votes needed for this issue;

-- FM Briz needs to shore up his own political bases before
pushing Article 98 in Congress;

-- events at Abu Ghraib have given powerful ammunition to
Article 98 critics, making this a particularly inopportune
time to present the agreement for congressional and public
debate.

The Berger Administration therefore prefers to submit Article
98 to Congress for ratification during the regular session
starting August 1, and to avoid as much as possible a
politicization of the issue. While the latter may be wishful
thinking, we concur that submitting Article 98 during the
current special session of Congress could be fatal. End
Summary.


2. (C) In a meeting with DCM on May 25, MFA Vice Minister
Jorge Skinner-Klee said the current special session of
Congress is focused on the political imperative of getting
fiscal reforms approved before July 30. This is the Berger
Administration's highest political priority, and demands the
GOG's full attention. Introducing Article 98 during the
current extraordinary session of Congress would distract from
fiscal reform passage and attract unwanted controversy to the
agreement. Shifting political alliances within Congress make
vote-counting difficult right now. (Note: the ruling GANA
coalition, the FRG and the Unionista Party appear to be in
agreement to pass the fiscal reforms, and the PAN may also
join in support, according to Presidential Chief of Staff
Eduardo Gonzalez. End Note.) The GANA coalition suffered
the loss of the Patriot Party over its dialogue with the FRG.
It is unclear whether the fiscal pact alliance could be
replicated on other issues, including Article 98.
Skinner-Klee said FM Jorge Briz needs to shore up his own
political bases before pushing Article 98 in Congress.
(Note: We have heard unconfirmed rumors that Briz might be
considering resigning. End Note.)


3. (C) Skinner-Klee also said recent revelations from Abu
Ghraib have given powerful ammunition to Article 98 critics.
He argued that effective US action against the culprits will
help counter that criticism.

Comment
--------------


4. (C) News of the signing of the Article 98 agreement has
not yet become public here. When it does, it will provoke
strong criticism from human rights groups, which have formed
an ad-hoc Commission in Support of the International Criminal
Court and are actively lobbying the GOG against any Article
98 agreement. Opposition to Article 98 is likely to be
concentrated in civil society and the smaller leftist parties
including the UNE, ANN, and URNG.


5. (C) We concur with the GOG's caution over how to deal
with Congress. Any move to ratify the agreement during the
extraordinary session, which is focused almost exclusively on
the issue of fiscal reforms, would likely cause another
political firestorm like the one the GANA faced after it
became clear that Berger was in dialogue with FRG leader Rios
Montt.


6. (C) Prospects for passage of the fiscal reforms are good,
as a result of Berger's willingness to work with the FRG and
to consider marginal changes and incentives demanded by other
opposition parties. By deferring the Article 98 debate until
after the fiscal reforms are approved, the prospects also
improve for the emergence of a working coalition which could
also support Article 98 ratification. We will continue to
discuss how the USG can best assist the GOG's efforts to
approve the agreement.
HAMILTON