TAJIKISTAN: ISLAMIC PARTY'S KABIRI UNPLUGGED

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000170


DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN - BANKS, DRL
MOSCOW FOR WOOSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/09
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR KISL KDEM KPAO TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: ISLAMIC PARTY'S KABIRI UNPLUGGED

REF: (A) DUSHANBE 146; (B) DUSHANBE 90; (C) DUSHANBE 02


CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD HOAGLAND, AMB, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.5 (D)



1. (C) Summary: At a small dinner party on January 29, First
Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Revival Party Muhiddin Kabiri
freely discussed the upcoming elections and his party's chances
of success. Drawing on his experiences in the last
parliamentary elections, he opined that President Rahmonov would
ensure that his party retains power by any means possible.
Kabiri said that Rahmonov retains popularity, but the next
generation of voters will look for concrete economic
achievements before casting their votes for him. Kabiri, like
his party, looks to the 2010 parliamentary elections as the
target date for possible change. End summary.


2. (C) DCM participated on January 29 in a small dinner hosted
by a German Embassy colleague whose featured guest was Muhiddin
Kabiri, the first deputy chairman of the Islamic Revival Party
of Tajikistan (IRPT). Arriving in his newly acquired Mercedes
Benz 500 series sedan, and more nattily attired than the rest of
the guests, Kabiri declined offers of wine and champagne and
settled for downing three or four beers during his stay of five
and one-half hours. Over a tasty Persian meal of fessenjun,
coo-coo, and mastakhiar, Kabiri discussed the upcoming
elections, the role of the IRPT in Tajikistan, and his own
political ambitions.


3. (C) Kabiri said that the 2005 parliamentary election would
not result in any change of power. Referring to his own
parliamentary campaign in Faizobad during the last election in
2000, Kabiri said that after the first round of voting he was
the front-runner with 48% of the vote. Though he had the
support of all the other opposition candidates for the second
round, his votes totaled only 48.5%, and the candidate from the
President's party, the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(PDPT),won.


4. (C) Kabiri said that after the first round results were in,
some government officials approached him and suggested that he
take the post of ambassador to Iran or to Turkey rather than
continue a fruitless campaign to enter parliament. He was
specifically told that he had no chance to win the election.
Kabiri demurred, though he knew the government would not allow
him to win a seat in parliament. A good friend who was leader
of one of the small municipalities told Kabiri that President
Rahmonov had called him in and ordered him to make sure that
Kabiri did not win. Kabiri's friend told him that "I had no
choice but to do the President's bidding, but because of our
friendship I want you to know what happened."


5. (C) In discussing the upcoming elections, Kabiri said that
the IRPT had a long-term outlook. (See Ref A) Realistically
speaking, Kabiri said, the IRPT would not win even if the next
election were fair and transparent. (He hastened to add,
however, that this would not/not be the case.) The IRPT is
looking to the next parliamentary election -- in 2010 -- as the
one when a viable alternative to Rahmonov could emerge. This
would be the first election in which the post-civil war
generation would participate, and their desire for increased
economic opportunities would not be flavored by the desire for
stability that overrides any democratic tendencies in most of
the present electorate. Nonetheless, the President is flexing
his muscles and chipping away at the IRPT with the recent arrest
of Shamsiddinov (Ref B).


6. (C) President Rahmonov, according to Kabiri, already has
started his campaign for parliamentary elections. By
intimidating independent media, Rahmonov wants to ensure that
not much light is shined on his election tactics. (Ref C) And,
Kabiri averred, Rahmonov plans to subvert the international
community's urging to reform the current election law by "taking
over" the process. Once he -- via the PDPT's control of
parliament -- brings a draft election law before parliament, any
reforms will only be to increase the President's hold on power.


7. (C) Kabiri readily admits that Rahmonov himself is popular
with the electorate. In a private and confidential poll
conducted by the IRPT, Rahmonov was the favorite for almost half
of those polled. The second leading candidate -- who Kabiri
would not name -- had support from 11% of those polled, and
Nuri, the leader of the IRPT, garnered 8%.


8. (C) Regarding the future of the IRPT, Kabiri said that it is
considering changing its name, perhaps removing "Islam" from it.
Nuri decided that it might be time to do so and discussed this
with the President. Rahmonov told him that it would not be a
good idea at the present time, and Kabiri characterized
Rahmonov's reasoning as Machiavellian -- the President likes to
hold up the IRPT to foreign visitors as the only legal Islamic
party in Central Asia and wants to raise the specter of an
Islamic "Taliban style" party to the electorate. Kabiri also
said that Nuri was ready to leave the leadership of the party
and turn it over to him, but Kabiri said he was not yet ready to
assume this position.


9. (C) In fact, Kabiri said he was prepared to support a
candidate for president from any of the opposition parties, if
only there were a viable candidate. The only person who Kabiri
believes could measure up is Rahmatullo Zoirov, leader of the
Social Democrat Party of Tajikistan. But as Kabiri said he told
Zoirov, "if only you were Tajik, you could be president."
(Zoirov is an ethnic Uzbek.)


10. (C) Bio note: Kabiri was open and frank in his assessments
and commented how much he enjoyed the discussion. Unlike most
Tajik politicians, he relishes hard questions, and he answered
them thoughtfully. He spoke in Tajiki and English, and although
he clearly preferred Tajiki, his English language skills were
more than adequate. He obtained his new Mercedes only two weeks
ago. He owns a company that imports Russian cars and cranes,
selling many of them in Afghanistan. One Afghan customer could
not pay for the delivery of a crane and gave Kabiri the Mercedes
instead. It's likely that Kabiri will sell the car soon rather
than risk trying to service it in Dushanbe -- the closest
Mercedes Benz dealer is thousands of miles away.


11. (U) Kabul minimize considered.

HOAGLAND