This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
1. (C) Summary: In an October 4 meeting with Ambassador
Kenny, EU Ambassador-designate to the United States John
Bruton noted his plans to work with Congress and through
public diplomacy to strengthen U.S.-EU relations. Bruton
said he would aim to underscore the policy objectives that
both sides shared and to reduce the focus on trans-Atlantic
differences. Ambassador Kenny encouraged this approach and
urged him to reach out to the U.S. business community and USG
agencies. Regarding key U.S.-EU issues, Bruton:
-- avoided predictions on the decision that the EU would take
on the China arms embargo;
-- related that Brussels was "desperately worried" about a
possible trade war over subsidies to aircraft manufacturers;
-- said that the EU had instructed him to make the resolution
of the FSC issue a priority in his dealings with Congress;
-- expressed concern that DHS would not be ready by next
autumn to implement biometric passport requirements; and
-- expressed EU hopes to engage the USG on efforts to curtail
international trade in small arms. End summary.
Bruton's Planned Approach to His Office
2. (C) In an October 4 meeting with the Ambassador, EU
Ambassador-designate to the United States John Bruton (bio
reftel) said that he would focus on Congress in his efforts
to strengthen U.S.-EU relations. He noted his intention to
foster exchanges between Congress and the European
Parliament, with a view to preempting controversies that
might arise through unilateral legislative action by either
side. Bruton mentioned that he was sensitive to the
influence that interaction between Congress and the
Administration had on the USG approach to Europe, having seen
the occasionally contentious interplay among the European
Commission, Council, and Parliament on U.S. policy. He
anticipated that Irish ethnic U.S. Representatives and
Senators would provide entre for his dealings with Congress.
He expressed concern, however, about the degree to which
partisanship would hamper such outreach, noting that the
bipartisan spirit that he had seen during his visits to
Washington in the early 1970s had disappeared.
3. (C) Bruton also planned substantial public diplomacy
during his tenure. He envisioned speaking engagements to
address possibilities for U.S.-EU cooperation on issues like
democratization, which the European public had inaccurately
associated with U.S. neo-conservatism. He would also try to
give his listeners a better sense of the way that EU
authorities interacted with the EU Member States -- a subject
that even most Europeans did not understand, he observed.
Quoting Freud, Bruton said that the overall goal of his
efforts would be to redress "the narcissism of small
differences" in U.S.-EU relations and to highlight the
abundance of shared objectives.
4. (C) The Ambassador encouraged Bruton's outreach to
Congress and urged him to work with the U.S. business
community and with USG agencies, including the State
Department. The Ambassador suggested, in particular, that
Bruton meet with USTR Zoellick to review U.S.-EU trade
issues, noting that trans-Atlantic trade relations were the
foundation upon which cooperation in all other fields was
built. The Ambassador observed that segments of Congress
were unfamiliar with the European Union and that Bruton could
play a valuable role in filling in those information gaps.
He added that Bruton could play a similar role with U.S.
business groups and industry associations, many of whom had
substantial investments in Europe and were hungry for input
on U.S.-EU economic issues. When Bruton asked what most
annoyed Americans about the EU, the Ambassador cited the
perception, fueled by the Microsoft case, that EU authorities
hassled U.S. firms in Europe.
Key Points on U.S.-EU Issues
5. (C) Bruton made the following points on key issues in
A. China arms embargo. There would be no European arms
exports to China even if the embargo were lifted, given the
strictures of the Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct would
thus have the same effect as the embargo, while appearing
less hostile to China. Bruton said he understood U.S.
concerns, adding that he could not predict the final decision
that the EU would take on the embargo.
B. Boeing-Airbus. Brussels is "desperately worried" about a
possible trade war over subsidies to aircraft manufacturers
Airbus and Boeing. A complicating factor is that some Member
States, particularly France, have substantial interests at
stake, while others have no interests at all.
C. FSC. The EU had instructed Bruton to make the resolution
of the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) case (in which the WTO
has authorized the EU to impose retaliatory fines for U.S.
tax breaks to exporters) a priority in his dealings with
Congress. Bruton hoped that the matter could be finalized in
this session of Congress.
D. Homeland Security. The EU wants to be helpful on U.S.
homeland security measures and has accepted the biometric
passport requirements to be implemented in 2005. As EU
Member States move to put the necessary passport technology
in place, however, they have concerns that DHS may not be
ready by next autumn to bring its own requirements into
E. The Middle East. The Commission has not been clear with
Bruton as to the role he could play regarding efforts by the
Quartet in the Middle East. He related the EU impression
that Israeli Prime Minister Sharon wished to keep the U.S.
from establishing a negotiating partner among the
F. Kyoto Protocol. The EU is unsure whether the Bush
Administration has remained outside the Kyoto Protocol
because of the economic impact that adherence would have on
U.S. industry, or because the Administration is simply not
convinced of the science of climate change. The EU believes
that the Administration has overemphasized the potential of
technology in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
G. Small arms trade. The Commission hopes to engage the USG
on efforts to curtail international trade in small arms and
light weapons, notwithstanding opposition to gun control in
the United States. In the EU view, easy access to small arms
is a principal reason for the failure of poor states.
H. Africa. Bruton agreed with the Ambassador that U.S.-EU
cooperation on African issues, particularly the fight against
HIV/AIDS, could be a positive experience upon which to build
in mounting joint efforts on other difficult issues, like the