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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
04DJIBOUTI825 2004-06-16 12:35:00 SECRET Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

EACTI: PRIORITIZATION OF DJIBOUTI CT PROGRAMS

Tags:   PTER EAID EFIN PREL PGOV DJ 
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					S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000825 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014
TAGS: PTER EAID EFIN PREL PGOV DJ
SUBJECT: EACTI: PRIORITIZATION OF DJIBOUTI CT PROGRAMS

REF: STATE 112122

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)



1. (C) In response to reftel, Embassy Djibouti sections and
agencies reviewed East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative
(EACTI) objectives and supporting programs. Embassy provides
the following list of objectives and supporting programs in
order of priority:

a. (C) EACTI objective - Limit Freedom of Movement to
Transnational Terrorists.

(i) (C) Coastal Security. Given that al-Qaida and other
terrorists are transiting the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa
and beyond, we propose developing a coastal security program
for Djibouti that will bolster its capacity to deny
terrorists freedom of movement in the littoral waters
surrounding Djibouti. This program will include capacity
building for surveillance and interdiction of maritime
traffic in the region. Program source - Foreign Military
Financing.

(ii) (C) Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). TIP assists
the Government of Djibouti (GODJ) in securing its borders by
limiting terrorists' capabilities to cross international
boundaries to stage terrorist attacks and escape undetected.
Through a series of networked computers and peripherals
installed at airport entry and departure points, transit
lounges and key sea and land border points, the TIP will
bolster Djibouti's ability to identify arriving or transiting
passengers suspected of having terrorist connections.
Additionally, it will allow the GODJ to determine quickly who
may be hastily leaving the country after an incident.

(iii) (C) Safe Skies For Africa (SSFA). The SSFA program
seeks to improve sub-Saharan aviation infrastructure by
targeting the now seven selected "hub" countries for advanced
technical assistance in meeting the international aviation
safety and security standards of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Djibouti has regular flights
coming from and going to Hargeisa, Yemen, Dubai, Addis Ababa,
Asmara and Paris. Djibouti's airport currently primarily
serves military uses, but would like to expand its passenger
travel. New economic ventures, such as the Doraleh Port, may
lead to an increase in passengers and freight. If Djibouti's
air freight and passenger services do not meet current safety
standards, it could deter incoming investors. Increased
training and security equipment at the airport can benefit
Djibouti's economic performance at the same time that it
ensures that all routes into Djibouti are secured and safe.

(iv) (S) Border Security. Djibouti shares a border with
Somalia. This same border is only 12 kms from the only U.S.
military base in Africa. It is critical to Djiboutian and
U.S. interests to improve the ability of Djibouti to monitor
and patrol its frontiers. Recent intelligence reports
indicate al-Qaida is operating along the Djibouti-Somalia
border, portending critical implications for U.S. force
protection. Proposed program would include training as well
as transportation and communications equipment. Program
source - Foreign Military Financing.

(v) (C) Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance (ATA). The ATA
program is focused on enhancing the policing skills of GODJ
security services to prevent or combat a terrorist action.
Through a series of training programs geared specifically at
countering terrorism, the ATA program increases a country's
ability to defend itself against terrorism while providing
greater security for U.S. personnel. Special courses in
airport and border security bolster the GODJ's ability to
control its borders and enforce immigration law.

b. (U) EACTI Objective - Counter Extremist Influence.

(i) (U) Public Diplomacy Program. Public diplomacy program
activities influence Djiboutian, French and regional public
opinion and decision-making consistent with U.S. national
interests. Increased interaction between the American and
Djiboutian communities fosters goodwill and provides a venue
for promoting programs and values that counter extremist
influences. Encouraging and framing Djibouti's success as a
Muslim, Somali-speaking, American ally is key to the success
of EACTI as well as our overall Mission Plan. This takes
many forms including distribution of books and other written
materials supporting EACTI goals, increased person-to-person
and cross-cultural interaction and television and radio
broadcasts.

(ii) (U) Self-Help. The Self-Help program's goal is to
encourage communities to better their own situation, while
improving the U.S. relationship with host country nationals.
Self-Help is one of the most visible and direct forms of U.S.
assistance. Embassy Djibouti has had more than 30 successful
community development projects over the past two years.
These projects go beyond giving financial assistance to the
government. They provide local communities with activities
for children, places to study and tutor, vocational training,
better resources for farming and greater access to water.
The inaugurations of successful projects and programs have
great impact on the hearts and minds of Djiboutians, more so
than grants to the government.

(iii) (U) Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF). The DHRF
is an annual allotment from USAID that gives Posts the
ability to fund small, short-term projects proposed by the
government and private secret groups to promote human rights,
good governance, political pluralism and democracy. The
funds have been especially useful in Djibouti for promoting
awareness in the public sector and government awareness of
human rights. DHRF funds have also been vital in past
legislative elections and in encouraging rights of the child.

(iv) (C) Voice of America (VOA). Radio and television
broadcasts are the most effective means of reaching a mass
audience in this largely illiterate country. They further
American values and goals consistent with EACTI and the
Mission Performance Plan. In addition to their shared
culture, Djibouti's close proximity to Somalia, southern
Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen makes it a natural launching point
for programs that will reach across the borders of this small
state. For example, our current VOA feeds are in English
(VOA) and Arabic (Radio Sawaa) and cover an arc from Sudan to
Saudi Arabia.

c. (C) EACTI Objective - Enhance Regional Counter-Terrorism
and Law Enforcement Capabilities.

(i) (U) International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).
Although ILEA is designed to address international crime, its
focus on developing mid-level management for law enforcement
and other criminal justice officials, is critical to the
overall ability of the GODJ police force to prevent or
counter a terrorist act. The ability of the host nation to
deploy an effective and professional police force is
detrimental to countering terrorism in a region ripe with
political instability and deteriorating communities.

(ii) (U) The ATA program complements ILEA by providing
specialized training in fields to which the GODJ would not
normally be exposed. Courses in post-blast investigation,
senior crisis management, VIP protection and officer survival
are just some of the courses that have helped bring the GODJ
security services into a new era of law enforcement.

(iii) (U) International Military Education and Training
(IMET). The IMET program serves to professionalize the
Djiboutian military, expose Djiboutian officers to the United
States and make the Djiboutian military more interoperable
with the U.S. military.

(iv) (U) Counter-Terrorism Fellowship. This additional
funding for education and training is very useful to continue
the professionalization of the Djiboutian military and expose
senior military and civilian leaders to U.S. strategic
thinking in relation to the GWOT.



2. (U) Post is aware that future funding of all programs will
be reflective of the national interest as it evolves.
However, given Djibouti's strategic location, key role in
regional stability and high level of support for the U.S.-led
war on terrorism, we believe most programs in Djibouti should
be maintained at current funding levels.



3. (U) Shortfalls and Additional Requirements.

a. (C) Coastal Security. Current FMF funding will allow the
Djiboutian Coast Guard to procure boats for coastal patrol,
interdiction and boarding operations. Additionally, Djibouti
will be able to construct small naval stations in the remote
regions to ensure continual military presence in the littoral
waters. However, Djibouti's coastal security program
requires radar to be effective. Current FMF funding is not
adequate to procure the necessary radar.

b. (C) Somali Language Broadcasts. Somalia is a known harbor
for extremists. We believe that increasing our Somali
language output, especially through VOA, would be an
effective means of reaching an important target population.
VOA currently lacks the transmitter to reach Somalia,
although the current station is amenable to and appropriately
placed for such an addition. A Somali language feed need not
represent a change in policy as Djibouti is largely
Somaliphone and would be a consumer of said products;
therefore, such a feed would not qualify as direct
engagement. That said, the Department of State currently
produces few, if any, Somali language products.

c. (C) The training programs designed for the GODJ, as
implemented through ATA and ILEA, are without a doubt one of
the best dollar-for-dollar investments the U.S. Government
(USG) has in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
Unfortunately, training is only a portion of what the
Djiboutian security services require to maintain a
professional police force. The skills acquired through USG
training can only go so far without the use of proper
equipment. The GODJ suffers from a depleted economy and is
unable to procure adequate equipment for the security
services. Items such as handcuffs, radios, ballistic vests,
riot batons, shields, helmets, ammunition for training and
many other basic tools of the trade in their inventory are
either obsolete or non existent. The GODJ Security Services
are in dire need of physical resources that are commensurate
with the level of training received. It would be in the best
interest of the USG's counter terrorism program to provide
either the actual resources or a monetary grant to procure
essential equipment.
RAGSDALE