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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
04DJIBOUTI815 2004-06-14 14:15:00 SECRET Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

DJIBOUTI AND PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE

Tags:   PREL MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PTER DJ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000815 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AF/RSA AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PTER DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI AND PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE

REF: A. STATE 122629

B. DJIBOUTI 549

C. STATE 112122

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE.
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).



1. (S) This cable reflects the views of the Ambassador,
Office of Regional Affairs, Regional Security Office, United
States Liaison Office and the Commander of the Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).



2. (S) Post appreciates the Department's concern outlined in
Ref A and wishes to clarify any misunderstanding created by
Ref B. Under the Ref B proposal, all counter-terrorism (CT)
programs in Djibouti are not being placed under the military.
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training and programs under
the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) will continue as
currently operating. Additionally, no new programs are
envisioned or requested by Post. The Djiboutian military has
requested, and will receive, two Blanket Order Training (BOT)
cases as part of its Border and Coastal Security programs.
Post will use these BOT cases to purchase a variety of
training that supports the stated goals of the Border and
Coastal security programs. Post would not, and could not,
direct the Djiboutian Government (DJG) to pursue any
particular course of action.



3. (S) That said, the Djiboutian military (including the
Gendarmerie, which falls under its jurisdiction) has
approached Post and CJTF-HOA on several occasions outlining
the need, and the current lack of capacity within the
Djiboutian military, to support and augment other agencies of
the Djiboutian government in the event of a terrorist act.
Post and CJTF-HOA have advised the DJG that specific training
on CT for the military cannot be pursued until the role of
the Djiboutian military in CT activities is clearly defined.
A recent ATA program review noted that the single greatest
inhibitor to effective CT operations in Djibouti was lack of
coordination among the various security agencies at the
national level. We have stated to the DJG the importance of
clearly defining the roles of its military organizations in
support of CT operations. With such coordination, and a
clear delineation of roles, the military could receive
training that would be in support of current U.S.-sponsored
CT programs.



4. (S) Post emphasizes that Ref B is not a request for
additional programs or monies. BOT cases are standard tools
of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) system and Djibouti's
BOT cases will be used to support the goals of the East
Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative as they are currently
stated. Post agrees with the Department that greater
coordination among elements involved in CT activities is
valuable. If the DJG creates a national CT Task Force that
includes portions of the Djiboutian military, post will
inform the Department.
RAGSDALE