ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000549

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR S/CT, PM, AF, AF/E, AF/RSA AND DS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MARR MOPS MCAP DJ
SUBJECT: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM
FORCE IN DJIBOUTI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE FOR REASON
1.4 (A),(B) AND (D)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Pursuant to the goals of the East Africa
Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI),U.S. Embassy Djibouti
wishes to use its security assistance (SA) program to
establish a national counter terrorism (CT) force within the
Djiboutian military. Because of multiple actors within the
Djibouti security services, the U.S. Embassy will need to
engage the Djiboutian Government (DJG) to designate this unit
of focus and set a clear chain of command.

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Current Situation
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2. (S/NF) Building host nation capacity in the area of
counter terrorism is an extremely important component of the
EACTI. Djibouti currently is lacking a single national asset
that can adequately respond to and mitigate regional
terrorist threats. The clear intention of the USG is to
fight regional terrorist threats and to build regional
stability through the programs of the EACTI.
Programmatically, the EACTI assigns the function of CT
capacity building in Djibouti to the Terrorist Interdiction
Program (TIP) and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
(ATA). These programs were funded at $500K and $2.3M
respectively. TIP and ATA are focused on customs and
policing functions. While important and vital to the overall
CT effort, TIP and ATA do not allow for the crucial
integration of the various governmental security elements
that perform CT roles in the Republic of Djibouti.


3. (S/NF) Past discussions with several security
organizations in Djibouti have indicated a desire on their
part to participate in counter-terrorism training. This is,
in part, because of the current national architecture of
security operations in Djibouti. That architecture gives
several different organizations responsibility for the
various national assets within the country. The Djiboutian
Gendarmerie, for example, has responsibility for the
International Airport and the maritime port perimeter. The
Djiboutian Army has responsibility for borders. The Coast
Guard has responsibility for approaches to the port. The
Republican Guard has responsibility for the Presidency and
the Presidential residence. Finally, the National Police
have responsibility for security of the port's interior and
Djibouti's cities and towns. Yet, past informal attempts to
get the Djiboutian security forces to consolidate their
counter-terrorism mission into a single force were stiffly
rebuffed. Instead the DJG wishes to create such a
counter-terrorism task force comprising all the elements
listed above.


4. (S/NF) The creation of a task force would help mitigate
the current scattered counter terrorism responsibilities of
existing organizations. That said, there remain many
problems related to the effective accomplishment of any
action executed by a force with multiple chains of command
and organizational lines. For a task force concept to be
successful, a clear chain of command and control must be
established at the outset. The counter terrorism task force
chain of command need not be a permanent realignment of
forces. It need only be an operational chain of command that
takes effect in the event the Djiboutian National Command
Authority assigns a mission to the counter terrorism task
force. The day-to-day functions of operations and training
can remain the responsibilities of each security service.


5. (S/NF) Additionally, there are internal political
dynamics within the DJG that must be considered. A delicate
balance of power exists currently between the various
security services within the DJG. Each service tends to act
as its own lobby with the President and in some cases each
has traditional family and clan ties that remain very
important. Giving each service a piece of the counter
terrorism pie would serve to preserve this delicate balance.

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The Way Forward
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6. (S/NF) U.S. Embassy proposes to formally approach the DJG
and request establishment of a CT Task Force with a declared
chain of command for the employment of it. Once
accomplished, a training case will be funded using Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) money provided as part of the EACTI.
This training case will fund the necessary training modules
to make the Djiboutian CG Task Force an effective force.
RAGSDALE