wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
04DJIBOUTI291 2004-03-02 14:09:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

2ND REQUEST FOR REACTIVATION OF A MARINE SECURITY

Tags:   ASEC PTER DJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000291 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR AF/EX, AF/E, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/SPC/MSG,
DS/IP/MSG

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT 1.6 X1 AND X8
TAGS: ASEC PTER DJ
SUBJECT: 2ND REQUEST FOR REACTIVATION OF A MARINE SECURITY
GUARD DETACHMENT IN DJIBOUTI

REF: 03 DJIBOUTI 988

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA RAGSDALE FOR REASON 1.5
(C)AND (G)



1. (U) Ambassador Ragsdale supports REFTEL request that a
Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSG DET) be re-activated at
American Embassy Djibouti. Embassy Djibouti submitted REFTEL
in May of 2003 and, to date, has not received an official
reply. The following justification for an MSG DET is
resubmitted.



2. (S/NF) The establishment of the only U.S. Military base in
Sub-Saharan Africa has placed numerous demands for resources
and information on the Embassy that has resulted in an
increase in the processing, storage and dissemination of
classified material at the highest levels. ORCA has
established a permanent Station at the Embassy and with it
the ability to receive and disseminate information at a
TS/SCI level.

SIPDIS



3. (S/NF) The security of the Station and its classified
material is of great concern to Post management as well as to
the RSO and COS. Recent activity, outlined in intelligence
reporting, clearly indicates that the capability of foreign
intelligence services to mount a technical intelligence
attack exists within Djibouti. RSO, ORCA and U.S. MIL/INTEL
all agree that it is a matter of time before a HUMINT/TECHINT
attack is carried out by several intelligence sources in
country. The presence of the Chinese, Libyan, Russian,
French and other nations, with a long history of hostile
intelligence operations, is a clear indicator that the
probability for such an attack to be carried out is greater
now than ever before. The existing threat, coupled with a
lock and leave facility plagued with constant technical
difficulties, is a simple formula for the compromise of
national security information.



4. (S/NF) Due to the sensitivity of intelligence operations
at Post, COS supports the reactivation of an MSG DET and has
indicated this through separate channels. The COS's report
underscores Post's deep concerns and the critical need for an
MSG DET. In addition, Djibouti's status as a front-line
country in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) makes it
extremely difficult for Post to have an effective walk-in
program absent the presence of an MSG DET.



5. (SBU) Post is cognizant of the large cost that goes
hand-in-hand with establishing an MSG DET. Post points out
however, that the former MSG DET in Djibouti was deactivated
in 1997 and that much of the physical infrastructure required
to begin operations currently exists. Post One is complete
and fully operational with upgraded equipment. Although the
former Marine house has been converted into office space,
adequate housing exists in the City of Djibouti that can
easily accommodate 5 watch standers and still meet the
security and social needs of the Detachment. In addition,
the Ambassador has indicated her willingness to release the
current CMR, located on the compound, for use of the MSG
Detachment, should OBO and DS concur on an off compound CMR.
The current CMR can be easily renovated to meet the standards
of an MSGR. Office space for a Detachment Commander and a
react room for the Marines can be converted from existing
space.



6. (S) Ambassador Ragsdale request the Department give strong
consideration to raising Djibouti's priority level for
receiving an MSG DET. The Ambassador feels that the security
situation in Djibouti will continue to be highly fluid and
without an MSG DET to help protect our National Security
Information, Embassy Djibouti will be vulnerable to an attack
on several levels. Should the Embassy suffer a catastrophic
event Post will be unable to provide adequately the proper
amount of resources needed to secure the facility while
dealing with numerous problems an emergency action will
generate.



7. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or
253-35-26-73 (secure).
RAGSDALE