Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
04DJIBOUTI291 | 2004-03-02 14:09:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Djibouti |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000291 |
1. (U) Ambassador Ragsdale supports REFTEL request that a Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSG DET) be re-activated at American Embassy Djibouti. Embassy Djibouti submitted REFTEL in May of 2003 and, to date, has not received an official reply. The following justification for an MSG DET is resubmitted. 2. (S/NF) The establishment of the only U.S. Military base in Sub-Saharan Africa has placed numerous demands for resources and information on the Embassy that has resulted in an increase in the processing, storage and dissemination of classified material at the highest levels. ORCA has established a permanent Station at the Embassy and with it the ability to receive and disseminate information at a TS/SCI level. SIPDIS 3. (S/NF) The security of the Station and its classified material is of great concern to Post management as well as to the RSO and COS. Recent activity, outlined in intelligence reporting, clearly indicates that the capability of foreign intelligence services to mount a technical intelligence attack exists within Djibouti. RSO, ORCA and U.S. MIL/INTEL all agree that it is a matter of time before a HUMINT/TECHINT attack is carried out by several intelligence sources in country. The presence of the Chinese, Libyan, Russian, French and other nations, with a long history of hostile intelligence operations, is a clear indicator that the probability for such an attack to be carried out is greater now than ever before. The existing threat, coupled with a lock and leave facility plagued with constant technical difficulties, is a simple formula for the compromise of national security information. 4. (S/NF) Due to the sensitivity of intelligence operations at Post, COS supports the reactivation of an MSG DET and has indicated this through separate channels. The COS's report underscores Post's deep concerns and the critical need for an MSG DET. In addition, Djibouti's status as a front-line country in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) makes it extremely difficult for Post to have an effective walk-in program absent the presence of an MSG DET. 5. (SBU) Post is cognizant of the large cost that goes hand-in-hand with establishing an MSG DET. Post points out however, that the former MSG DET in Djibouti was deactivated in 1997 and that much of the physical infrastructure required to begin operations currently exists. Post One is complete and fully operational with upgraded equipment. Although the former Marine house has been converted into office space, adequate housing exists in the City of Djibouti that can easily accommodate 5 watch standers and still meet the security and social needs of the Detachment. In addition, the Ambassador has indicated her willingness to release the current CMR, located on the compound, for use of the MSG Detachment, should OBO and DS concur on an off compound CMR. The current CMR can be easily renovated to meet the standards of an MSGR. Office space for a Detachment Commander and a react room for the Marines can be converted from existing space. 6. (S) Ambassador Ragsdale request the Department give strong consideration to raising Djibouti's priority level for receiving an MSG DET. The Ambassador feels that the security situation in Djibouti will continue to be highly fluid and without an MSG DET to help protect our National Security Information, Embassy Djibouti will be vulnerable to an attack on several levels. Should the Embassy suffer a catastrophic event Post will be unable to provide adequately the proper amount of resources needed to secure the facility while dealing with numerous problems an emergency action will generate. 7. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or 253-35-26-73 (secure). RAGSDALE |