Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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04DJIBOUTI1288 | 2004-10-06 13:20:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Djibouti |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001288 |
1. (U) SUMMARY: As Djibouti does not yet have a program under Safe Skies for Africa, Post endeavors to describe what the civil aviation officials on the ground hope a SSFA program could provide. Djibouti's airport is not up to international standards as written by the ICAO, however, according to Airport Director, David Hawker, it is not far from standards. The most critical point that needs to be addressed in order to be compliant is the existence of national legislation regarding airport standards. Djibouti's department of Civil Aviation reportedly has a draft in the works. However, Hawker hopes that the Government can be persuaded to adopt the ICAO legislation as its own rather than attempting to draft a new law from scratch. END SUMMARY. DJIBOUTI'S RESOURCES ON THE GROUND -------------------------- 2. (U) Ambouli International Airport is a single runway airport located just outside the capital city of Djibouti. The airport is flanked by the French Air Force Base, the American military base home to the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Tadjourah. The airport presently can land, and does land, planes as large as the C-5 Galaxy. Though the airport can land planes suitable for mass-cargo shipping, its air traffic is currently limited to mostly passenger flights. 3. (U) Djibouti's air connections currently include weekly flights from Paris on Daallo Airlines, Air France and Ethiopian Airlines; flights to Addis Ababa three times weekly on Ethiopian Airlines; flights three times weekly to Dubai on both Djibouti Airlines and Daallo Airlines; twice weekly connections to Nairobi on Kenyan Airways; and British Airways services that connect to Asmara and Nairobi. Djibouti Airlines also connects regionally to Hargeisa and Dire Dawa. Its capacity to handle cargo and freight shipping is currently minimal. 4. (U) Security screening equipment is limited to two out of date belt-fed x-ray machines and two walk through metal detectors to scan baggage and personal goods. Security lighting is well within ICAO regulated codes, thanks to a grant project by the French military. Both the American and French military have improved the exterior fencing around portions of the airport, but several hundred kilometers more is still needed. Fire-fighting equipment consists of one engine that can no longer make the length of the runway in two minutes, as required by safety regulations. According to Hawker, there is no significant change since the last FAA evaluation of the airport, improvements are already underway. 5. (SBU) Security for the airport is provided by a combination of National Police and Gendarme personnel. This arrangement has proven to be less than efficient. Overlapping and redundant responsibilities among the security services, coupled with the lack of clear legislation and detailed planning for airport security, engenders confusion and creates serious vulnerabilities. It is unclear as to which organization has the responsibility and jurisdiction to provide emergency response to critical situations. In addition, while there is a controlled-access badge system in place, there is a significant abuse of privilege and a resultant lackadaisical attitude on behalf of the security personnel. This deficiency presents a situation in which sensitive areas of the airport are loosely controlled and are easily penetrated by unauthorized personnel either posing as important officials or slipping past unwary sentries. 6. (U) The airport land and infrastructure is owned by the Government of Djibouti but managed by Dubai Ports International. The total budget of the airport is provided by funds generated by incoming and outgoing passenger and cargo traffic. Currently, this traffic is barely enough to maintain existing functions. Though there has been an increase in passenger traffic due to economic development projects, it is not yet enough to make the airport profitable. WHAT DJIBOUTI LACKS -------------------------- 7. (U) Djibouti currently does not meet international regulations for fire fighting equipment. Though it can land a plane as large as a C-5 Galaxy, it does not have the equipment that would bring it up to category nine fire-fighting standards. The one engine the airport has is outdated and cannot get from one end of the runway to the other in under two minutes, as required by ICAO regulations. 8. (U) Djibouti's airport is not certified, and cannot become certified until it has national legislation to comply with. Hawker hopes that the Djiboutian Civil Aviation Authority and the Government of Djibouti will adopt the ICAO standards as its own. Hawker said that in any case, the airport is working towards the ICAO standards regardless of how the legislation issue goes. 9. (U) Hawker said the airport does not have an update Instrument Landing System (ILS). It is currently trying to procure a refurbished one from Talis Germany, but is encountering problems from Talis France which requires that Africa be serviced by Talis France. The problem, Hawker said, with procuring the system from France is that it does not sell older models and a new one is far beyond the price range for the airport. Djibouti's airport also does not have at present the means to calibrate radio aides, and is currently waiting for assistance from the French military. NOTE: (SBU) Djibouti received an airport security management course coordinated through the DS Anti-Terrorism Assistance program in December 2002. Although the course was effective and beneficial for the Djiboutians that attended, it also pointed out several deficiencies that include, but are not limited to; the lack of legislation for airport operations; the need for a government organization to regulate the airport and bring it into compliance with ICAO; the need for the development of a national civil aviation plan, an airport security plan and an air carrier operations plan; and the establishment of crisis management and contingency plans to deal with catastrophic events. Unless Djibouti can meet some of these basic requirements no amount of physical security will be adequate to deal with a crisis situation. WHAT DPI PLANS FOR DJIBOUTI'S AIRPORT -------------------------- 10. (U) DPI hopes the new traffic brought in by economic development projects will bring greater revenue from cargo shipment. With the new port at Doraleh coming on-line next year, there have already been requests for the airport to provide significant amounts of equipment to handle trans-shipment through the airport. Hawker said there are several Dubai companies that are looking towards Djibouti's planned Airport Free Zone as an option to expand their over-extended offices in Dubai. The estimated target for tons shipped through Djibouti's airport is 20,000 per year with routes going from Dubai to Central Africa. 11. (SBU) Hawker explained that airport has the resources and funds ready to construct the Airport Free Zone but has stalled in hopes of a new runway. He explained that since the area between the airport and the two camps - Camp Lemonier in particular - is so small, the airport cannot expand and still have sufficient area around it for regulations sake. Hawker proposes that the American and French military could easily take over the whole of Ambouli Airport if they could construct a new runway for the airport. He identified a small airstrip that the French military uses close to the city that could "cost effectively be expanded" and DPI would then put up the funding for a new terminal. The airstrip identified is in a convenient location to the new port and to the highway. Hawker added that taking over the existing airport would be beneficial in many ways to Camp Lemonier, particularly in the issues of space and security. The target completion date for the Airport Free Zone remains this year. HOW DJIBOUTI SEES SAFE SKIES -------------------------- 12. (SBU) There is a general sentiment of impatience on the issue of Safe Skies. Both Hawker and the Director of Civil Aviation, Almis Haid, have expressed disappointment, and slight displeasure, at what they describe as Embassy requests for improvements needed for the past three years running yet giving no definitive word on whether Djibouti is in or out of the Safe Skies program. Hawker commented that Haid had felt slighted after attending programming in 2003 as a potential participant because the Djiboutian delegation was not included, in his opinion, to a satisfactory degree. Hawker said that he hoped the upcoming conference in Johannesburg will prove to be more fruitful. SAFE SKIES AND SECURITY PROGRAMS -------------------------- 13. (SBU) Although immigration controls are currently considered to be ponderous, unresponsive and prone to mistake and abuse, a USG sponsored counter-terrorism initiative (Terrorist Interdiction Program - PISCES) is under way that will assist the Djiboutians in bolstering their tracking and registration capabilities. Upon completion of Phase-1 of the program, the immigration service will be able to document and screen potential terrorists using a network of computer systems and bio-metrics. This system will have real time reports generated that will be monitored by the Security Services and Embassy personnel. 14. (SBU) Djibouti's security services have received several training courses through DS/ATA that concentrate on enhancing their counter-terrorism capabilities. In addition to DS/ATA training, Djiboutian police officers have begun training at the International La Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana. Although ILEA training is not geared towards countering terrorism, it does concentrate on the professional development of police managers. This sort of training will provide the Djiboutians with managerial and organizational skills that will translate into more effective and traditional security operations. RAGSDALE |