Norwegian facilitators upbeat after meetings

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000772

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
DEPARTMENT ALSO PLEASE PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-12-14
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL CE NO IN LTTE
SUBJECT: Norwegian facilitators upbeat after meetings
with GSL and LTTE, but arranging talks will take time

Refs: Colombo 747, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Norwegians found President
Kumaratunga and LTTE Chief Prabhakaran determined to
move ahead on negotiations. The sides need to decide
agenda, locale and timing. It's months, not weeks, and
negotiations could not begin before late-July at a
minimum. The new government needs to understand
unilateral actions are not helpful. The Indians have no
interest in changing the nature of their engagement.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen
briefed donor Chiefs of Mission May 12 on the visit by
Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen May 10-11. Petersen
met President Kumaratunga twice, and met Prabhakaran in
Kilinochchi on May 11. Helgesen stayed on after
Petersen's departure and would meet Kumaratunga again
before leaving himself on Thursday. Helgesen said that
despite the difficult political scene in the South, he
found both parties "determined to move ahead." There
were three categories of issues that needed to be
discussed before negotiations resumed, however.


3. (C) The first item was what should be on the agenda.
The LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposal would obviously be a part of that. There was a
question as to how to link that discussion to one on the
final settlement. It would also be necessary to keep
attention on the Ceasefire Agreement. The second issue
was where. Public statements by both sides on this
issue had been unhelpful, and Petersen had made it clear
the two sides needed to agree. (Helgesen said that the
LTTE wanted Europe, because with Balasingham now back in
the picture, his health condition made long trips a
problem.)


4. (C) The last question was when. Helgesen said that
with the amount of preparatory work needed, this was a
matter of months, not weeks. At the earliest,
negotiations might resume in late-July, early-August.
He said that he thought Kumaratunga understood now that
it was not desirable to rush into negotiations.


5. (C) Helgesen found it interesting the LTTE was using
more "political" content in their discussions now. For
instance, they said that they (through their Tamil
National Alliance proxies) had won all of the
parliamentary seats in the North on the promise to bring
development. Therefore they needed to do so to fulfill
their campaign commitments. Ambassador asked Helgesen
if he had at that point, or any other point, pointed out
to LTTE that their behavior before and during the
elections -- intimidation and murder of rival
candidates, stuffing of ballot boxes, etc -- was
unacceptable. It was also stupid, because they would
have won a great majority of seats anyway. Helgesen
said the Norwegians had not. Ambassador asked if this
was not a type of "political moral hazard." Donors
should not allow such statements to go unchallenged, or
the LTTE would think we accepted their arguments.
Netherlands and Canadian Ambassadors chimed in to agree,
and said they might go to Kilinochchi to make these
points, which Ambassador applauded.


6. (C) Helgesen said Kumaratunga had not yet chosen her
chief negotiator or negotiating delegation. She said
she would do that once the time of negotiation was
settled. Helgesen and a number of others around the
table had heard a rumor that Finance Minister Amunugama
might get the nod as chief negotiator. Most agreed he
seemed a reasonable choice.

7. (C) In sum, Helgesen said, the challenge with the
new government was to make them understand that
unilateral actions were not welcome. (n.b. this applies
especially to Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, who has a
habit of revealing his uncleared thoughts to the press.)
The point to be made to the GSL, Helgesen said, was that
they had to "move in parallel."


8. (C) As a last thought, Helgesen added that he had
stopped in Delhi and had a long conversation with NSA
Mishra. Despite public comments by Kadirgamar and
others on an enhanced Indian role, Delhi has no
intention of changing the nature of its engagement.
India did not want a direct role in the negotiations.


9. (C) COMMENT: The Norwegians are doing the hard
slogging work of trying to prepare the ground well for
the eventual resumption of negotiations. We were a bit
disturbed by their apparent reluctance to call the LTTE
on their egregious human rights violations during
election time. We think they heard the message, but it
would be useful to reinforce at the June 1 Co-Chairs
meeting in Brussels. END COMMENT


10. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD