Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO644
2004-04-15 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR CE NO LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-15-14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews
recent discussion with President on peace process

Refs: Colombo 637, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-15-14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews
recent discussion with President on peace process

Refs: Colombo 637, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Norway expects a formal request from
the GSL to continue its role as peace facilitator.
Norwegians think the new Sri Lankan Government needs to
realize it cannot make unilateral decisions on the
course of the peace process. No "Peace Team" in place
yet. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar briefed
Ambassador April 14 on the conversation he and Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Furuhovde had with
President Chandrika Kumaratunga late evening of April
10, following the delayed swearing-in of the new
cabinet. The meeting also took place as fighting
between forces of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) chief Prabhakaran and breakaway leader Karuna was
ongoing, before the collapse of Karuna's rebellion (see
Reftels). Brattskar said that the President complained
that LTTE actions were a violation of the Ceasefire
Agreement (CFA) and seemed to want the SLMM to do
something immediately. Brattskar explained that the CFA
set out a procedure, and that the GSL would have to make
a formal complaint to the SLMM, which would then
investigate and make a judgment.


3. (C) The President said that she desired to restart
the peace talks as soon as possible. Brattskar said
that he told the President that when the previous
government took power, it had formally requested the
Norwegians to continue their facilitation role. Norway
expected to receive such a request from the new
government, with a description of what it expected
Norway to do. The President was surprised at this.
Brattskar then said that he explained to the President
that neither the GSL nor the LTTE could make unilateral
decisions about the talks. The two sides would have to
agree to any decisions. Brattskar told Ambassador (but
not the President) that the Norwegians, and Deputy
Foreign Minister Helgesen in particular, were disturbed
by an interview which new Foreign Minister Kadirgamar
had given to a local newspaper a few days ago in which
he had made several categorical statements, such as that
any new rounds of talks would be held only in Sri Lanka,
not in foreign locations, and also laying out what he
thought Norway's role would be. Brattskar said that any
such decisions would have to be agreed by both sides and
should be discussed privately, not in the press. He
also expressed unease about statements by both
Kadirgamar and new Prime Minister Rajapakse that India
would have a new, and prominent, role to play in the
peace process. Again, this was something both sides
would need to agree on.


4. (C) Alluding to the then-ongoing LTTE infighting,
the President told Brattskar that she thought peace
talks only succeeded when one side negotiated from a
clear position of strength. (This position is probably
made moot by Karuna's collapse.) Brattskar discussed
with her a number of different peace processes, but said
he did not think the LTTE could be pressurized in that
way. He told Ambassador that it reminded him of the
strategy the President had followed in the mid-90s of
"War for Peace," which had ended disastrously.


5. (C) Brattskar said it was also clear that the
President had not yet put together a "Peace Team" to
conduct the negotiations. She told him she would keep
the current Peace Secretariat, but change some of its
personnel. She did say that current Foreign Secretary
and also Peace Secretariat Head Bernard Goonetilleke
would be removed from both jobs.

6. (C) COMMENT: The charitable view of this is that
the new Government was unaware of the ways in which the
Peace Process has changed and become formalized over the
past two years, and will adjust to new realities. If it
does not, and tries to make unilateral changes and
decisions, there could be a rough road ahead. The
Norwegians, no doubt feeling a bit buffeted by criticism
of their role during the election campaign, are perhaps
being over-sensitive. Nonetheless, they have made a
useful point to the President that their role cannot
just be taken for granted.


7. (C) COMMENT (Continued): No one doubts the
President's commitment to peace. What remains
questionable are: (1) whether she has the vision to
understand what changes a peace settlement will entail
for Sri Lanka and (2) whether she can deal with the
Process in a systematic, disciplined manner. The weak
nature of her government, beset on peace from within by
its JVP partners and from without by the Buddhist monks,
will make it all the harder. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD