Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO62
2004-01-13 07:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

The ties that don't bind: Cohabitation

Tags:  PGOV PINS PREL PINR CE 
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130742Z Jan 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000062 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA;
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/14
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PINR CE
SUBJECT: The ties that don't bind: Cohabitation
further strains troubled President/PM relationship

Refs: Colombo 54, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000062

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA;
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/14
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PINR CE
SUBJECT: The ties that don't bind: Cohabitation
further strains troubled President/PM relationship

Refs: Colombo 54, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since Sri Lanka's cohabitation
experiment began in December 2001, President Kumaratunga
and PM Wickremesinghe have been at daggers drawn, with
relations plunging to new depths of late. Both sides
have their complaints against the other and neither
wears a white hat: From the President's perspective,
the PM and his government have shown her little respect.
The PM, in the meantime, finds the President mercurial
and impossible to deal with. Amid their horrible
personal chemistry hovers the aggravating factor that
both are scions of political dynasties that have rubbed
up against each other nastily for decades. Efforts by
the U.S. and the international community may help the
two leaders briefly refocus and act in the national
interest. Permanently healing the breach between the
two sides is not a likely possibility, however, and
further crises are almost certain to occur. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
Relations hit new Depths
--------------


2. (C) Since Sri Lanka's cohabitation experiment began
in December 2001, the relationship between President
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe has been rocky -- and relations
have only plunged to new depths of late. The recent
downward spiral of action and reaction has included the
following:

-- President's Takeover of Ministries: In early
November 2003, while the Prime Minister was in
Washington to meet with President Bush, President
Kumaratunga suddenly took over the Ministries of
Defense, Interior, and Mass Communications. She also
suspended Parliament for a two-week period. Kumaratunga
cited the GSL's "ineffective steps...to ensure national
security" as the key reason behind her actions. (At the
time, the President also declared a "state of
emergency," but several days later her office retracted
it, saying no emergency had ever been officially

declared.)

-- Prime Minister's Response: Countering the
President's early November actions, the PM rejected her
explanation of the ministerial takeovers and demanded
that all three portfolios be returned to government
control immediately. From mid-November until mid-
December, a joint committee composed of representatives
of both leaders met to try to resolve the situation, but
it had little success in ending the impasse. Further
complicating matters, the PM made an unexpected
announcement on January 7 that the government could no
longer take responsibility for the February 2002
ceasefire agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) in light of the President's continuing
control of the Defense Ministry (see Reftels). While
his statement was mischaracterized by some as indicating
that the GSL was pulling out of the ceasefire accord
altogether, the PM's statement strengthened domestic and
international concern that the cohabitation impasse was
steadily undermining the peace process.

-- Issue of President's Term: In another recent
complication, a dispute has arisen as to the exact
length of President Kumaratunga's term in office. The
details are confusing, but the President was sworn into
office for her second, and final, six-year term in
December 1999. Her call for presidential elections in
the fall of 1999, however, came one year prior to the
end of her first presidential term (1994-2000). While
it was widely assumed that her second term would end in
late 2005 (six years from the 1999 election),the
President apparently believes that she is entitled to
the full six years of both terms (i.e., her current term
in office would end in late 2006). The PM and his
supporters are bound to object strenuously if the
President actually moves forward and asserts that she
can serve until late 2006.

--------------
The President's Complaints
--------------


3. (C) Aside from the latest tensions, there is a long
track record of cohabitation friction between the two
sides. Both sides have their own detailed list of
complaints and neither wears a white hat. From the
President's perspective, the PM and his government have
shown little respect for her and her position. The
President and her aides have complained, for example,
that the government has not involved them in the peace
process with the LTTE although she began the effort when
she came to power in 1994 and brought the Norwegian
facilitators in to work on the matter. The President
also complains that she was not asked her opinion of the
ceasefire accord with the LTTE before it was signed.
Moreover, the GSL never invited a presidential
representative to participate in the six rounds of peace
talks with the Tigers that took place from 2002-2003.
Feeling little ownership of the process, the President
and her advisors have felt free to attack how it is
being run, asserting that the Tigers are regularly
violating the ceasefire accord with impunity even as
their military forces grow in size and strength.
Resentful of the international kudos the PM's efforts
have reaped, the President and her advisers have also
noted that when his United National Party (UNP) was in
opposition from 1994-2001 it vociferously criticized the
President's peace initiatives. They note -- as if it is
indelibly burned in their minds -- an instance in August
2000, for example, when UNP MPs burned copies of the
President's draft devolution proposal in Parliament (due
to the UNP's failure to support the draft, it was never
voted on).


4. (C) The President has also resented the personal
attacks heaped on her by a group of the PM's ministers.
These ministers -- G.L. Peiris, Ravi Karunanayake, S.B.
Dissanayake, and others -- have often hit out at the
President in abusive ways. Karunanayake, for example,
once accused Kumaratunga of bringing a listening device
into a cabinet meeting and has criticized her face-to-
face on other occasions. These ministers have also been
at the forefront of the drafting of impeachment articles
against the President on corruption and abuse of power
charges. Although these charges have not been brought
before Parliament (the UNP knows it cannot get the two-
thirds support needed for passage at this time),the
President is known to be extremely angry over the whole
matter. On the more personal side, Kumaratunga is also
known to resent that her son, Vimukhthi, was denied
admission to a prestigious Colombo GSL-controlled high
school in the early 1990's and that her appeal of the
matter was rejected by the then-Minister of Education
Ranil Wickremesinghe.


5. (C) Another aspect of President Kumaratunga's poor
relationship with the Prime Minister is the fact that
she wants to stay involved in politics beyond the limits
of her term (which, as noted above, is slated to end in
either two or three years). As she is unable to run for
president again (a person can only serve two terms),
Kumaratunga -- who is only 58 -- is known to be
seriously thinking about trying to adjust the Sri Lankan
Constitution to get rid of the executive presidency. In
its place, she would return to the pre-1978 system in
which the prime minister had executive powers. If this
was done, the President would then become prime minister
if her party formed the majority in Parliament. The PM,
who like Kumaratunga has spoken out in favor of
adjusting the Constitution to get rid of the executive
presidency, knows that the President is considering this
option. It is thought that he has no intention,
however, of supporting any plan to change the
Constitution because he wants to be (executive)
president himself. Not adjusting the Constitution would
also be convenient for Wickremesinghe because it would
ease Kumaratunga effectively out of politics, as she
almost certainly would not want to try to become prime
minister in the current system dominated by the
executive presidency. As the President moves toward the
end of her term (in late 2005 or late 2006),her desire
to stay in politics in a dominant role is bound to
become an increasing bone of contention between her and
the Prime Minister.

--------------
The PM's Complaints
--------------


6. (C) For his part, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe
finds President Kumaratunga mercurial and impossible to
deal with. He and his advisers assert that they have
gingerly tried to improve cohabitation ties in various
ways, but have found their entreaties rejected outright
and sometimes with harsh language. (The PM is known to
be upset by the President's semi-regular verbal assaults
on his government: She recently characterized the PM's
desire to take back the Defense Ministry as "a joke,"
for example; In the past, she has also referred to
members of his government as "donkeys," "dogs," and
"clowns in a circus.") They note that the President and
her advisers have consistently taken a tack critical of
the peace process, which makes it hard to involve them
in decision-making on the matter, or to involve them in
negotiations with the LTTE.


7. (C) There is also the matter of trust. Simply put,
the PM and his team do not trust the President to any
extent. There is a feeling that she and her advisers
will agree to something, only to go back on the deal if
they believe it is politically expedient. In making
these charges, the PM and his advisers assert that the
President has been working on "an escape hatch," which
involves aligning her People's Alliance (PA) party with
the radical Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party. The
possibility of a PA-JVP combine makes the UNP doubt that
Kumaratunga sincerely wants to improve cohabitation
ties. There is also a view among many in the UNP that
the President is out "to get" the 10 or so current UNP
MPs who defected from her PA party in late 2001 and thus
precipitated the December 2001 election which the PA
lost. These MPs include the outspoken G.L. Peiris and
S.B. Dissanayake, both of whom Kumaratunga is known to
loathe. Finally, the PM is also known to resent deeply
the poor treatment he believes was meted out to him by
the President when he was the Leader of the Opposition
from 1994-2001.

--------------
Abysmal Personal Chemistry
--------------


8. (C) Another factor aggravating the situation is the
fact that President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe share abysmal personal chemistry. It is
hard to imagine two individuals who are less alike --
and, in this case, opposites do not attract. The
President is an outgoing person of rapidly shifting
moods. She has great charisma and charm when she turns
it on, and is excellent on the stump. By contrast, the
PM is a technocrat and an excellent "inside" politician,
and, in personality, is phlegmatic. He appears shy and
sometimes uncomfortable in public settings. Unlike the
President, he does not thrive on political
confrontation. The few photos of the two leaders
together underscore their acute discomfort with each
other: in many photos, for example, the two are
actively leaning away from each other and grimacing as
if they cannot bear the sight of the other. Although
political rivals can sometimes transcend day-to-day
tensions and develop warm personal ties in Sri Lankan
society, there is no record of Kumaratunga and
Wickremesinghe socializing with each other in any
manner.

--------------
Scions of Battling Political Dynasties
--------------


9. (C) In some ways, the tensions between the two
leaders were written in the stars (as this astrology-
loving society would have it). The fact is that the two
were virtually born to dislike the other given that they
are both the scions of Sri Lanka's two great political
dynasties. Kumaratunga, for example, is very conscious
that both her father and mother were prime ministers
(S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike),and that her
family tree includes major Sri Lankan figures going back
generations. The PM, on the other hand, is related to
D.S. and Dudley Senanayake, and John Kotelawala, the
country's first three prime ministers, and also to
President Jayewardene, who led the country from 1977-88.
To put it mildly, these two clans have been at each
other's throats for decades. Examples of brutal
political infighting between the two clans are legion:
Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her allies, for example,
played hard ball with Dudley Senanayake and Jayewardene,
the then-leaders of the UNP, after she twice won
elections in the 1960s and 1970s. Settling scores years
later, Jayewardene pushed through a bill in the early
1980s that stripped Sirimavo Bandaranaike of her civil
rights (they were later restored). Against this
backdrop, it is clear that Kumaratunga and
Wickremesinghe -- who have known each other since they
were children -- are simply acting in conformity with
the long-standing familial rivalry. Lending substance
to this, is the fact that Kumaratunga, Wickremesinghe
(to a lesser extent),and their advisers will launch
into detailed history lessons -- as if the events took
place yesterday -- of how the other side did wrong on
this or that issue, thus proving how malicious they are.

--------------
COMMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
--------------


10. (C) As noted, neither side wears a white hat. Both
Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe have done things that
have served to spoil their relationship and they are
both responsible for the fact that ties are at their
nadir now. Efforts by the U.S. and the international
community may help the two leaders briefly refocus and
act in the national interest, however. Such
ameliorative efforts have had some limited success in
restraining the two sides from acting on their worst
impulses in the past and they need to continue now.
That said, while it may be possible for the
international community to help ease passing crises,
outside efforts almost certainly cannot heal the deep
breach between the two sides (which exist even in the
face of the national threat from the terrorist LTTE).
Too much water has passed underneath the bridge to
expect any long-term easing in the tensions. Moreover,
with both leaders relatively young (Kumaratunga at 58
and Wickremesinghe at 54) prospects are that the tense
situation that now prevails could go on for years.
Indeed, given the family linkages, it is very possible
-- if depressing to think about -- that the
Kumaratunga/Wickremesinghe conflict could well be passed
on to the next generation of Sri Lankan leaders, just as
the conflict was passed on to them. END COMMENT.


11. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD