Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO567
2004-03-31 11:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Sri Lanka: Implications for U.S. policy of

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PINR PHUM ECON CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000567 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA
DEPARTMENT ALSO PLS PASS TO USTR J. ROSENBAUM
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
TREASURY FOR R. ADKINS
COMMERCE FOR A. BENAISSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PHUM ECON CE
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Implications for U.S. policy of
possible post-election scenarios

Refs: Colombo 564, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000567

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA
DEPARTMENT ALSO PLS PASS TO USTR J. ROSENBAUM
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
TREASURY FOR R. ADKINS
COMMERCE FOR A. BENAISSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PHUM ECON CE
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Implications for U.S. policy of
possible post-election scenarios

Refs: Colombo 564, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: This message reviews the implications
for U.S. policy of possible scenarios resulting from Sri
Lanka's April 2 parliamentary election. The two most
likely post-election scenarios are:

-- (A) The President's UPFA grouping wins outright or is
able to cobble together a majority in Parliament. As
outlined in Reftel, this outcome could put the peace
process and economic reforms at risk. Also, while
bilateral ties would remain positive, they would
probably be a bit cooler; and,

-- (B) The PM's UNP is able to form a government on its
own or more likely via an alliance of convenience with
the pro-LTTE TNA grouping. Under this scenario, the
peace process and economic reforms would continue,
although stressful cohabitation ties would remain in
place.

Outside of these two likely scenarios, there are other
considerably less probable outcomes, including: a hung
parliament, which would create a very fluid situation as
parties scrambled for power for an indefinite period;
and the President's SLFP and the UNP (or elements
thereof) forming a "national unity" government. This
latter possibility might be a favorable outcome
depending on how it is done.


2. (C) SUMMARY (continued): If the election is a close
one (as is widely expected),there almost certainly will
be significant political maneuvering in the post-
election period and it may take some time before a new
government is formed. Given the tense, confusing
situation that may prevail, we recommend that the U.S.
remind the parties, as necessary, to respect democratic
norms and to work together in the national interest.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
Likely Scenario #1: UPFA wins

--------------


3. (C) Campaigning for Sri Lanka's April 2
parliamentary election wrapped up on March 30 per
regulations. At this point, it seems unlikely, given
Sri Lanka's complex proportional electoral system (see
Reftels),that any of the parties will win a landslide
victory, or even obtain an absolute majority of 113
seats in the 225-member Parliament. One of the most
likely scenarios at this time is that the alliance
between President Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party,
"SLFP," and the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna,
"JVP," wins the largest number of seats. (The SLFP-JVP
combine's technical name is the United People's Freedom
Alliance, "UPFA.") Polls and other anecdotal evidence
suggest that the UPFA would probably not win outright by
gaining enough seats on its own to form a majority in
Parliament. The UPFA might, however, be able to put
together a majority after the election by obtaining the
support of smaller parties eager to be in government.
Observers believe, for example, that the Jathika Hela
Urumaya (JHU),which is running an all-Buddhist monk
candidate slate, may decide to support the UPFA under
certain conditions. In addition, the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) and the tea estate Tamil Ceylon Worker's
Congress (CWC) might move from supporting Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe's United National Party (UNP) to the UPFA
if the opportunity presented itself. It is also
possible that some MPs may defect from the UNP and join
the UPFA if they were assured that they would receive
ministerial positions (see more on this type of scenario
in para 8).


4. (C) If the UPFA wins the election, one possible
positive is that it would end Sri Lanka's tense
cohabitation situation. This would allow the UPFA
government to move forward with its plans for the
country in an unfettered manner. That said, as outlined
in Reftel, the problem for the U.S. is that the UPFA's
plans themselves are problematic. A UPFA victory could
put the peace process at risk, for example, as it is
unclear how effective President Kumaratunga leading a
government in coalition with the anti-peace process JVP
would be in dealing with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). Moreover, a win by the alliance would
pose serious questions about the direction of GSL
economic policy and reform. With respect to bilateral
ties, a UPFA government would almost certainly be more
difficult to deal with and less responsive to our
positions on international matters. We would expect the
UPFA to continue the policy of trying to reach a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S., though how
committed and capable a UPFA government would be in
negotiations on the matter is uncertain.

--------------
Likely Scenario #2: A UNP/TNA linkup
--------------


5. (C) Another likely post-election scenario involves
the UNP being able to form a government on its own, or
more likely via an alliance of convenience with the pro-
LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) grouping. Most
observers believe that the UNP probably will be unable
to win 113 seats or more (with allies, it now controls
about 114 seats),but will have to settle for a reduced
total of seats in the election. If that happens, the
UNP will have to turn to the TNA, which appears set to
win roughly 20 or so seats. It is unlikely that the
UNP, in doing this, would conclude a formal governing
pact with the TNA, but rather that the TNA would receive
an informal understanding from the UNP on how it (the
UNP) would handle peace process matters. So far,
neither the UNP nor the TNA have publicly discussed the
mechanics of forming any sort of informal alliance. (On
the UNP's part, doing so would risk a backlash from
voters in the south who resent the pro-LTTE TNA.)
Nonetheless, it is widely understood that the UNP would
almost certainly reach out to the TNA if doing so would
allow the UNP to form the majority in Parliament. One
potential fly in the ointment is that it is unclear what
impact if any rebel commander Karuna's recent split from
the LTTE might have on this scenario. It is not known,
for example, whether all MPs under the TNA grouping
would work together, or whether the party might break
apart into pro-LTTE and pro-Karuna factions.
Yesterday's assassination of a "pro-Karuna" TNA
candidate further muddies the waters.


6. (C) A victory by the UNP on its own (without the
TNA) would be the single best result for the U.S. Since
coming to power in December 2001, the UNP has been
strongly pro-peace process, as well as pro-economic
reform and international investment. The UNP has also
been careful to tend to the bilateral relationship and
to support the U.S. in multilateral fora such as the WTO
and the UN (on Iraq),for example. A UNP/TNA combine,
meanwhile, would probably also be good for the peace
process and economic reform, as well as bilateral ties.
As a coalition, it would not be as stable as the UNP
ruling on its own, however. Due to the TNA element, for
example, such a linkup would probably come under fierce
partisan attack from the UPFA, which would claim that
the UNP was too close to the LTTE. One negative factor
that would remain in place regardless of whether the UNP
wins on its own or with the support of the TNA involves
cohabitation with President Kumaratunga. Cohabitation
ties, no doubt, would remain stressful and susceptible
to regular crises, as they are now. It is possible,
however, that the UNP's political momentum following a
victory might politically intimidate Kumaratunga for
some time after the April 2 election, as happened after
the December 2001 election.

--------------
Other Possible (if unlikely) Outcomes
--------------


7. (C) Outside of these two likely scenarios, there are
other considerably less probable outcomes, including a
hung parliament in which no grouping can form the
majority for an indefinite period. This would be a very
negative outcome because the political situation would
be unsettled for some time as parties battled each other
for majority control. Some parties might take to the
streets in efforts to affect the situation. If a hung
parliament proved particularly protracted in nature, it
is doubtful that the GSL would be able to get much done
with respect to either the peace process or economic
reforms for months on end. Indeed, President
Kumaratunga might call another round of elections,
setting the whole destabilizing process currently taking
place in motion again.


8. (C) Another scenario involves the President's SLFP
and the UNP forming a "national unity" government. If a
SLFP-UNP combine was formed it would probably be as a
result of a hung parliament in which there seemed to be
no other way to form the next government. With Sri
Lanka's two major parties working together, in theory
such a government could prove to be good news for the
peace process and for economic reforms. Given the
intense personal animosity between the President and the
PM, however, it is difficult to see how such a
government could work together for very long. There
have also been some vague reports that President
Kumaratunga might try to form a "national unity"
government of a different stripe. This would involve
the President cherry picking some well-known UNP MPs and
enticing them to join her by promising them high-level
ministries. If a "national unity" government is formed
under such circumstances, it would seem to be a recipe
for problems as the rump portion of the UNP would almost
certainly fight back hard. (Another twist that has been
discussed, along these lines, is that the President
would ask a UNP leader other than the PM to form a
national unity government. Foreign Minister Tyronne
Fernando and Power and Energy Minister Karu Jayasuriya
have been mentioned as high-level UNP officials possibly
willing to work with Kumaratunga, for example.)

--------------
COMMENT: U.S. Posture in the Coming Days
--------------


9. (C) With the approach of the election, Sri Lanka
appears to be hurtling toward a period marked by even
greater uncertainty than usual. It is an open question
whether the election will add clarity, or whether it
will make the situation even murkier. If the election
is a close one, for example, there almost certainly will
be significant political maneuvering in the post-
election period and it may take some time before a new
government is formed. The President is not obliged,
under the Constitution, to ask the leader with the
largest number of seats to form a government. Rather,
she "shall appoint as Prime Minister the Member of
Parliament who, in her opinion, is most likely to
command the confidence of Parliament." This, of course,
gives ample room for mischief-making. (FYI: Political
give-and-take among the parties would almost certainly
be prolonged by the onset of Sri Lanka's major holiday
season involving Sinhalese and Tamil New Year's, which
will begin in earnest late next week.)


10. (C) In the meantime, the post-election timeframe
could also be marked by a severe uptick in violence as
the main LTTE organization tries to knock out rebel
commander Karuna in the east. (There are reports that
the LTTE has been waiting until after the election to
hit out at Karuna in a major way.) Given the tense,
confusing situation that may prevail as parties seek to
form the next government in Colombo, we recommend that
the U.S. remind them, as necessary, to respect
democratic norms and to work together in the national
interest. If the situation gets bad, we should be
prepared to issue public statements and to warn the
parties privately that the unprecedented level of U.S.
support of the past few years could be jeopardized. END
COMMENT.


11. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD