Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-15-14
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election

Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous

- (B) Oslo 419

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four
local co-chairs (Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and
again to a wider donor group on March 15, Norwegian
Special Envoy Erik Solheim discussed his latest visit to
Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead participated in the
meetings. Most of Solheim's comments focused on the
recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka's April 2
parliamentary election. Solheim's visit appears to have
been mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new
complexities and uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan
situation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and
March 15 meetings, which were attended by Ambassador
Lunstead, Solheim said he had met with S.P.
Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political chief, during a March
11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the Vanni region.
During the discussion, which centered around rebel
eastern commander Karuna's recent break with the main
LTTE leadership (see Ref A),Solheim said Thamilchelvam
had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to
"peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting
that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern
cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim
that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from
within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging
defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also blamed
Karuna for the two recent election-related
assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has
placed blame for these killings on the LTTE's
intelligence apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim
of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna
situation. The group was steadfast that it was an
"internal matter" for the LTTE alone. (Separately,
during two meetings, Solheim said PM Wickremesinghe made
clear that the GSL would not get involved in the
situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the
situation.)


3. (C) While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he
had met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander
from Trincomalee District. According to Solheim,
Pathuman looked "okay" and stated that he (Pathuman)
was still in command of the Trincomalee district.
(Solheim's meeting with Pathuman effectively rebutted
recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed"
Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna --
see Ref A.)


4. (C) In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of
Trincomalee, Solheim said that he had had a positive
meeting with Sri Lanka Army Major General Sunil
Tennekoon, the general in charge (GOC) of the
district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports
to the contrary. Local Tigers officials in
Trincomalee, for their part, told Solheim they were
happy that the Norwegian delegation was visiting
Trincomalee. According to the Tigers, the visit was
an important signal that the international community
remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
was continuing its work in the east, despite press
reports to the contrary. The only change was that
the SLMM was not entering the eastern areas held by
Karuna.


5. (C) Solheim told the co-chairs that the
Norwegians saw three possible outcomes to the Karuna
situation:
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills
Karuna;
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with
Karuna, giving the rebel commander autonomy over the
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara;
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord."
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most
unsettling for the peace process if it came to
fruition.)


6. (C) Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed
donor assistance and the need to resolve the issue of
an assistance funds delivery mechanism. To the co-
chairs, Solheim stated that the Norwegians were
considering a model similar to the Afghan Fund.


7. (C) PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the
April 2 parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that
the LTTE hoped the government would approve polling
sites either at the GSL's crossing points into Tiger-
controlled area, or in the "no-man's land" between
GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On this point, it
was not clear which alternative had been agreed to,
although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army
will not honor election plans and, in a repeat of the
December 2001 parliamentary elections, would largely
bar Tamils in Tiger-controlled areas from reaching
polling sites. If polling sites were approved for
either of these areas, the LTTE expected that the
Army would not be present, with the Sri Lanka police
instead providing security. According to Solheim,
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated
that the Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the
GSL's crossing points. (Mission has heard reports
that the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner will
support holding the polling in "no-man's land"
areas.)


8. (C) COMMENT: Solheim's visit appears to have been
mainly devoted to fact gathering. Karuna's decision to
separate himself from the main LTTE organization has
clearly made the overall situation that much more
complex. Moreover, there is great uncertainty over how
the Karuna matter will play out and over the upcoming
election. That said, the Norwegians still appear firmly
engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile
period, however. END SUMMARY.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD