Sri Lanka: Can rebel Tamil Tiger commander in

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000440

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, S/CT, SA/INS, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/14
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR MOPS CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Can rebel Tamil Tiger commander in
the east survive?

Refs: Colombo 435, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

SUMMARY
=======

1. (C) A week after he split from the main LTTE
organization in the north, rebel commander Karuna
appears to be gradually consolidating his position in
the east. With many loyal troops in strong defensive
redoubts, his military position seems relatively strong.
There are also signs that he is picking up popular
support among eastern Tamils. All that said, the main
LTTE organization has considerable assets (an
intelligence apparatus, suicide teams, etc.) that it
will not hesitate to use against Karuna. While the
overall balance of forces within the LTTE does not favor
Karuna, he seems, at this point, to have a clear chance
at longer-term survival. END SUMMARY.

=================================
Karuna's strong military position
=================================


2. (C) Rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
commander Karuna appears to be consolidating his
position in the east, a week after he split from the
main organization in the north (see Reftels). At this
point, his military position seems relatively strong.
Karuna himself is known to be a tough, effective
military commander, who has led LTTE forces into battle
with GSL forces many times in the past. While several
of his military and political commanders defected to the
north right after he announced that he was leaving the
group, Karuna appears to have retained many of his top
officers and virtually all of his troop strength. It is
not precisely clear how many forces he has under his
command, but he may have as many as 6,000 men and women.
In a March 10 meeting with the DCM (see Reftel),Indian
Deputy High Commissioner Mohan Kumar said the GoI
estimated that, of this number, about 2,500 - 3,500
troops were armed and combat ready. These forces were
divided into eight regiments of 350 each, according to
Kumar.


3. (C) Karuna's exact logistical situation is unclear,
but Kumar estimated that he may be able to sustain his
forces for up to six months. The exact details of
Karuna's financial situation also are not known. He
will probably be able to rely, to some extent, on the
"taxation" of the Tamil populace in the east and other
extortion activities (as we reported in early 2003, the
LTTE "tax" machine was becoming more sophisticated and
beginning to produce a steady flow of revenue). There
is, however, no firm information available as to whether
Karuna has allies in the international Tamil community,
a major source of LTTE funds. Kumar said Karuna has a
brother who is a businessman in the east who might be
able to help him.


4. (C) Karuna's forces have the advantage of holding
strong defensive positions in the east. For over 20
years the LTTE has maintained fortified bases in the
Thoppigalla jungle, a large area located to the west of
Batticaloa city. Other than the Vanni region in the
north where the main LTTE organization is based, the
Thoppigalla jungle has been the LTTE's strongest
military bastion in Sri Lanka. GSL forces had an
extremely difficult time when they tried to clear this
rugged area of LTTE forces during the conflict and
ultimately gave up on the effort. Karuna controls all
of this area now. With control of the jungle, Karuna's
forces have wide latitude to move in and around
Batticaloa and Ampara Districts. (Trincomalee, the
third district in the east, appears to be under control
of the main LTTE organization at this time, with the
LTTE Trincomalee leader Pathuman, reportedly friendly to
Karuna, apparently being detained in the Vanni.)

===========================
Picking up Popular Support?
===========================


5. (C) There are also signs that Karuna is picking up
popular support in the east. Indications of such
support come, for example, from the several pro-Karuna
rallies that were held in Batticaloa and Ampara last
week. Some of these rallies were quite large, with at
least several thousand Tamils participating. The
rallies were especially notable for the burning of
photos and effigies of LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran and
other LTTE officials. While Karuna and his forces could
have cooked up these rallies via coercion or otherwise,
large anti-LTTE demonstrations are virtually without
precedent among the Tamil populace in the east and the
fact they took place at all was quite noteworthy.


6. (C) In addition to the public rallies, Mission has
also been picking up other broader hints from contacts
that many easterners are fed up with the main LTTE
organization and may be turning to Karuna. There has
been a long history of eastern "Batticaloa" Tamil
resentment against northern "Jaffna" Tamils. Many
easterners feel that northerners have tried "to lord it
over them" and treat them as subordinates. Caste
differences also run deep. Karuna has given voice to
these feelings toward the north by stating in a March 9
AFP interview, for example, that: "The Vanni
administration should think of being forgiven by our
people and soldiers for being thankless for the deeds we
(in the east) have done to protect the Vanni and its
people." In his public remarks, Karuna's secretary,
Varathan, has also noted the thousands of easterners who
have been killed in past fighting with the Sri Lankan
security forces, while pointedly noting that there are
no eastern Tamils on the LTTE's 30-member ruling
committee. These assertions may be exaggerated:
Karuna, an easterner, was known to be one of the top
five in the LTTE hierarchy and was included on the
group's peace negotiation team, for example.
Nonetheless, according to contacts, Karuna's enunciation
of eastern grievances against the north appears to have
struck a chord with the populace in the east.


7. (C) Although Karuna seems to have netted some
popular support at this time, it is not clear whether
his eastern supporters will remain with him through
thick and thin, or choose to throw their support back to
the Vanni LTTE down the road. On the plus side for
Karuna is the fact that he appears charismatic and
articulate, and clearly knows how to use the press (as
illustrated by his BBC TV interview which aired
yesterday). On the minus side, the skill and breadth of
his political network is a question mark. Much of the
LTTE's political network in Batticaloa and Ampara
appears to have shut down when Karuna launched his
rebellion with some of the political cadre assigned to
the area departing for the Vanni. If Karuna's rebellion
is to be sustained, he will have to rebuild this
political organization and make sure it is effective.

======================================
Main LTTE Organization has assets, too
======================================


8. (C) Despite Karuna's clear strengths in the east,
the main LTTE organization has considerable assets that
it will not hesitate to deploy against Karuna.
Prabhakaran is a battle-tested leader, who has dealt
fiercely and decisively with all previous challenges
(real and imagined) to his one-man rule of the LTTE.
There have been numerous cases of LTTE figures being
executed by Prabhakaran for alleged treason. One of the
most notorious cases was that of Mahattaya,
Prabhakaran's deputy, who was executed in 1990. In
trying to defeat Karuna, there is little doubt that
Prabhakaran will deploy all of his considerable assets.
These include an intelligence apparatus, which is
considered highly effective (although it appears to have
missed Karuna's rebellion). There are also the "Black
Tiger" suicide squads. These squads have not been used
in some time in actual operations, but they reportedly
remain at the ready. With respect to armed forces,
Karuna appears to have a slight edge. Indian Deputy
High Commissioner Kumar told the DCM that the GoI
thought that Prabhakaran had about 500 fewer combat
ready troops at his disposal than Karuna. We have been
told by Sri Lanka Army sources that the discrepancy
between Prabhakaran's and Karuna's forces is even larger
in Karuna's advantage. With respect to logistics, the
Vanni has a decided edge, with large supply depots and
the ability to bring in more supplies via the sea, and
effective domestic "taxation" plus international
fundraising efforts.

=======
COMMENT
=======


9. (C) The overall balance of forces within the LTTE
does not favor Karuna. The main LTTE organization has
much more money, is used to tough infighting, and has
tentacles stretching throughout Sri Lanka's Tamil
community. It would not be a surprise, for example, if
the group, which is calculating in the extreme, has
supporters in Karuna's camp ready to knock him off.
That said, if Karuna can avoid being assassinated, it
would appear that his faction of the LTTE has a clear
chance at longer-term survival. Much will depend on
whether Karuna's faction can quickly develop a separate
logistics base now that it has split off from the main
LTTE organization. Karuna will need arms and
ammunition, and food and money in the coming months for
his forces. If he does not come up with these items,
his forces could melt away. In addition, as noted
above, Karuna will also have to move quickly to develop
a political organization in the east to match his strong
military position. With a strong political
organization, his position in the east would be further
consolidated, making efforts to replace him by the main
LTTE that much more difficult. Developing a logistics
base and a political organization is tough to do, but
Karuna needs to do so and in short order. He should not
be underestimated, however: In surviving for even a
week, Karuna has already surpassed many observers'
expectations.


10. (C) If Karuna makes it into the spring, there could
well be implications for the peace process. It is easy
(and disturbing) to construct a scenario in which the
post-election GSL returns to the peace table, across
from LTTE representatives who no longer represent both
the North and the East. Moreover, Karuna would
undoubtedly be quite vocal in his displeasure at not
having a place at the table. END COMMENT.


11. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD