In meeting, key JVP leader tries to take

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000280

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/14
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS CE NO
SUBJECT: In meeting, key JVP leader tries to take
moderate tack, but hard-line views show through

Refs: (A) Colombo 271; (B) Colombo 109

(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Polchief met February 19 with Somawansa
Amarasinghe, a key leader of the JVP party. Amarasinghe
tried to assume a moderate tack on most issues. Glints
of a hard-line showed through, however, in his harsh
views toward the ceasefire accord with the Tigers and
also toward the governing UNP, which cracked down on the
JVP insurrection in the late 1980's. Amarasinghe, who
indicated that he was back in Sri Lanka for good after
years of exile, will likely be a baleful influence on
Sri Lanka's already turbulent political scene. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) MEETING WITH KEY JVP LEADER: Polchief met
February 19 with Somawansa Amarasinghe, a key leader of
the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP - "People's
Liberation Front") party. Amarasinghe, who was clearly
being careful in what he said in his first meeting with
a USG interlocutor in years (he has been in exile in
Europe -- see below),tried to assume a moderate tack on
most issues. He said, for example, that he strongly
supported "all ways to bring ethnic reconciliation to
Sri Lanka." Brushing off years of criticism that the
JVP is essentially Sinhalese extremist in ideology, he
asserted that the party did not support any form of
"ethnic chauvinism" and was working to bring all
communities together. Polchief underlined that it was
vital that the campaign for the April 2 parliamentary
elections not be used in such a way that harmed the
fragile peace process. In response, Amarasinghe said
the JVP would be careful on how it dealt with the peace
process in the campaign because it "did not want this
important peaceful era to end."


3. (C) Polchief also noted concerns from the Sri Lankan
business community and international investors about the
JVP's economic views. Amarasinghe replied that the JVP
supported business investment of all types, noting that
he had addressed Sri Lanka's Joint Business Forum
("JBIZ") on February 17 in order "to alleviate all
concerns."


4. (C) GLINTS OF A HARD-LINE: Despite his efforts to
appear reasonable and restrained, glints of a very real
hard-line showed through in many of Amarasinghe's
remarks. Most particularly, he was quite critical of
the ceasefire accord reached between the government and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February

2002. Amarasinghe charged that the accord had been
reached "secretly" by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's
United National Party (UNP) and contained provisions
which were "very favorable to the LTTE." Polchief
countered that the ceasefire accord was the linchpin of
the peace process and efforts to undermine it would have
very serious repercussions. Amarasinghe said the JVP
had no plans "to throw out" the accord if it won the
election in league with its Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(SLFP) allies. The JVP might well lobby for changes,
but he said the party realized that the SLFP took a
different approach on peace track issues (the SLFP is
skeptical of the GSL's peace process policies, but less
critical of them than the JVP). (Also, regarding the
peace process, Amarasinghe -- as touched on in Ref A --
went on to hit out at the Norwegian peace facilitation
effort, charging that the GoN favored the LTTE.)


5. (C) ANIMUS TOWARD THE UNP: Amarasinghe saved much
of his bile for the UNP. Amarasinghe, who is the last
surviving official from the JVP "politburo" that
launched a bloody 1987-89 insurrection, asserted that
the UNP had mistreated the opposition "in countless
ways" since coming to power in December 2001 and had
proven itself "corrupt." When asked if any of his
animus stemmed from the UNP's successful crackdown on
the JVP's revolt, he said that some of it did inasmuch
as several of the current UNP leaders had been in power
at that time, including PM Wickremesinghe.
(Wickremesinghe was a mid-ranked minister at the time.)
He said he did not think Wickremesinghe was directly
responsible for what he characterized as "atrocities"
committed against the JVP in the 1980's, but he was not
sure. In any case, he said, it was a fact that JVP
founder Rohana Wijeweera had been killed in custody by
order of the UNP government. (Wijeweera died in
mysterious circumstances while under police custody in
November 1989. Wijeweera's death effectively ended the
JVP insurrection.)


6. (C) Noting a certain wistfulness in Amarasinghe's
eyes when he discussed Wijeweera (the two were close
associates),Polchief queried whether the JVP had given
up on any notion of returning to violence. Amarasinghe
said the group had, and indeed had made this commitment
in public "on countless occasions." Even if "UNP thugs
attack us, we will not retaliate," he said. The party
"accepted democracy and the ballot" and would "not
resort to arms again." He then cited the alliance with
the SLFP, which he said indicated that the JVP was a
"mature organization that was committed to peaceful
change." Questioned on how the JVP might do in the
election, Amarasinghe hesitated and then predicted it
would win about 25 seats (it now has 16).


7. (C) COMMENT: Amarasinghe spoke excellent English
and was quite articulate, even charming during the
meeting. He indicated that he was back in Sri Lanka for
good after years of exile in the UK and other sites in
Europe. (Amarasinghe returned to Sri Lanka last month.
He was out of the country from 1990 until 2004, except
for one brief trip made during the 2001 parliamentary
campaign. See Ref B for additional biographic details.)
While sophisticated and thoughtful, Amarasinghe appears
to be a hard-line element in a hard-line party. His
influence in the JVP appears considerable, as he is
considered to be a senior statesman who was close to the
revered leader Wijeweera (a huge photograph of Wijeweera
was hung in the room at JVP headquarters where the
meeting took place). Given his apparent hard-line
perspective, which seems to have been solidified by
years of exile, he is likely to be a baleful influence
on Sri Lanka's already turbulent political scene. END
COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD