SOLHEIM SEES NO PROGRESS TOWARDS TALKS BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002018

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SOLHEIM SEES NO PROGRESS TOWARDS TALKS BUT
COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING CEASE-FIRE; CO-CHAIR MEETING
NEEDED

REF: 12/17 CAMP/ENTWISTLE/BRENNIG TELCON

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR
REASON 1.5(D)


1. (C) Summary. After making the rounds in Sri Lanka,
Norwegian peace envoy Solheim sees little chance of a
quick return to the peace table although "things could be
worse." He found both sides committed to the cease-fire
and neither seeking a return to combat. In the Norwegian
view, the priority in the coming months must be
maintenance of the cease-fire while efforts continue to
jumpstart the next round of talks. Solheim (and the
Japanese and Dutch ambassadors) believe a co-chairs
meeting early in the New Year would be valuable and ask
that Washington propose dates and location. We also do
not see signs of an imminent return to fighting, but we
think Tiger intentions are largely unknowable and we do
see some troublesome signs of unease in the GSL. End
Summary.


2. (C) Norwegian peace envoy Eric Solheim visited Sri
Lanka December 13-17, met with GSL officials including
President Kumaratunga and traveled to Kilinocchi to meet
with LTTE political wing chief Tamilchelvam. The
Ambassador attended Solheim's meeting with donor
embassies and IFI representatives December 14, the
Ambassador and DCM met with Solheim on December 16 and
the DCM represented the U.S. in a co-chair meeting with
Solheim on December 17.

Worried Upon Arrival
--------------


3. (C) In his initial meeting with donor embassies and
IFI representatives (before he had seen either the GSL or
the LTTE),Solheim said that Norway "has to consider what
to do" in the current situation of a negative climate
between the two main parties. He wanted international
community input since Norway is, at least implicitly,
acting on its behalf. If the current trend continues,
he said: (1) Sri Lanka will slide back into war and
(2) the role of Norway (or any other third party) will
become impossible. What more, he asked, can the
international community do? Solheim clarified that
he was not predicting an imminent return to hostilities,
but that for the first time since the cease-fire was
signed, there was a chance of slipping back to war.
Neither party has a strategy for war, but they are
following tracks in that direction. Each side is
irritating the other. The LTTE is pushing the
government, Prabhakaran's speech was unhelpful.
The government is also sending negative signals,
the most recent being a ban on government helicopter
flights over LTTE-controlled territory, ostensibly
on the grounds of security. This, he said, had to
be seen as a negative signal to Norway, which used
those flights as part of its mission. Moreover,
there was a deliberate campaign by parts of the
government--the JVP and the EPDP--to attack the
peace process, the ceasefire and the SLMM, and Norway.


4. (C) The donors assured Solheim of continued support
for Norwegian efforts and engaged in a general discussion
of what the voice of the international community should
be saying at present. However, there were few practical
suggestions as to what the "something" might be. The
Ambassador commented that peace process was hostage to
internal political considerations. As a result, it was
useless to appeal to Sri Lankan leaders on the basis of
the national interest or the greater good. It was fine
to say the international community's "voice" must be
heard, but the real question was: "What would that
voice say"? Several donors suggested that Norway might
consider doing again what it had done in November 2003
when CBK took over three key ministries: announce that
it was going home and would stay there until the parties
came up with something positive.


5. (C) There was some discussion of assistance and
the link in the Tokyo Declaration between assistance
and progress in the peace process. The general view
around the table was that interest in Sri Lanka was
diminishing because of stalemate and associated
assistance was likely to also diminish. However, it
was also felt that the government and the LTTE would
not be swayed significantly by funding or lack thereof.
Solheim proposed that the international community might
wish to hold a conference around the third anniversary
of the cease-fire (Feb 22) to look for a collective
understanding which could lead to a strong unified
position and statement.

Gap Narrow but No Confidence
--------------


6. (C) In his subsequent conversations with us and
in the co-chair lunch, after his GSL and LTTE meetings,
Solheim commented that the "gap is narrow" between the
two sides and that it could be "easily bridged if there
was confidence between them." Unfortunately, that
confidence is lacking. In Solheim's view there had
been an imminent return to the table in May/June but
all movement since then has been backward. The other
obstacle besides the lack of confidence is President
Kumaratunga's political dependency on the Janatha
Vimukta Peramuna (JVP). "If she were able to act
on her own, talks would have started by now."
Moreover, Solheim viewed as unhelpful an LTTE
insistence that CBK publicly commit herself to
negotiations on ISGA only. She could probably go
forward on ISGA only if the LTTE would not insist
that she publicly expose that intention.

Both Sides "Positive"
--------------


7. (C) Solheim said that despite the lack of progress,
he had found both sides to be "positive" in their talks
with him. CKB had been in a "terrific, positive mood -
at her best." ("She didn't mention Ranil once!") She
had expressed concern about "new" LTTE "bases" near
Trinco. Solheim told the co-chairs this assertion is
unproven. There are "gray areas" around Trinco in which,
based on the maps the GSL and the LTTE turned over to
the SLMM at the beginning of the cease-fire, it is
impossible to tell who was in control when the cease-
fire started. Solheim emphasized, however, that CBK
made clear to him that she fully supports the cease-
fire and is not looking to break it.


8. (C) Solheim commented to co-chairs that CBK is
clearly trying to find her way out of the "trap" in
which her dependency on the JVP keeps her from getting
back to the peace table which, the Norwegian believes,
she genuinely wants to do. Solheim said CBK "apologized"
for the JVP anti-Norwegian campaign. Solheim said that
Kadirgamar referred to ongoing "negotiations" with the
JVP apparently intended to work out a way they could
support a return to the peace table.


9. (C) Solheim said that, in Kilinochchi, he had
found LTTE political chief Tamilchelvam "relaxed and
confident." Solheim said he had two main observations
from the discussion. First, Tamilchelvam made no
threat about returning to war nor did he mention any
sort of deadline for a return to talks, although he
assured Solheim that Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day speech
reference to "advancing the freedom struggle" should
be taken seriously. Second, however, Tamilchelvam
did not show any flexibility in terms of seeking new
ways to get back to the table. Solheim said
Tamilchelvam was "focused" on the JVP, stating that
CBK needed to rein in the JVP or dump them and find
an accommodation with the UNP. Tamilchelvam commented
to Solheim that CBK's priority seems to be "self-
preservation." Solheim commented that although the
LTTE will not publicly "reaffirm its commitment to
Oslo," it has done so repeatedly in various meetings
with the Norwegians.

"Could Be Worse;" Norway Undeterred
-------------- ---


10. (C) Asked to summarize his observations at the
end of the visit, Solheim told the co-chair reps that
"things could be worse." He predicted a "continued
stalemate" with no imminent return to the peace table
while the "political power play" in the south runs
its course. Solheim emphasized that, overall, the
cease-fire is not under threat from either side and
neither side wants a return to war. He cautioned,
however, that a cease-fire requires constant
maintenance and attention from both sides and
suggested that all concerned parties should make
cease-fire maintenance their priority during the
coming months of stasis.


11. (C) Solheim stressed that Norway, plans to
stay the course, although the recent JVP anti-
Norway smear campaign and other pressures (among
them a "white powder" scare at the Norwegian
embassy here this week) have been unpleasant.
Solheim said he and his government were extremely
appreciative of the "tripartite" U.S./EU/Japan
demarche to CBK on Norway's behalf earlier in the
week. Solheim and/or Helgesen plan to return to
Sri Lanka every 4-6 weeks to assess the situation
and make the rounds. He noted that Norway will
also continue to work with both the GSL and the
LTTE in the ongoing effort to produce a written
agenda for the next round of talks palatable to
both sides. Solheim told the co-chairs that he
had just received from GSL Peace Secretariat chief
Jayantha Dhanapala "new language" for the agenda
which he will carry to London and share with LTTE
luminary Anton Balasingam (several of Solheim's
colleagues around the co-chair lunch table rolled
their eyes at the mention of the ongoing effort to
find common GSL/LTTE language). Solheim said he
was encouraged by the GSL's decision to go back to
its previous policy to use its helicopters to
facilitate both Norwegian travel to Kilinocchi and
LTTE travel in and out of the country.

Co-Chair Meeting, International Conference
-------------- --------------


12. (C) DCM asked Solheim if Norway thought a co-
chairs meeting early in the New Year would be useful.
Solheim said he thought it absolutely essential. He
said two key agenda items ("off the top of my head")
would be: 1) given that the peace process is clearly
going to take much longer than originally thought in
the "optimism of Tokyo," how should co-chairs "position
themselves for the long haul?;" 2) given that no
real peace talks are imminent, should co-chairs call
attention of broader donor community to paragraph 18
of Tokyo declaration which links aid to peace
progress?


13. (C) Japanese Ambassador Suda and Dutch Ambassador
Blankhart said their governments (and in Blankhart's
case, the European Union) thought a co-chairs meeting
imperative. They thought Solheim's agenda suggestions
were valid although both (especially Suda) were
uncomfortable with a "paragraph 18" discussion that
was "only negative." Suda said it was important
that the promise of more aid be used as a carrot
rather than using an implied aid cutback as a "stick."
Suda also commented that a co-chair meeting should
involve "real substance" rather than just having a
meeting in order to issue a statement. There was
also general agreement that, depending on the co-chair
meeting and events on the ground, it might be useful
to have the larger "international donors conference"
that Solheim had mentioned in his meeting with donors
and IFIs earlier in the week later on in the first
quarter of 2005, although there was no need to get
into that until after the co-chairs meeting.


14. (C) Solheim suggested (with the other co-chairs
nodding) that it would be best, given the transition
in Washington, if the U.S. could suggest dates and
location which would accommodate Deputy Secretary
Armitage's schedule. DCM agreed to convey that
suggestion back to Washington.

Comment
--------------


15. (C) The Norwegians have taken their licks lately
but plan to keep on keeping on. Solheim clearly views
this as a years-long process but one to which his
government is firmly committed. Obviously in this
situation where it is so difficult to get talks
underway, maintenance of the ceasefire is a priority.
Solheim and his Norwegian colleagues tend to take an
optimistic view on this issue, always stating that
"neither side wants a return to war." That is probably
true, but needs some qualification. On the Tiger side,
no one really knows what Prabhakaran is thinking. We
remember that at the time of the Karuna breakaway, the
Tigers assured the Norwegians that they would not take
any dramatic action--and a few weeks later they
commenced a military operation against Karuna. For its
part, the GSL seems increasingly anxious. Our DATT will
report separately on a "war planning" meeting held
recently with service commanders and the President.
We are certainly not predicting imminent war, but
we do think the situation is more troublesome than
the Norwegians want to admit.
LUNSTEAD